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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impacts of Recent Tax Legislation on Dividend Policy  
and Investment. (May 2007) 
George Ryan Huston, B.B.A.; M.S., Texas A&M University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael Kinney 
 
This dissertation examines firms’ reactions to two changes in tax law intended to 
increase dividend payout and capital investment, the Job Creation and Worker 
Assistance Act (JCWAA) of 2002 and the Jobs Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
(JGTRRA) of 2003. Chapter IV assesses whether firms assuage agency conflicts 
between management and shareholders created by changes in individual-level taxes on 
dividends, focusing on the impact of board independence on changes in management 
compensation and dividend policies.  Data analyses suggest that greater board 
independence mitigates the effects of both CEO stock and option holdings on dividend 
increases.  Additionally, firms appear to implicitly dividend-protect options through 
increased cash compensation, effectively reimbursing CEOs for decreases in option 
value.  Firms that did not increase dividends in the first year following the passage of 
JGTRRA decreased option grants to induce greater future dividend payouts. 
Chapter V examines the relation between contemporary dividend increases and 
future earnings around JGTRRA. Specifically, I investigate whether firms increase 
dividends in response to shareholder demands, and I examine the market reaction to pre- 
and post-JGTRRA dividend changes.  In addition, I focus on the dividend policies of 
 iv
growth firms, testing between firm maturation (Grullon et al. 2002) and tax-based 
explanations. Results suggest that dividends are less explanatory as to future earnings in 
the post-JGTRRA period.  Post-JGTRRA dividend increases by growth firms are 
consistent with tax motives rather than firm maturation because growth firms paying 
dividends have greater investment in the post-JGTRRA period. 
Chapter VI examines the effects of JCWAA and JGTRRA provisions enacted to 
increase business capital expenditures through increased depreciation allowances. I 
develop a model to predict what firms’ capital expenditures would have been in the 
absence of these acts, comparing the actual and predicted values. I find firms 
significantly increased purchases of qualified assets but decreased nonqualified asset 
purchases, netting only a marginal overall increase in capital expenditures. Finally, I 
examine the impact of these acts on leasing transactions, finding that low marginal tax 
rate firms significantly increased use of operating leases following the passage of 
JCWAA, whereas firms with higher MTRs decreased lease transactions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: IMPACT OF RECENT TAX LEGISLATION 
In the past four years, the Bush Administration has signed into law two tax 
provisions that changed the landscape of corporate and individual taxation.  First, the Job 
Creation and Worker Assistance Act (JCWAA) of 2002 created a 30 percent first-year 
bonus depreciation allowance for new property with a recovery life of at most 20 years 
acquired between September 10, 2001 and September 11, 2004.  Second, the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) extended the JCWAA depreciation 
provisions, and more importantly, substantially reduced the individual tax rate for 
qualifying dividends.  In this dissertation, I examine the impact of these changes in tax 
legislation on firms’ dividend policy and investment decisions. 
This dissertation is structured as three papers.  Chapter IV examines the impact 
of reduced shareholder-level dividend taxes from JGTRRA on firms’ dividend decisions.  
The act creates a natural setting for studying the effects of classic agency conflicts 
between shareholders and management resulting from the change in individual 
investors’ demand for dividends and the impact of dividends on management stock 
options.  The conflict arises specifically from the increase in option compensation over 
the past twenty years- stock options now account for more than half of total CEO 
compensation in the largest U.S. companies (Rappaport 1999), and increases in 
dividends diminish the value of these options.  According to Jensen, Murphy and Wruck  
(2004, p. 30), “since well-designed management compensation policies cannot resolve 
_______________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
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all conflicts of interest and agency problems between executives and the firm, well-
designed corporate governance systems implemented by directors of high integrity must 
be in place to resolve those conflicts that cannot be handled by remuneration policies 
alone.” 
I attempt to determine whether and how firms attempt to assuage the agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders created by JGTRRA, specifically 
focusing on the impact of board independence.  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) find that 
stock and option compensation for directors has increased over time; for this reason, I 
determine if increased equity and option compensation for directors aligns the financial 
interests of managers and directors, giving management a better chance to act 
opportunistically to the detriment of other shareholders.  Opportunistic behavior in the 
case of JGTRRA could result in some firms increasing dividends too much (resulting in 
the expropriation of wealth from the firm) or not increasing dividends enough (resulting 
in the underutilization of shareholder tax benefits) depending on firms’ and managers’ 
particular characteristics.  While many of the initial studies of JGTRRA look at firms 
increasing dividends following the act, I add to the stream of literature by also focusing 
on firms not increasing dividends after the passage of the act. 
In addition to examining the impact of JGTRRA on dividend policy, I examine 
changes in management compensation schemes following the passage of the act.  I 
specifically determine whether firms implicitly dividend-protect management option 
wealth through increased stock or cash (through bonuses) compensation.  Next, I 
examine whether firms that did not initially increase dividends decreased option grants 
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following JGTRRA to induce management to increase dividends and whether changes in 
compensation induce managers to increase dividends.  After looking at the main effects 
of each type of compensation change, I look at the impact of board independence to 
determine if more independent boards are more likely to change compensation contracts 
to assuage the agency conflicts created by JGTRRA. 
Chapter V examines the relation between contemporary dividend increases and 
future profitability.  Signaling theory (Ross 1977; Bhattacharya 1979, 1980) argues that 
because dividends are costly, only strong firms with good future expectations can afford 
to pay them.  Empirical evidence generally suggests that dividend increases coincide 
with strong past and current profits, but yields only mixed evidence as to whether firms 
also sustain future profitability levels (Healy and Palepu 1988; Bernatzi et al. 1997; 
Nissim and Ziv 2001).  I provide a cleaner test between traditional signaling arguments 
and tax arguments for dividend payments by comparing past, concurrent, and future 
earnings levels for firms increasing dividend payments both before and after the passage 
of JGTRRA.  The tax argument is supported if the correlation between dividends and 
earnings drops in the period after the passage of JGTRRA, as firms would be increasing 
dividends with fewer earnings to support these increases, taking advantage of the 
temporary tax benefits. 
In this same context, past research has ignored contextual variables that are 
potentially important in interpreting the economic significance of dividend increases.  
For example, the literature does not differentiate between dividend increases for growth-
oriented and mature firms.  I extend this literature by testing the future earnings 
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implications of dividend increases for firms of varying growth rates to determine if there 
is a firm maturation explanation inherent in dividend increases (Grullon et al. 2002).   
Finally, I examine the market reaction to announcements of dividend increases to 
determine if JGTRRA changed the market interpretation of dividend payouts.  If the 
market reaction to dividend increases diminishes after JGTRRA, this evidence might be 
consistent with a tax argument that dividend increases are based on tax benefits as 
opposed to expected future earnings.  However, this evidence might also be consistent 
with a market expectation that dividend increases are transitory, as the tax-advantaged 
dividend provisions of JGTRRA end in 2008. 
In Chapter VI, I study firms’ responses to JCWAA, specifically looking at firms’ 
expenditures on both advantaged and non-advantaged assets. In addition, I look at cross-
sectional differences among firms’ expenditures, examining the impacts of loss positions 
and international holdings. After determining whether the acts had their intended effects 
on advantaged asset purchases, I examine two potentially unintended side effects of the 
acts. First, I investigate whether firms increased capital asset purchases or simply shifted 
the categories of assets purchased to utilize the benefits of the acts. Second, I observe 
whether firms accelerated their intended first quarter 2003 investments into the fourth 
quarter of 2002 to take full advantage of the NOL carryback provisions that ended in 
2002 and whether they increased fourth quarter 2004 spending before the bonus 
depreciation provisions ended. Kinney and Trezevant (1993) find that firms maximize 
the present value of investment-related tax shields by placing these investments in 
service during the fourth quarter of the current year rather than the first quarter of the 
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following year, and I expect to find a similar effect for depreciable asset additions. 
Similarly, Maydew (1997) finds evidence of intertemporal income shifting by firms with 
NOL carrybacks in response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.   
After looking at the acts’ impacts on depreciable asset spending, I examine the 
acts’ impacts on firms’ leasing transactions for firms in varying marginal tax rate 
classes.  Conventional lease models predict that firms with low marginal tax rates use 
more leases relative to firms with high marginal tax rates (Graham, Lemmon and 
Schallheim, 1997).  The provisions of JCWAA and JGTRRA could have two separate 
effects on leasing transactions.  The provisions increase the tax benefits for the lessor on 
qualified purchases, potentially leading higher marginal tax rate firms to increase 
qualified purchases during the bonus depreciation period.  According to Graham et al. 
(1997), “Leasing by the low tax-rate firm is favored when (i) the depreciation tax shield 
is received early in the lease term, (ii) the taxable gain on the sale of the asset is 
relatively small, (iii) larger lease payments occur later in the lease term, or (iv) the 
before-tax discount is high.”  While (ii) through (iv) are difficult to test, the increased 
depreciation provisions obviously move the depreciation tax shield forward in the lease 
term.  However, the extended NOL carryback provisions in 2002 could lead firms with 
current-year losses (likely lower MTR firms) to decrease rental transactions in favor of 
purchasing assets outright. 
I believe that this dissertation is of interest to many parties.  First, this 
dissertation extends tax literature using the Scholes et al., (2002) framework.  The 
Scholes et al. (2002) framework acknowledges that tax strategies do not always explain 
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firms’ decisions, as other costs may outweigh the tax benefits of a transaction.  In the 
case that firms respond to the tax acts inconsistently with tax incentives, it is imperative 
to determine which other costs drive firm behavior.  This dissertation is also of interest 
to researchers in finance, as a number of finance theories are inherent in the empirical 
tests (e.g. agency theory and signaling).  In addition, these papers are of value to 
regulators, who are interested in understanding the implications of changes in tax law, 
and whether firms’ responses are consistent with the intent of these laws. 
This dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter II briefly describes the 
provisions of each of the two acts.  Chapter III reviews the relevant literature for each of 
the three papers.  In Chapters IV through VI, I outline the hypotheses, data, and 
methodology used in each of the three papers.  In Chapter VII, I summarize the findings 
of this dissertation and conclude. 
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 CHAPTER II 
 
BACKGROUND: THE TWO ACTS 
 
Figure A presents the timeline of events surrounding the passage of the two acts 
and the specific dates for firms to receive benefits under the acts. Congress passed 
JCWAA in March 2002, and its provisions were implemented retroactively to 2001 tax 
returns. Although the Act applied retroactively to 2001, firms had no knowledge of the 
Act in 2001. Thus, the first possible response to the provisions of JCWAA occurred in 
2002. For this reason, I test for changes in 2002, using 2000 and 2001 as control years. 
To test the impact of JGTRRA’s 50 percent allowance, I compare the increases from the 
JCWAA period to the JGTRRA period, which began in May 2003. 
Before the passage of JCWAA, firms could carry tax losses back two years or 
forward fifteen years. Because of JCWAA provisions, firms could carry FY 2001 and 
FY 2002 tax losses as far back as five years. Firms continued to have the option to carry 
losses back two years or forward fifteen years based on their determination of the 
present value of the benefits of these losses.1 
Appendix A outlines the criteria for firm expenditures to qualify for the 30 
percent bonus depreciation allowance. Generally, any newly purchased property with a 
recovery life of less than 20 years (all property except land and buildings) placed in 
                                                 
1 A firm’s decision as to whether it carries losses forward or backward is a function of three variables: 
first, the firm must determine its marginal tax rate in the year(s) to which it could carry back current 
losses. Second, it must estimate future marginal tax rates to which it could carry forward current losses. 
Finally, it must compare the present value of the losses carried forward to the benefits of carrying the 
losses back. 
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service between September 11, 2001 and September 10, 2004 that has at least 50 percent 
business usage qualifies for the 30 percent allowance. 
On May 28, 2003, President Bush signed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) into law.  The main provision of this law was the 
reduction of individual tax rates for qualifying dividends to the tax rate for long-term 
capital gains.  The provisions of this act are effective from May 5, 2003 until December 
31, 20102 when a sunset provision in the law will take effect.   
This rate reduction alleviates one of the main costs associated with dividend 
payments and creates a scenario in which dividends could become tax-advantaged 
income sources.3  Furthermore, the act creates an historic opportunity to study drivers of 
dividend policy because dividends and long-term capital gains have received equal tax 
treatment only one other time since the inception of the U.S. income tax. 
                                                 
2 The original JGTRRA provisions were effective until December 31, 2008; however the passage of the 
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2006 (TIPRA) extended these provisions for an 
additional two years. 
3 Under the JGTRRA provisions, dividends are taxed at long-term capital gain rates.  They are tax 
advantaged relative to short-term (held less than one year) capital gains, which are treated as ordinary 
income.   It is also important to note that the drawback of dividends relative to capital gains relates to the 
fact that an investor can choose not to sell the stock, delaying the taxable capital gain; dividends create 
taxable income when they are paid. 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) derive the optimal firm-level dividend strategy 
under the assumptions of frictionless capital markets, rational investors, perfect 
investment certainty, and share price decreasing proportionally to per share dividend 
payout.  Miller and Modigliani begin with a simple model that equates sources of funds 
(financing inflows and profits) to uses of funds (investment and dividends).  In this 
stylized setting, Miller and Modigliani prove that dividend payout is irrelevant in the 
valuation of a firm.  Much of the subsequent theoretical and empirical research on 
dividend policy has focused on the effects of relaxing the Miller and Modigliani 
assumptions. 
There have been many arguments leading to the conclusion that firms should not 
pay dividends, including individual-level taxation and the opportunity costs associated 
with dividend payments.  In this section, I discuss the prior literature providing reasons 
for paying dividends or making other interim payments to shareholders, (e.g., share 
repurchases).  The reasons include agency costs, signaling or information asymmetries, 
and individual preferences and behavioral explanations for dividends. 
Information Effects, Agency Costs and Signaling 
 
The information effects and signaling theories of dividend policy have roots in 
the Miller and Modigliani (1961) irrelevance proposition.  If dividends are irrelevant as 
the proposition suggests, researchers questioned why some firms consistently pay 
dividends and why markets react to those payments.  The signaling or information 
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content hypothesis contends that managers provide observable information that 
stockholders can use to make inferences about unobservable trends.  Its reasoning is 
based on the administrative and financial cost of paying dividends, implying that only 
strong firms can use dividends to signal the market.  Alternatively, management may 
create dishonest or distorted signals to dupe investors into overvaluing stock prices 
based on false expectations. 
Ross (1977) relaxes the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance 
proposition by assuming that management possesses information that outside investors 
do not possess.  Management creates a signal through both capital structure and dividend 
policies to convey private information to the outside market.  Bhattacharya (1979, 1980) 
extends the theoretical work in the area of dividend signaling, to explain why firms pay 
dividends in spite of the obvious tax disadvantages.  Similar to Ross (1977), 
Bhattacharya (1979) assumes information asymmetry between management and outside 
shareholders.  He also assumes that the value of the firm is a function of cash flows 
distributed by the firm in the form of dividends and a terminal liquidation value.  From 
this assumption, Bhattacharya discusses the “bird in hand” explanation: investors prefer 
the surety of current dividend payments to the terminal or liquidating value of the firm.  
Bhattacharya (1980) models the “information content” hypothesis of dividends, 
demonstrating that corporate dividends are an ex ante signal of future earnings.  
Miller and Rock (1985) also explain dividend policy under the assumption of 
asymmetric information between managers and outside shareholders, suggesting that the 
market uses dividend announcements to form new estimates of expected future earnings. 
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Gonedes (1978) and Charest (1978) provide empirical evidence on the signaling 
value of dividend changes and extraordinary components of accounting income to 
determine if investors behave as though these numbers were effective signals.  They find 
evidence inconsistent with the view that the annual dividend signals reflect information 
beyond that reflected in contemporaneous annual income signals.  Richardson, Sefcik, 
and Thompson (1986) also examine signaling theory using 192 firms announcing their 
first cash dividend and find an increase in trading volume and firm value around the 
announcement date.  Bajaj and Vijh (1990) examine more than 8,500 dividend changes, 
determining that price reactions to dividend increases (decreases) are significantly more 
positive (negative) for higher yield stocks.  Additionally, they find that the price reaction 
is larger for low-priced and small-firm stocks, and they hypothesize that this reaction is a 
result of the information environment of smaller firms.   
The preceding papers generally focus on an empirical context of dividend 
increases, but the other side of the signaling hypothesis relates to firms’ choices to 
decrease or omit dividend payments.  Christie (1994) tests the theoretical view that 
dividend omissions will produce a larger average decline in stock price than will 
reductions of less than 100 percent.  Christie’s results suggest that omissions do not 
create the most severe price decreases, as prices fall an average of 4.95% for less than 20 
percent reductions, whereas reductions over 60 percent cause average declines of only 
8.78%.  This relation between price drops and reductions in dividend payouts is similar 
to the penalties associated with missing analyst earnings targets or other benchmarks.  
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DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) examine a set of firms experiencing financial 
distress to identify reasons for dividend policy adjustments.  They find that more than 
half of their sample faced binding debt covenants in the year they reduced dividends, 
consistent with the agency view that debt covenants impact dividend policy.  DeAngelo 
et al. (1992) analyze the relation between dividend reductions and losses and find that an 
annual loss is a necessary but not sufficient condition for dividend reductions in firms 
with established earnings and dividend records.  They find that dividend-decreasing 
firms tend to have continuing earnings difficulties as opposed to one-time earnings 
difficulties.  DeAngelo et al. (1996) examine a subset of firms whose annual earnings 
decline after nine or more consecutive years of earnings growth, focusing on dividend 
decisions in the year of earnings decline.  They find little support for the signaling 
hypothesis, lending support to the idea that management is overly optimistic about future 
growth prospects and mistakenly sends favorable dividend signals.   
Easterbrook (1984) applies an agency-cost perspective to firms’ dividend 
policies, assuming that managers are perfect agents of investors.  Much of the agency 
theory literature focuses on aligning managers’ interests with those of investors (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976).  Easterbrook asks whether dividends are a method of aligning 
managers’ interests with investors, contending that dividends exist because they 
influence firms’ financing policies by disgorging cash and inducing firms to float new 
securities.  This periodic return to the markets acts as a form of monitoring, as managers 
must continuously provide evidence of financial stability and growth to receive 
additional capital.   
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On the other hand, Myers (1984) extends the “pecking order” theory, stating that 
firms can optimize capital structure by financing investments through minimizing 
asymmetric information and other financing costs.  To minimize these costs, firms 
should first use retained earnings, then safe debt, then risky debt, and finally equity 
financing.  Myers does not address why firms pay dividends per se, but Fama and French 
(2000) argue that pecking order considerations are prominent in affecting firms’ 
dividend decisions. 
Easterbrook (1984) also discusses risk aversion by managers who have a large 
portion of their portfolios tied to the performance of the firm’s stock.  Managers can 
control the level of risk in their employer’s stock by paying dividends and not choosing 
risky, low net present value projects.  
Jensen (1986) argues that managers often improperly reinvest free cash flows in 
negative net present value (NPV) projects (empire building) rather than returning it to 
investors.  Empirical evidence suggests that large cash reserves hinder firm performance 
(Harford 1999; Mikkelson and Partch 2003).  Blanchard et al. (1994) examine a subset 
of firms receiving cash windfalls, finding that firms increase investment, frequently 
creating divestitures or other negative NPV projects, despite the fact that their 
investment opportunity set has not changed.  The firm life cycle argument works with 
the agency free cash flow arguments, as Grullon et al. (2002) show that dividend 
changes are often a sign of firm maturity, consistent with diminished investment 
opportunities.   
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In summary, signaling and agency cost explanations for dividends provide 
intriguing arguments concerning the rationale for dividend payouts.  However, empirical 
results show ambiguous support for these explanations. 
Behavioral Finance and Shareholder Demands 
  
Along with information effects, agency costs, and signaling, there are a number 
of other potential explanations for firms’ payment of dividends.  Shefrin and Statman 
(1984) utilize behavioral theories to explain dividend payments, specifically drawing 
upon the theory of self-control outlined by Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Shefrin and Statman assert that dividends and 
capital gains, even in the absence of taxes and transactions costs, may not be perfect 
substitutes as investors may prefer having periodic dividend payments to large returns of 
capital in the form of capital gains because of self-control difficulties.  Additionally, they 
set up a framing argument similar to Kahneman and Tversky, suggesting that investors 
prefer having $2 today and a 50-50 chance of $54 or $50 tomorrow over nothing today 
and a 50-50 chance of $56 or $52 tomorrow.  Dong, Robinson, and Veld (2003) submit a 
questionnaire to Dutch investors to ascertain why individual investors want dividends.  
Their empirical results do not confirm the theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) for cash 
dividends, as they indicate that investors tend not to consume a large part of their 
dividends.  However, they find that transactions costs are an important reason for 
individuals to appreciate dividends because investors view dividends as a cost-efficient 
way to realize capital gains.   
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Brennan and Thakor (1990) create a theoretical model of choice between 
dividends and share repurchases.  Their model suggests that despite preferential tax 
treatment for capital gains relative to dividends, a majority of shareholders may support 
a dividend payment for small distributions.  However, for larger distributions, 
shareholders prefer an open market stock repurchase, with tender offer repurchases 
dominating the largest distributions. 
Tax clientele theory (Scholes et al., 2002) suggests that taxpayers in higher tax 
brackets prefer tax-advantaged assets (i.e. municipal bonds), and taxpayers in lower tax 
brackets are more likely to invest in non-tax-advantaged assets.  Dividend arbitrage 
theory assumes that the equilibrium price will leave buyers and sellers indifferent as to 
whether they buy or sell before or after the ex-dividend date.   
Perez-Gonzalez (2002) examines the characteristics of firms’ large shareholders, 
finding that dividend payouts increase when dividend income is less tax-disadvantaged 
relative to capital gains when the shift in tax regime is applicable to large shareholders.  
He also uses ex-dividend day analysis demonstrating that there are significant increases 
in the valuation of dividend income for those firms with individual large shareholders in 
periods when dividends are tax-advantaged.  These results create an interesting 
perspective on the tax-clientele hypothesis, as they provide evidence that firms respond 
to the tax demands of large shareholders.   
Graham and Kumar (2004) examine the investment accounts of more than 
60,000 retail investors, finding that retail investors prefer non-dividend paying stocks to 
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dividend paying stocks.  However, older and lower-income investors prefer high 
dividend stocks, consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis outlined by Pettit (1977). 
It is argued that large corporations prefer dividend-paying stocks because such 
corporations are allowed a significant tax deduction for dividends they receive.  Barclay, 
Holderness and Sheehan (2003) use trades of large share blocks to determine if corporate 
shareholders truly prefer high-dividend paying stocks, consistent with clientele theory.  
They find no evidence that corporate shareholders buy higher-dividend paying stock and 
no evidence that dividend payouts increase after a corporation buys a large block of a 
company’s stock, suggesting that dividend policy appears to be a secondary 
consideration for inter-corporate investment decisions.  Similarly, Grinstein and 
Michaely (2003) and Jain (2003) find that institutions avoid stock of firms that pay no 
dividends, but they prefer stock of firms that pay fewer dividends and repurchase shares 
on a regular basis.  These results also contradict clientele theory models suggesting that 
institutions, which pay no individual level taxes, prefer high dividend yield stocks. 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) create a “catering theory” of dividends, assuming that 
(1) some investors have an uninformed or time-varying demand for dividend-paying 
stocks, (2) arbitrage fails to prevent this demand from driving apart the prices of payers 
and non-payers, and (3) managers rationally cater to investor demands, paying dividends 
when investors pay higher prices for payers and not paying when investors prefer non-
payers.  They suggest that dividends are relevant to share price but in different directions 
at different times, potentially consistent with tax clientele theory. 
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Additionally, a number of studies focus on the effects of managerial incentives 
on firms’ dividend policies.  Fenn and Liang (2001) find that management stock 
ownership is positively associated with higher dividend payments, but management 
stock options correlate negatively to dividend payout.  This trend is especially likely for 
firms with the greatest potential for agency problems (i.e. few investment opportunities 
and high free cash flow).  Nam, Wang, and Zhang (2004) find that managerial stock 
holdings have a positive effect on the likelihood and extent of dividend increases 
subsequent to JGTRRA. 
In sum, the behavioral finance literature creates an interesting explanation for 
why firms pay dividends.  However, the behavioral finance literature lacks a consensus 
as to whether these theories have any long-term predictive ability.  The shareholder 
demand literature creates a number of potential implications, especially considering the 
impact of JGTRRA on individual level dividend taxes. 
Trends in Dividend Policy Pre-JGTRRA 
In this section, I outline research regarding trends in firms’ dividend policies, 
which is dominated by studies documenting share repurchases as a substitute for paying 
cash dividends.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that share repurchases have become 
an important form of earnings distribution for U.S. firms, as firms finance their share 
repurchases with funds that would have otherwise been used to increase dividends.  In 
1983, the SEC approved Rule 10b-18, which provided a safe harbor for corporate share 
repurchases, significantly increasing repurchase activity.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
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document that repurchases are the preferred form of disgorging cash, specifically for 
younger firms. 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) measure firms’ usage of stock 
repurchases and dividends, finding they are used at different times and by firms with 
differing characteristics.  Stock repurchases are pro-cyclical, whereas dividends tend to 
increase over time.  Firms with higher permanent operating cash flows are more likely to 
pay dividends, whereas firms with higher temporary, non-operating cash flows are more 
likely to make stock repurchases, consistent with signaling theory.  Firms tend to 
repurchase stock following downturns in stock price, but they increase dividends 
following good earnings performance. 
There have been significant changes in the landscape of dividend payments over 
the past twenty years.  Fama and French (2001) find that firms are less likely to pay 
dividends, reporting that the proportion of firms paying cash dividends has fallen from 
66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999.  Although this result is due in part to changing 
characteristics of publicly traded firms and the technology boom, they find that this 
result holds after controlling for firm characteristics.  Fama and French also find that 
firms that have never paid dividends are more profitable than are former payers and that 
they have stronger growth opportunities.  However, dividend payers are larger and more 
profitable than firms that have never paid dividends.   
 DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) document another recent trend:   
special, one-time dividends, once commonly paid by firms (almost as consistently as 
“regular dividends”) are now rarely paid.  One might suspect that share repurchases, 
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which the literature suggests are a substitute for regular dividends, have taken the place 
of these special dividend payments as well.   
In summary, share repurchases appear to substitute for dividends for many firms 
because of their flexibility and relative tax advantage.  Yet, many firms continue to pay 
dividends today despite the apparent relative benefits of share repurchases.  The newly 
enacted legislation, lowering dividend tax rates to the same level as rates for long-term 
capital gains, will provide a number of interesting tests of trends regarding the relative 
use of share repurchases, ordinary dividends, and special dividends to distribute wealth 
to shareholders.  
Dividends and Earnings 
 Penman (1983) conducts one of the first tests of the Bhattacharya (1980) 
information content theory, comparing the information content of dividends to 
management earnings forecasts.  Penman suggests, “If dividends function as signals of 
firms’ values, then the information revealed in managements’ earnings forecasts should 
also be reflected in their dividend decisions.”  To create these tests, Penman compares 
earnings forecast errors to prediction errors based on dividend announcements, judging 
the relative information content of the two predictors using the performance of 
investment strategies.  The findings suggest that dividend-based forecasts are more 
accurate than management earnings forecasts for firms with significant dividend 
changes. 
 Healy and Palepu (1988) examine firms initiating and omitting dividend 
payments, specifically looking at earnings performance for five years before and five 
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years after the initiation or omission.  In addition to earnings performance, they test 
whether subsequent earnings changes are related to the information released at the 
dividend announcement and analyze the market’s reaction to earnings announcements 
after the dividend policy change.  Their results indicate that firms initiating (omitting) 
dividends have significant increases (decreases) in their annual earnings for at least one 
year before, the year of, and at least one year after the change in dividend policy.  
Finally, Healy and Palepu find that the market reacts less to unfavorable earnings 
announcements following dividend reductions and omissions than normal, indicating 
that these earnings changes are anticipated by the market at the time of the dividend 
announcement. 
Bernatzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) also test the signaling theory of dividends.  
Their findings suggest that firms increasing dividends in year 0 have significant earnings 
increases for years -1 and 0, but that this does not translate into future earnings growth, 
regardless of the magnitude of dividend increases.  Firms cutting dividends in year 0 
experienced a reduction in earnings in years -1 and 0 but reported significant increases in 
earnings in year 1.  Nissim and Ziv (2001) re-examine the relation between dividend 
changes and alternative measures of future profitability, finding that dividend changes 
correlate positively with future earnings changes, earnings levels, and abnormal 
earnings.    
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CHAPTER IV 
DIVIDENDS AND AGENCY COSTS 
 
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003 reduced 
individual level tax rates on dividends and created demand from individual investors for 
firms to raise dividend payouts (Blouin et al. 2004).  Hence, the act creates a natural 
setting for studying the effects of classic agency conflicts between shareholders and 
management resulting from the change in individual investors’ demand for dividends 
and the impact of dividends on management stock options.  The conflict arises because 
increases in dividends diminish the value of stock options.4  Jensen et al. (2004, 22) state 
that, “because well-designed management compensation policies cannot resolve all 
conflicts of interest and agency problems between executives and the firm, well-
designed corporate governance systems implemented by directors of high integrity must 
be in place to resolve those conflicts that cannot be handled by remuneration policies 
alone.”  
In this paper, I attempt to determine whether and how firms assuage the agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders created by JGTRRA, specifically 
focusing on the impact of board independence.  Core et al. (1999) find that firms with 
lower board independence have greater agency conflicts, leading to higher overall CEO 
compensation and weaker firm performance.  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) find that 
                                                 
4 Option compensation has increased dramatically over the past twenty years; stock options now account 
for more than half of total CEO compensation in the largest U.S. companies (Rappaport 1999).  The 
payment of dividends causes a decrease in the value of the share price by an amount similar to the per 
share amount of the dividend, leading to a decrease in the value of any options held.  While option 
compensation is not as high (mean 47% for the entire sample period, with the lowest annual mean at 42%), 
option compensation is still a significant part of CEOs’ compensation mix. 
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stock compensation for directors has increased over time; for this reason, I determine if 
increased equity compensation for directors aligns the financial interests of managers 
and directors, giving management a better chance to act opportunistically to the 
detriment of outside shareholders.  Theoretically, all directors have a “duty of loyalty” to 
perform in good faith and pursue the best interests of the corporation, avoiding conflicts 
of interest (Doty 2004; Monks and Minow 2004).  However, inside directors have dual 
roles as both managers and directors that potentially create conflicts of interest.  Because 
independent directors have only a monitoring role, they should be able to ensure that 
management acts in the best interest of shareholders, curbing opportunistic behavior of 
management.  Opportunistic behavior in the case of this act could lead some firms to 
increase dividends so much as to expropriate wealth from the firm or so little as to 
grossly underutilize the potential shareholder tax benefits.  This variation in response is 
likely related to firms’ and managers’ particular characteristics.  For instance, firms with 
high management share ownership could increase dividends to the point that the growth 
and even the liquidity of such firms could be adversely affected.  Conversely, firms with 
high insider option holdings could keep their individual investors from realizing the tax 
benefits of JGTRRA by not changing dividend payout because of the negative impact on 
their option values.  While many of the initial studies of JGTRRA focus on firms 
increasing dividends following the act, I add to the stream of literature by also focusing 
on firms not increasing dividends after the passage of the act.  The purpose of this 
analysis is not to determine an optimal dividend policy for every firm following 
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JGTRRA, but to examine the agency cost forces affecting dividend policy and the ability 
of board independence to mitigate these forces. 
I create a metric for board independence comprised of relative shares held by 
directors, relative stock paid to directors as compensation, percentage of inside board 
members, percentage of affiliated or gray directors, and a dummy variable if the CEO is 
also a director.  I use regression analysis to determine the impact of board independence 
on firms’ dividend policies.  Along with the metric for board independence, independent 
model variables include insider stock holdings, insider stock options, debt, and control 
variables for firm size, and idiosyncratic risk.  In addition to main effect analysis of the 
impact of board independence, I examine the interactions between board independence 
and insider stock and option holdings.   
Relating to changes in management compensation, I first examine whether 
dividend-increasing firms implicitly protect managers’ option wealth by increasing 
bonuses or other cash compensation and whether firms with greater board independence 
impacts the level of dividend protection of CEO option wealth.  Next, for firms that did 
not initially increase dividends, I determine whether sample firms change the 
compensation structure by increasing cash or stock compensation or decreasing option 
payouts, and I determine if board independence impacts this change in compensation 
structure.    
Data analyses suggest that board independence appears to mitigate the effects of 
both CEO stock and option holdings on dividend increases, as the coefficients for CEO 
stock and option holdings become insignificant when board independence is included in 
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the model.  Firms with greater board independence pay lower dividends and increase 
dividends less than firms with less board independence.  Additionally, firms with greater 
board independence pay their CEOs less both in bonuses and total cash compensation, 
consistent with the findings of Core et al. (1999).   
Compensation analyses suggest that the cross-section of firms examined in this 
paper appear to implicitly dividend-protect CEO option wealth, as dividend-increasing 
firms with greater CEO option sensitivity (how sensitive CEO option portfolios are to 
changes in stock price) increase bonuses and total cash compensation to effectively 
reimburse CEOs for the decrease in option value, holding constant other variables 
commonly associated with compensation.  Additionally, firms with greater board 
independence appear to protect options from increases in dividends through increases in 
bonuses and other cash compensation than better firms with lower board independence.  
Finally, I find that firms not increasing dividends in the first year following the passage 
of JGTRRA decrease option grants, specifically for firms with greater CEO option 
sensitivity.  Although this is true of the cross-section of firms, firms with greater board 
independence decrease option grants more than firms with less board independence. 
This paper is relevant to multiple streams of literature in both finance and 
accounting.  First, this paper extends the agency cost literature by examining the tension 
between CEO stock and option holdings and shareholder demands for dividends.  To my 
knowledge, this is the first paper to determine whether firms implicitly dividend-protect 
CEO stock option wealth.  Second, this paper extends the compensation literature by 
examining the impact of various compensation metrics and their interactions with 
 25
dividend policy.  Additionally, this paper extends the dividend and tax literatures by 
examining the impacts of taxes in the context of agency costs by examining the reasons 
firms would not react to the change in tax policy.   Finally, this paper extends the 
corporate governance literature by examining the ability of board independence to 
mitigate agency costs associated with dividend policy. 
This paper is organized as follows: section II provides background about 
JGTRRA and previous literature examining the effects of the act.  Section III develops 
hypotheses, section IV discusses the models used in the paper, section V describes the 
results found, and section VI concludes. 
Background 
 
On May 28, 2003, President Bush signed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) into law.  The main provision of this law reduced 
individual tax rates for qualifying dividends to the tax rate for long-term capital gains in 
order to boost dividend payout, thereby spurring economic growth and reducing 
excessive earnings retention (Brown et al. 2005).  Upon signing JGTRRA, President 
Bush hailed the act saying that, “This [act] will encourage more companies to pay 
dividends, which, in itself, will not only be good for investors, but will be a corporate 
reform measure because it is hard to pay dividends unless you actually have cash flow.”  
The provisions of JGTRRA are effective from May 5, 2003 until December 31, 20105; 
thereafter, dividend tax rates return to ordinary income rates. This rate reduction 
                                                 
5 The original JGTRRA provisions were effective until December 31, 2008; however the passage of the 
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2006 (TIPRA) extended these provisions for an 
additional two years. 
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mitigates the tax costs associated with dividend payments creating an historic 
opportunity to study drivers of dividend policy because this is the first time that 
dividends and long-term capital gains have received equal tax rate treatment since the 
inception of the U.S. income tax.6 
Preliminary evidence on firms’ initial responses to JGTRRA indicates that firms 
increased regular and special dividends following the act (Blouin et al. 2004; Julio and 
Ikenberry 2004).  Additionally, firms with greater insider ownership increased dividends 
relative to firms with less insider ownership (Nam et al. 2004; Brown et al. 2005).  
Conversely, insider option holdings have been associated with a lack of response to the 
act (Brown et al. 2005).  All of the evidence showing that firms increased dividends to 
suit the interests of insiders is consistent with the pre-JGTRRA results of Fenn and 
Liang (2001), who find that management stock ownership is associated with higher 
payouts. 
Hypotheses Development 
I begin by determining whether firms implicitly dividend-protect options in both 
the pre-JGTRRA and post-JGTRRA periods.  The main reason that managers with 
options are reluctant to increase dividends relates to the decrease in share price after the 
stock goes ex-dividend and the fact that stock options are not explicitly (stated in the 
management compensation contract) dividend-protected by most firms (Arnold and 
Gillenkirch, 2005).  For this reason, I test whether firms increase bonuses or other cash 
                                                 
6 While there is equal treatment in the tax rates for dividends and capital gains, there remains a difference 
in the timing of taxable events, as it is possible to defer capital gains taxation by deferring the sale of the 
stock, whereas there is no deferral of tax on dividend income. 
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compensation to CEOs to implicitly dividend-protect their option wealth from the value 
decline associated with increases in dividends.  A change in dividend policy may lead to 
an increase in cash compensation to reimburse CEOs for declines in option values 
associated with increases in dividends.  After looking at the main effect to changes in 
compensation, I examine whether board independence impacts firms’ usage of 
compensation changes to alleviate the agency conflict related to CEO option holdings, as 
board independence has been shown to alleviate agency conflicts in other compensation 
matters (Core et al., 1999).  This leads to hypotheses 1a and 1b: 
 H1a: Firms increase bonus or other cash compensation to protect CEO option 
 wealth for increases in dividends when CEOs have option holdings that are 
 highly sensitive to movements in stock price. 
 
H1b: Firms with greater board independence increase bonus or other cash 
 compensation to protect CEO option wealth from increases in dividends. 
 
My next set of hypotheses relates to firms’ responses to the passage of JGTRRA 
both for firms that implicitly protect options and for firms that do not.  Prior literature 
has shown that firms with greater insider ownership increased dividends relative to firms 
with less insider ownership (Nam et al. 2004; Brown et al. 2005).  An increase in 
dividends for managers whose wealth is tied largely to company performance allows 
these managers additional portfolio diversification without a change in their ownership 
percentage in the firm.  Conversely, firms with greater insider option holdings have been 
found to be less likely to increase dividends relative to firms with lower insider option 
holdings (Brown et al. 2005) due to the decrease in option value associated with 
dividend payouts.  The impact of insider stock ownership could lead firms to increase 
dividends so much as to expropriate wealth from the firm, whereas the impact of option 
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holdings could lead firms to smaller (or zero) increases, leading to the underutilization of 
potential shareholder tax benefits. For this reason, I attempt to determine whether board 
independence affects the dividend increase for firms with higher insider ownership in 
H2a; in H2b, I determine whether board independence affects the insensitivity of 
dividend policy to shareholder tax benefits for firms with greater option holdings.  For 
both potential agency conflicts, I expect that board independence will mitigate the 
conflicts associated with the findings of the initial JGTRRA studies (Brown et al. 2005; 
Nam et al. 2004) related to stock and option holdings. 
H2a: As insider share ownership increases, firms with higher board 
 independence increase dividends less than firms with lower board independence. 
 
H2b: As insider option holdings increase, firms with higher board independence 
 have larger dividend increases relative to firms with lower board independence. 
 
Next, I turn my attention to firms that did not increase dividends in the first year 
following the passage of JGTRRA.  I examine firms not increasing dividends in the first 
year because the board of directors sets managerial compensation annually and because 
firms generally do not change dividend policy immediately due to board approval 
requirements.7  Because insider options are thought of as one of the main reasons why 
management would be reluctant to increase dividends, I examine whether firms change 
management compensation, specifically decreasing option grants, as an incentive to 
increase dividend payments.8  This is not to say that firms are decreasing overall CEO 
                                                 
7 Admittedly, using the first year following the act is arbitrary, but firms certainly have ample time to 
change dividend policy in the first year following the passage of JGTRRA. 
8 There are other factors besides insider option holdings that dissuade firms from changing dividend 
payouts, including a need to retain cash to fund growth opportunities, lack of cash, and debt covenants.  
All of these variables are included as model control variables.  In addition, it is possible that firms 
decreased option grants in this period due to potential changes in accounting treatment of stock options 
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compensation, but merely shifting pay from option grants to either cash or stock 
compensation.  A decrease in the number of options issued is a step that could reduce 
managerial resistance to a change in dividend policy, and a shift toward greater stock 
compensation could further reduce such resistance.  While there are potential timing 
issues that add noise to this relationship, this noise only biases against finding results.  
Upon determining if there is a main effect associated with compensation structure 
changes, I determine whether board independence impacts the choice to change 
compensation policy, similar to the above impact of board independence on implicit 
dividend protection.  As in H1b, H2a and H2b, I expect that board independence will 
assuage agency conflicts and lead firms to change compensation policy to encourage 
dividend increases.  This leads to hypotheses 3a and 3b: 
 H3a: Firms not increasing dividends in the first year following the  passage of the 
 JGTRRA decrease option grants to induce managers to increase dividends. 
 
H3b: Among firms not increasing dividends in the first year following the 
 JGTRRA’s passage, firms with greater relative board independence are more 
 likely to decrease option grants to induce managers to increase dividends in the 
 following year. 
 
Data and Research Design 
 
I gather data for this paper from a number of sources for the 2000 through 2004 
sample period.  Table 1, Panel A provides definitions for all variables used in the paper, 
and Table 1, Panel B outlines the data source for all variables.  Dividend and stock 
return data are taken from the CRSP database.  Executive compensation and option data 
                                                                                                                                                
(expensing) associated with FAS 123(R); Johnston and Rock (2006) find that firms voluntarily choosing to 
expense stock options early decrease stock option grants. 
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come from the Execucomp database.  Board independence data come from the Board 
Analyst dataset from the Corporate Library.  Other firm specific data come from the 
Compustat database.  The Board Analyst dataset is the most limited, comprising 7,304 
observations over the sample period.  Among these 7,304 observations, 1,801 
observations have ample data from the other datasets to create the dividend models used 
to test H2a and H2b, and 1,229 observations have enough data to create the 
compensation models used to test H1a and H1b. 
I begin by creating a board independence metric from five separate measures of 
board independence: percentage of shares held by directors, shares received by directors 
annually for their service, percentage of inside directors on the board, percentage of 
affiliated gray directors on the board, and a dummy variable coded as a 1 for firms where 
the CEO serves as a director, and zero otherwise.  I scale the two share variables by the 
maximum among all sample firms, similar to Clement and Tse (2003), creating a level 
between zero and one for both of these variables.  I use the scaling method to create a 
continuous variable bounded by zero and one for each share measure to ensure that there 
is relatively equal weighting9 for each of the five independence measures.  Because a 
higher score for each of these variables is synonymous with less independence, I invert 
each of the continuous variables by subtracting the scaled value from one, such that a 
score of five would denote the highest possible board independence score.  The 
calculation of the independence metric is shown in Model (1): 
                                                 
9 The inclusion of the dichotomous variable for CEO as director and the percentage of inside and gray 
directors, which are between zero and one, necessitate the scaling of the share variables.  Otherwise, the 
size of the share variables would dominate the independence score.  While the measure is somewhat 
arbitrary, the goal is to incorporate multiple measures of board independence to give a better picture of a 
firm’s overall board structure. 
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Indep = f (sharesheldt-1, sharesreceivedt-1, % insiderst-1, %grayt-1, CEO) (1) 
 
where: 
 
Sharesheld   = 1 – (shares held by directors / total shares outstanding) /  
   maximum sample value 
Sharesreceived  = 1 – (annual shares paid to directors / total shares outstanding) /
   maximum sample value 
%Insiders   = 1 – (# Inside Directors / # Total Directors) 
%gray   = 1 – (# Gray or Affiliated Directors / # Total Directors) 
CEO  = dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if CEO is not also a 
director, and zero otherwise 
 
To determine whether firms implicitly dividend-protect CEO option wealth, I 
estimate ordinary least squares regression models of year-over-year compensation 
changes.  The dependent variables include changes in bonus and changes in total cash 
compensation.10  To control for alternative explanations of compensation increases, I use 
a number of economic determinant variables, similar to Core et al. (1999), including 
sales, investment opportunities, return on assets, stock returns, and the standard 
deviations of both return on assets and stock returns.  The focus of these models is on 
insider option sensitivity (Sense)11, which I define as the change in option value for a 1% 
change in stock price, changes in dividends (Chg. Div), and the interaction between 
option sensitivity and dividend changes12, which determines if firms implicitly protect 
                                                 
10 In addition to changes in bonus and total compensation, I examine a number of additional compensation 
variables, including changes in salary, restricted stock, stock option grants.  As a sensitivity test, I also 
scale all compensation variables by total assets; results are qualitatively similar in both measures, but I use 
the unscaled dependent variables to be consistent with Core et al. (1999). 
11 In the compensation models, I use a measure of the sensitivity of option values to changes in stock price, 
as opposed to total number of CEO options, because option sensitivity better determines the wealth effect 
for CEOs associated with a change in stock price.  Obviously, any dividend paid decreases the value of the 
stock price on the ex-dividend date, making this a better measure of how much CEOs lose from the payout 
of a dividend.  Results are qualitatively similar when using either total options or the extent to which CEO 
options are in the money.  
12 To ensure a proper inference between the interaction of option sensitivity and dividend changes, I create 
categorical variables for high (greater than sample median) option sensitivity and for increases in 
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insider options.  A positive coefficient for the interaction term (β11) would support H1a. 
Models (2) and (3) are as follows: 
Chg. Bonus = α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA + β5 Ret + 
   β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops + β9 Chg. Div +  
   β10 Senset-1 + β11 Senset-1 * Chg. Div + ε   (2) 
 
Chg. Total Cash = α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA +  
 β5 Ret + β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops + β9 Chg. Div + 
β10 Senset-1 + β11 Senset-1 * Chg. Div + ε    (3) 
 
where:  
 
Chg. Bonus  = year-over-year changes in CEO bonus from Execucomp 
Chg. Total Cash = year-over-year changes in CEO total cash compensation from 
   Execucomp 
Sales   = log of net sales (Compustat Data Item #12) 
InvOpp  = investment opportunities, calculated by Core et al. (1999) as the 
   average of market to book ratio for the previous five years 
ROA   = return on assets (earnings before interest and taxes [Compustat 
   Data Item #18 + Compustat Data Item #15 + Compustat Data 
   Item #16] divided by average total assets [Compustat Data Item 
   #6]) 
Chg. ROA  = change in return on assets 
Ret   = annual stock return from CRSP 
Chg. Ops  = change in operating income before depreciation (Compustat 
   Data Item #13) 
StdROA  = standard deviation of ROA over the most recent five-year period 
StdRet   = standard deviation of stock return over the most recent five-year 
   period 
Chg. Div  = change in common dividends in millions from CRSP, scaled by 
   total assets (Compustat Data Item #6)13 
Sense   = the sensitivity of CEO option value to a change in stock price, 
   as created by Core and Guay (2002)14 
                                                                                                                                                
dividends (classified as one for dividend increases, and zero otherwise).  Sensitivity analyses yields 
qualitatively similar results regardless of whether changes in dividends or option sensitivity are classified 
as continuous or categorical variables in the interaction terms.  
13 To avoid improper inferences due to differences in sample firms’ choices as to the number of shares 
outstanding, I use common dividends in millions and scale by assets to control for firm size.  In sensitivity 
analyses, I use dividends per share and unscaled dividends, finding that results are qualitatively 
unchanged.  
14 Option sensitivity is calculated for the CEO’s entire portfolio of option holdings, including option 
grants, unexercisable options, and in-the-money options.  Please see the Appendix for the reproduction of 
Appendix A of Core and Guay (2002), which provides the calculation of option sensitivity. 
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Upon determining whether the cross-section of firms implicitly protect option 
wealth from dividend payments, I examine the impact of board independence on implicit 
dividend protection by adding the independence metric, Indep, created in equation (1).  
In addition to the main effect of board independence, I interact Indep with option 
sensitivity, changes in dividends, and the interaction of option sensitivity and changes in 
dividends.  As in Models (2) and (3), I expect a positive coefficient on the interaction 
between option sensitivity and changes in dividends (β12).  In addition, a positive 
coefficient on the three-way interaction (β15) between option sensitivity, changes in 
dividends, and board independence would be consistent with H1b. Models (4) and (5)15 
are as follows: 
Chg. Bonus =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA + β5 Ret + 
   β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg Ops + β9 Chg. Div +  
   β10 Senset-1 + β11 Indep + β12 Senset-1 * Chg. Div +   
   β13 Indep*Chg. Div + β14 Senset-1*Indep +   
   β15 Senset-1 *Chg. Div*Indep + ε    (4) 
 
Chg. Total Cash =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA +  
β5 Ret + β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops +          
β9 Chg. Div + β10 Senset-1 + β11 Indep +          
β12 Senset-1 * Chg. Div + β13 Indep*Chg. Div +          
β14 Senset-1 * Indep +β15 Senset-1 *Chg. Div*Indep + ε  (5) 
 
where: 
 
Indep  = board independence metric calculated in equation (1) 
 
                                                 
15 As a sensitivity test, I run Models (2) through (5) only for firms increasing dividends, taking out the 
interactions between changes in dividends (Chg. Div) and Indep and Sense.  Results are qualitatively 
similar using both measures.   
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Next, I estimate an ordinary least squares regression model to test H2a and H2b 
with dividend changes as the dependent variable.16  I use cash, operating income, interest 
expense, firm size and market to book ratio as control variables17, similar to Brown et al. 
(2005).  I use cash as a control because firms often use dividend payments to decrease 
excessive cash positions.  Because firms must have earnings in order to pay dividends 
and because dividend payments are expected to continue into future periods, I also 
control for operating income.  Interest expense is a proxy for the level of debt that a firm 
carries on its balance sheet, as there are often restrictive dividend covenants attached to 
long-term debt. Market to book ratio controls for firm growth, as growth firms are less 
likely to pay dividends because they need all available cash to pay for future projects. 
The variables of interest in these models, however, are Options18 and Stock; I expect a 
negative correlation between Options and Chg. Div and a positive correlation between 
Stock and Chg. Div., respectively, based on the findings of Brown et al. (2005). Model 
(6) is as follows:  
Chg. Div = α + β1 Cash + β2 Ops + β3 Intexp + β4 Options +   
     β5 Stock + β6 Size + β7 MB + ε      (6) 
 
where: 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 As a sensitivity test, I run these models with dividend levels on the left-hand side and the lagged 
dividend level on the right-hand side.  Results are reported in Tables 5 and 7. 
17 Results are not sensitive to the inclusion of a number of other control variables to proxy for the ability to 
pay dividends, including idiosyncratic risk, growth, and net operating losses. 
18 I use total CEO options to be consistent with Brown et al. (2005) and other models looking at the impact 
of options on dividends.  In addition, I rerun these models using option sensitivity, as calculated by Core et 
al. (1999), and the amount that CEO options are in the money.  Results are qualitatively similar using any 
of the three measures. 
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Chg. Div  = change in common dividends, in millions of dollars, from CRSP, scaled 
  by total assets  (Compustat Data Item #6) 
Cash  = cash and cash equivalents (Compustat Data Item #11), scaled by the 
  maximum sample value 
Ops  = operating income before depreciation (Compustat Data Item #13), 
  scaled by the maximum sample value 
Intexp  = interest expense (Compustat Data Item #15), scaled by the maximum 
  sample value 
Options  = CEO options held from Execucomp, as a percentage of shares  
  outstanding  
Stock   = CEO shares held from Execucomp, as a percentage of shares  
  outstanding 
Size   = total assets (Compustat Data Item #6) 
MB   = market to book ratio (market value of equity [from CRSP] divided by 
  book value [total assets, Compustat Data Item #6 – total liabilities,  
  Compustat Data Item #181] ) 
 
Upon determining that the main effects for Stock and Options are consistent with 
prior studies, I examine the relative impact of board independence on firms’ dividend 
policies, adding the metric for board independence calculated in Model (1), along with 
the interactions between Options and Stock and Indep to Model (6).  A negative 
coefficient for the interaction between Indep and Stock indicates that board 
independence mitigates CEOs ability to increase dividends based on personal share 
holdings, consistent with H2a.  A positive coefficient for the interaction between Indep 
and Options would signify that board independence mitigates CEOs attempts to decrease 
dividend payments based on personal option holdings, consistent with H2b.  Model (7) is 
as follows: 
Chg. Div = α + β1 Cash + β2 Ops + β3 Intexp + β4 Options +   
        β5 Stock + β6 Size + β7 MB + β8 Indep + β9 Indep*Options +  
       β10 Indep*Stock +ε       (7) 
 
 36
To test H3a and H3b, I estimate a regression model using changes in options 
granted, scaled by total assets19, as the dependent variable.  As in Models (2) through 
(5), I control for various economic factors associated with management compensation, 
including sales, investment opportunities, return on assets, stock return, operating 
income, and the volatility of stock returns and return on assets.  The focus of Model (8) 
is on the variable indicating whether firms increased dividends in the preceding year, 
LagDivDum, and the interaction between LagDivDum and option sensitivity (Sense).20  I 
expect a negative coefficient for both variables, consistent with the H3a notion that firms 
not paying dividends in the year following JGTRRA decrease option grants in an effort 
to give management the incentive to increase dividends.  I interact LagDivDum with 
Sense because greater option sensitivity increases CEO option losses when dividends are 
increased, making these firms less inclined to increase dividends. To determine if firms 
decreasing option grants are also increasing other forms of compensation, I include two 
compensation variables, changes in total cash compensation (ChgTCC) and change in 
stock compensation (ChgStock). I expect negative coefficients for ChgTCC and 
ChgStock because I do not expect firms’ changes in compensation to be punitive, but 
simply a change in the compensation mix.   In Model (9), I include the impact of board 
independence on firms’ option grant changes.  The focus of Model (9) is on the three-
way interaction between LagDivDum, Sense, and Indep.  A negative coefficient for this 
term would support H3b, suggesting that firms with greater board independence 
                                                 
19 I use changes in option grants scaled by assets in this model to alleviate the effects of size associated 
with the other compensation variables, changes in cash compensation and changes in stock compensation, 
on the right-hand side. 
20 In addition to using Sense, I also use in-the-money options to proxy for firms whose CEOs are more 
likely to be impacted by dividend increases.  Results are qualitatively similar for both measures. 
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decrease option grants to provide management with the incentive to increase dividends.  
Models (8) and (9) follow: 
Chg. OptGrants =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA +  
β5 Ret + β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops +β9 LagDivDum+ 
 β10 Senset-1 + β11 Senset-1 * LagDivDum + β12ChgTCC +  
 β13 ChgStock + ε         (8) 
 
 Chg. OptGrants =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA +  
   β5 Ret + β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops +   
   β9 LagDivDum + β10 Senset-1 + β11 Senset-1 * LagDivDum +
    β12ChgTCC + β13 ChgStock + β14 Indep +    
   β15 Senset-1 * LagDivDum + β16 Indep*Chg. Div +   
   β17 Senset-1 *LagDivDum*Indep + ε    (9) 
 
where: 
 
Chg. OptGrants  = changes in option grants from Execucomp 
LagDivDum  = 1 if firms did not increase dividends in the year following the 
   passage of JGTRRA 
ChgTCC  = changes in total cash compensation from Execucomp, scaled by 
   total assets (Compustat data item #6) 
ChgStock  = changes in stock compensation, scaled by total assets  
   (Compustat data item #6) 
 
Results 
 
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample period, while 
Table 2, Panel B contains descriptive statistics broken out into pre- and post-JGTRRA 
periods.21  Both mean and median tests were conducted to determine differences in the 
pre- and post-JGTRRA periods.  The most interesting finding in Panel A is that changes 
in dividends are, on average, negative in the sample period.  This is consistent with 
previous literature (DeAngelo et al. 2002) suggesting that dividends are diminishing 
                                                 
21 All sample periods ending after the passage of JGTRRA are considered part of the post-JGTRRA 
period.  Under this classification scheme, the second quarter of 2003 for calendar-year firms is considered 
part of the post-Act period. 
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over time.  Panel B shows that this effect is largely found in the pre-JGTRRA period, as 
changes in dividends are significantly greater in the post-JGTRRA period (to the point 
that post-JGTRRA dividend changes are positive).  It is also interesting to note that 
changes in board independence, Indep, indicate boards are less independent in the post-
JGTRRA period.  This is consistent with previous literature that finds directors are being 
paid more in stock over time.  Panel B also suggests that sample firms are growing over 
time, and they are significantly increasing cash compensation to their CEOs over the 
period.  While CEO options increased slightly in the post-JGTRRA period, CEO stock 
holdings decreased in the post-JGTRRA period. 
 Table 3, Panel A presents bivariate correlations between variables used in the 
compensation models, Models (2) through (5); Panel B presents correlations between 
variables used in the dividend models, Models (6) and (7).   Panel A reports a negative 
association between board independence and changes in bonus and total cash 
compensation, consistent with Core et al. (1999).  Panel B reports a negative association 
between board independence and changes in dividends, stock compensation, and option 
compensation.  For this reason, it is important to control for these factors and test for the 
effects of multicollinearity in multivariate analysis before making any conclusions as to 
the effects of board independence on firms’ dividend policies. 
Table 4 presents results for the compensation change models.  Columns 1 and 2 
present changes in bonuses as the dependent variable, as shown in Models (2) and (4), 
and Columns 3 and 4 present changes in total compensation as the dependent variable, as 
shown in Models (3) and (5).  The explanatory variables used by Core et al. (1999), 
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Sales, Invopp, ROA, Ret, ROAStd, RetStd, and Ops generally have similar coefficients as 
in their paper, albeit somewhat weaker for investment opportunities and operating 
income.  The main effect for option wealth sensitivity, Sense, varies based on whether 
the board independence variables are included in the model, coming in significantly 
positive when the independence variables are excluded and significantly negative when 
these variables are included.  However, the coefficient of interest in Models (2) and (3), 
the interaction between changes in dividends and option wealth sensitivity, is positive 
and significant, consistent with the H1a expectation that firms implicitly protect CEO 
options from increases in dividends by increasing bonuses and total cash compensation. 
 Columns 2 and 4 present the impact of board independence on changes in 
bonuses and total cash compensation as in Models (4) and (5).  As in columns 1 and 3, 
the control variables used by Core et al. (1999) are significant in the expected direction.  
The negative coefficient on the main effect of board independence suggests that firms 
that are more independent make smaller increases in bonuses and total cash 
compensation.  However, the positive coefficient on the three-way interaction term Chg. 
Div* Sense*Indep is consistent with the H1b expectation that more independent firms 
implicitly protect options from changes in dividends by increasing bonuses and total 
cash compensation.  The results are not sensitive to the substitution of other option 
variables for Sense, such as total options or the amount that options are in the money. 
Untabulated sensitivity analysis finds that results are similar when the left-hand side 
variables are scaled by total assets, ensuring that size effects are not dominating the 
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results.  Additionally, results are qualitatively similar when the pre-JGTRRA and post-
JGTRRA periods are examined separately. 
In Table 5, I rerun the compensation models, using levels of bonus (total cash 
compensation) on the left-hand side, adding the lag of bonus (total cash compensation) 
as an additional control variable.  Again, the Core et al. (1999) explanatory variables 
come in significant in their expected directions, and the lagged term is highly significant 
in all four models.  As in Table 4, the interaction between Chg. Div and Sense is positive 
and significant, suggesting that firms with greater option value sensitivity to stock price 
changes that increase dividends pay higher cash compensation and bonuses.  
Additionally, board independence is negatively associated with these compensation 
levels, but firms with greater board independence appear to better protect CEO options 
from dividend increases by paying greater bonuses and cash compensation, holding 
other factors constant, as suggested by the positive coefficient on the three way 
interaction term, Chg. Div*Sense*Indep.    
As an additional sensitivity test, I create a proxy for abnormal total cash 
compensation (TCC) to compare the amount of increase in compensation to the amount 
lost due to decreases in option values.  The abnormal TCC variable is calculated by 
using the coefficients from a regression model using each of the Core et al. (1999) 
economic determinants over the entire 2000 through 2004 sample period, including 
sales, return on assets, stock returns, investment opportunities, and the volatility of stock 
returns and return on assets.  The coefficients are multiplied by actual values of these 
economic determinant variables to create a predicted TCC and the predicted value is 
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subtracted from actual TCC to create the abnormal TCC.  I then divide abnormal TCC 
by the loss from a change in dividends, which is calculated by multiplying the change in 
ordinary dividends per share by the number of options (shares) held by the CEO.  In 
untabulated results, I find that the median ratio of abnormal TCC to option loss from 
changes in dividends is approximately 1.2, which means that the median firm increases 
cash compensation by an amount slightly greater than the decrease in option value.  This 
result also supports H1a, as it appears that firms are increasing cash compensation to 
compensate CEOs for option value decreases associated with increased dividends. 
Table 6 presents the results for Models (6) and (7), for which changes in 
dividends represent the dependent variable.  In Model (6), CEO stock holdings are 
positively associated with changes in dividends, while CEO option holdings are not 
significantly associated with changes in dividends, partially consistent with prior 
findings (Brown et al., 2005).  However, the inclusion of board independence and the 
interactions between board independence and Stock and Options causes the effects of 
stock holdings to become insignificant.  Firms with more independent boards of 
directors appear to make smaller dividend changes, whereas firms with less independent 
boards make greater dividend changes.  While the results are not explicitly consistent 
with H2a and H2b, as the interactions between board independence (Indep) and Stock 
and Options are insignificant, the significance for Indep suggests that board 
independence impacts this agency relation between management share and option 
holdings and dividend policy.  It is important to note that the insignificance of Stock and 
Options is not a function of multicollinearity, as no VIF score in the model exceeded ten.  
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These results are unchanged upon the inclusion of a number of other control variables, 
including idiosyncratic risk, growth, and net operating losses, and results are 
qualitatively similar in both the pre- and post-JGTRRA periods. 
As a sensitivity test, I examine the impact of board independence, CEO stock and 
option holdings on dividend levels, controlling for lagged dividends and the other 
control variables used in Models (6) and (7).  I report results in Table 7.  Consistent with 
Brown et al. (2005), dividend levels are positively associated with Stock and negatively 
associated with Options when Indep is excluded from the model; however, the inclusion 
of Indep mitigates the explanatory power of Stock and Options, suggesting that firms 
with greater board independence not only make smaller dividend changes, but they also 
have lower dividend levels.  As in Table 6, multicollinearity is not an explanation for the 
insignificance of Stock and Options, as VIF scores remain below ten in each model. 
 Table 8 presents the results for Models (8) and (9), which focus on post-
JGTRRA changes in option grants for firms that did not increase dividends in the year 
following the act.  In Model (8), LagDivDum is negative but insignificant; however, the 
interaction between LagDivDum and option sensitivity, Sense, is negative and 
significant, supporting the H3a assertion that firms with high option wealth sensitivity 
not increasing dividends in the year following JGTRRA decreased option grants.  The 
negative coefficient for changes in total cash compensation (ChgTCC) suggests that 
firms decreasing option grants are simply changing the mix of compensation from 
options to cash.  Results for Model (9) are qualitatively similar to Model (8); however, it 
is important to note that firms with greater board independence decrease option grants 
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relative to other firms.  This is particularly the case for firms with greater option value 
sensitivity, as evidenced by the negative coefficient on the three-way interaction 
between LagDivDum, Sense, and Indep.  Overall, the results provide support for H3a and 
H3b.  As an untabulated sensitivity test, I add a categorical variable for whether firms 
voluntarily adopted stock expensing early (McConnell et al. 2004) for FAS 123(R) to 
control for the alternative explanation for decreases in stock option grants found in 
Johnston and Rock (2006); untabulated results for H3a and H3b are unchanged, and the 
early adoption variable is insignificant in all models.  Finally, I examine whether firms 
decreasing option grants subsequently increase dividends; however, these tests did not 
prove conclusive.  
Discussion 
The compensation models presented in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that firms assuage 
the agency costs associated with CEO options by increasing bonus and total cash 
compensation to reimburse CEOs for the reduction in option value associated with 
changing dividend payouts.  Additionally, the inclusion of board independence in these 
models suggests that more independent boards better protect CEO options from the 
reduction in value associated with dividend increases through increases in cash 
compensation.  The results found in Tables 4 and 5 potentially shed light on the reason 
why less independent boards increase dividends.  Because firms appear to implicitly 
protect options, the negative impact of dividends for options is likely weaker than the 
positive impact of dividends for stock holdings. This, combined with the high stock 
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ownership among board members (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2003) potentially aligns the 
motives of management and directors to increase dividends. 
Based on the preceding results, boards of directors appear to have significant 
impact on firms’ dividend and compensation policies, and they appear able to assuage 
agency costs associated with managers’ desire to increase or to decrease dividend levels 
based on their stock or option holdings.  Previous work has found that firms are more 
inclined to increase dividends based on higher management share ownership and are less 
inclined to increase dividends based on greater option holdings.  However, the inclusion 
of board independence mitigates these effects and thereby impacts firms’ dividend 
policies.  The positive association between dividend increases and board shareholding, a 
key component of the board independence metric used in this paper, suggests that paying 
directors with shares ties the motivations of board members and management, leading to 
increased dividend payouts.  For this reason, it appears that firms should exercise caution 
in paying directors in stock, as this might lead to the alignment of the financial interests 
of managers and directors in other circumstances, potentially changing the nature of the 
board’s oversight of management actions.  This is obviously beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it would be an interesting avenue for future governance research. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I attempt to determine whether and how firms assuage the agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders regarding dividend policy, specifically 
focusing on the impact of board independence.  I examine the impact of board 
independence on firms’ changes in dividend policy, focusing on the impact of board 
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independence on CEO option and share holdings.  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) find 
that stock and option compensation for directors has increased over time.  Increased 
equity compensation for directors could potentially align the financial interests of 
managers and directors, giving management a better chance to act opportunistically to 
the detriment of other shareholders.  Opportunistic behavior in the case of JGTRRA 
could result in some firms increasing dividends too much (resulting in the expropriation 
of wealth from the firm) or not increasing dividends enough (resulting in the 
underutilization of shareholder tax benefits), depending on firms’ and managers’ 
particular characteristics.  While many of the initial studies of JGTRRA look at firms 
increasing dividends following the act, I add to the stream of literature by also focusing 
on firms not increasing dividends after the passage of JGTRRA. 
In addition to examining the impact of JGTRRA on dividend policy, I examine 
changes in management compensation schemes following the passage of the act.  I 
specifically determine whether firms implicitly dividend-protect CEO option wealth 
through increased stock or cash (through bonuses) compensation.  After looking at the 
main effects of each type of compensation change, I look at the impact of board 
independence to determine if more independent boards change compensation contracts 
to assuage the agency conflicts created by the act. 
Data analyses suggest that the inclusion of board independence in common 
dividend models appears to mitigate the effects of both CEO stock and option holdings, 
as the coefficients for CEO stock and option holdings are considerably weaker when 
board independence is included.  Firms with greater board independence pay lower 
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dividends and increase dividends less than firms with less board independence.  
Additionally, firms with greater board independence pay their CEOs less both in bonuses 
and total cash compensation.   
Relating to compensation, analyses suggest that the cross-section of firms used in 
this paper appear to implicitly dividend-protect CEOs’ option wealth, as dividend-
increasing firms with greater CEO option sensitivity increase bonuses and total cash 
compensation to reimburse CEOs for the decrease in option value, holding other 
variables commonly associated with compensation constant.  Additionally, when 
breaking out firms with greater board independence, it appears that firms with greater 
board independence better protect options through increases in bonuses and other cash 
compensation than firms with less board independence.  Finally, I find that firms not 
increasing dividends in the first year following the passage of JGTRRA decrease option 
grants, specifically for firms with greater CEO option sensitivity.  While this is true of 
the cross-section of firms, firms with greater board independence decrease option grants 
more than firms with less board independence. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DIVIDENDS AND EARNINGS 
 
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (hereafter JGTRRA) 
reduced individual tax rates for qualifying dividends to the tax rate for long-term capital 
gains for the period beginning May 5, 2003 and ending December 31, 2010. The primary 
purpose of JGTRRA was to reduce excessive corporate earnings retention by 
encouraging higher dividend payouts (Brown et al. 2005), with the secondary 
expectation that an increase in dividends could help to reduce the incidence of corporate 
malfeasance illustrated by numerous recent corporate scandals. Upon signing JGTRRA, 
President Bush stated that, “This Act will encourage more companies to pay dividends, 
which, in itself, will not only be good for investors, but will be a corporate reform 
measure because it is hard to pay dividends unless you actually have cash flow” (Bush 
2002).  
To determine the impact of taxes on firms’ dividend policies, this paper examines 
the relation between contemporary dividend increases and earnings levels and changes 
around the passage of JGTRRA. Specifically, I investigate whether firms increase 
dividends in response to shareholder demands for dividends caused by short-term tax 
incentives or in response to favorable changes in the economic circumstances of the 
firm.  The change in economic circumstance of the firm is central to the question of 
whether firms can sustain higher dividends. While some firms may have increased 
dividends to maximize the value of temporary tax advantages, other firms may have 
chosen to increase dividends only modestly so that the higher dividend could be 
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maintained indefinitely. This latter strategy would provide a hedge against stock price 
effects associated with future dividend decreases or omissions (Christie 1994).  
To determine whether firms’ changes in dividend policy are a result of either 
increased shareholder demand for dividends or a favorable change in their economic 
circumstances, I begin by determining whether dividends can predict earnings equally 
well before and after JGTRRA. In addition to dividend-based forecasts, I examine the 
relative earnings persistence of dividend-increasing firms both before and after 
JGTRRA. A decline in the capacity of dividends to predict earnings and in earnings 
persistence for dividend-increasing firms following JGTRRA supports the proposition 
that firms temporarily increased dividends to take advantage of tax incentives. If a 
dividend change is temporary and implemented to exploit the new tax law, prior research 
suggests that a negative market price effect could follow a future dividend reduction 
(Christie 1994).22 
I examine pre- and post-JGTRRA market reactions to dividend announcements 
to determine whether the market expects post-JGTRRA dividend increases to be 
temporary, as if associated with tax incentives or to reflect a change in firm economic 
status and outlook. A less positive market response to post-JGTRRA dividend 
announcements relative to pre-JGTRRA announcements would be consistent with the 
notion that the market interprets post-JGTRRA dividend increases to be in response to 
                                                 
22 The sunset provision attached to JGTRRA provides an interesting question as to how the market will 
react to dividend reductions when the JGTRRA benefits expire.  Past research has shown that dividend 
reductions and omissions are viewed negatively by the market (Christie 1994); however, a tax-oriented 
rationale for dividend reductions associated with the end of temporary tax benefits could mitigate the 
market reaction.   I do not speculate as to what the future market reaction will be, but I acknowledge that 
firms will be cognizant of the penalties associated with future dividend reductions when making dividend 
changes in the JGTRRA period. 
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shareholder demand associated with tax incentives rather than as a favorable change in 
the economic circumstances of the firm.  
Next, I focus on the impact of dividend increases for growth firms before and 
after JGTRRA. Absent an exogenous stimulus such as JGTRRA, dividend increases by 
growth firms would likely be interpreted by the market as evidence of firm maturation 
(Grullon et al. 2002). Maturation occurs when firms experience a decrease in growth 
opportunities and use dividends as a means of reducing excessive free cash flow. 
However, growth firms may temporarily pay dividends in response to JGTRRA with no 
expectation of a decrease in future earnings, assuming growth opportunities are 
unchanged. I test whether dividend-increasing growth firms have a concurrent decrease 
in research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures in both the pre- and post-
JGTRRA periods, consistent with a firm maturation argument. After testing whether 
there is a decrease in these expenditures, I examine the market reaction to dividend 
increases of growth firms before and after JGTRRA to determine if dividend increases 
are interpreted differently by the market.  
Results generally support the notion that dividend increases were less predictive 
of future earnings in the post-JGTRRA period relative to the pre-JGTRRA period, 
consistent with a tax-oriented explanation for dividend increases. Overall, I find that 
earnings forecast errors are higher in the post-JGTRRA period and provide a more noisy 
prediction than in the pre-JGTRRA period, as forecast errors are more optimistically 
biased.   Multivariate analyses suggest that firms increased dividends in response to tax 
incentives; however, the earnings response varies for growth and non-growth firms. 
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Non-growth firms that increase dividends have lower earnings to support them in the 
post-JGTRRA period, consistent with a tax-oriented explanation for dividend increases; 
however, growth firms that increase dividends have higher earnings in the post-JGTRRA 
period. Additionally, R&D and capital expenditures for dividend-increasing growth 
firms are significantly higher in the post-JGTRRA period, suggesting that post-JGTRRA 
dividend increases are in response to tax incentives as opposed to firm maturation. 
Market reaction to dividend increases for both growth firms and non-growth 
firms in the post-JGTRRA period is consistently positive. The market views initiation 
and increases in ordinary dividends by growth firms negatively in the pre-JGTRRA 
period but more positively in the post-JGTRRA period. Sensitivity analyses provide 
evidence that small dividend increases by growth firms lead to the most positive market 
responses, lending support to the notion that these firms are responding to the tax 
benefits of JGTRRA but not losing growth opportunities.  The market reacts to special 
dividends paid by growth firms positively in both the pre-JGTRRA and the post-
JGTRRA periods. 
This paper is relevant to lawmakers to determine how firms respond to tax 
incentives and whether firms’ reactions to this specific act were consistent with 
Congressional intent. It is also of interest to researchers in accounting and finance, 
extending the dividend literature by adding to our understanding of the causal factors of 
dividend policy and more generally the impact of taxes on policy, providing evidence 
that individual-level taxes have a significant impact on firms’ dividend policies, even for 
growth firms. 
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The paper is organized as follows: the next section develops hypotheses; the third 
section outlines the data and methodology used. The fourth section summarizes the 
univariate and multivariate results, and the final section concludes. 
Hypotheses Development 
Initial studies examining the effects of JGTRRA (Blouin et al., 2004 and Chetty 
and Saez, 2004) find that firms increase dividend payments in response to the reduced 
individual-level taxes; however, no attempt is made to determine whether post-JGTRRA 
dividend increases are simply temporary responses to tax incentives or based on 
improved earnings expectations that could be sustainable beyond the sunset period of tax 
benefits.  To distinguish between these alternative explanations, I first determine 
whether dividend increases have the same predictive power regarding future earnings in 
the post-JGTRRA period as in the pre-JGTRRA period. Penman (1983) creates 
dividend-based earnings forecasts to suggest that dividend forecasts more accurately 
explain future earnings than management forecasts or naïve models, consistent with 
firms using dividends as signals. I estimate dividend-based earnings models’ predictive 
ability for the pre-JGTRRA period and compare the results to model estimates in the 
post-JGTRRA period. A decline in the explanatory power of dividend-based earnings 
models following JGTRRA supports the proposition that firms have increased dividends 
to take advantage of tax incentives, despite the potential negative market price reaction 
that could result from future reversal of the dividend change (Christie 1994).   
In addition to dividend-based forecasts, I also examine the relative earnings 
persistence of dividend-increasing firms before and after JGTRRA. In a pre-JGTRRA 
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test of the information content of dividends, Skinner (2004) finds that reported earnings 
of dividend-paying firms are more persistent than firms not paying dividends. In this 
paper, I examine whether the act of increasing dividends is associated with greater 
earnings persistence, and whether this association deteriorates from the pre-JGTRRA to 
the post-JGTRRA period. Similar to the dividend-based earnings forecast tests, 
decreased earnings persistence for dividend-increasing firms following JGTRRA 
supports the proposition that firms have increased dividends to take advantage of tax 
incentives. Accordingly, H4a and H4b are as follow: 
H4a: Post-JGTRRA dividends are less informative as to future earnings levels 
 and earnings changes than pre-JGTRRA dividend-based earnings forecasts.  
 
H4b: The earnings of dividend-increasing firms are less persistent in the post-
 JGTRRA period than the pre-JGTRRA period. 
 
 In addition to examining firms’ earnings, I examine pre- and post-JGTRRA 
market responses to dividend announcements. Past research suggests that market 
responses are generally favorable to announcements of dividend increases (Healy and 
Palepu 1988), consistent with the market expectation of increased future earnings.  A 
less positive market response to post-JGTRRA announcements of dividend increases 
relative to pre-JGTRRA announcements would imply that the market interprets post-
JGTRRA dividend increases to be in response to tax-driven shareholder demands rather 
than a favorable change in the economic circumstances of the firm. My fifth hypothesis 
reflects this expectation and is as follows: 
H5: Market reaction is less positive to post-JGTRRA dividend increases than to 
pre-JGTRRA dividend increases.  
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Next, I focus on dividend increases of growth firms before and after JGTRRA. 
Absent an exogenous event such as JGTRRA, dividend increases by growth firms would 
likely be interpreted by the market as evidence of firm maturation (Grullon et al. 2002). 
Maturation occurs as growth firms experience a reduction in growth opportunities and 
use dividend payments as a means of reducing excessive free cash flow. However, 
growth firms may pay dividends in response to tax-driven shareholder demand for 
dividends following JGTRRA with no expectation of maturation, as firms’ growth 
opportunities are unchanged. I test the maturation effect by examining R&D and capital 
expenditures of growth firms in the pre- and post-JGTRRA periods, expecting that R&D 
and capital expenditures are greater in the post-JGTRRA period than the pre-JGTRRA 
period for dividend-increasing growth firms. This leads to H6a and H6b: 
 H6a: Research and development expenditures for dividend-increasing growth 
 firms are higher in the post-JGTRRA period relative to the pre-JGTRRA period. 
 
H6b: Capital expenditures for dividend-increasing growth firms are higher in the 
post-JGTRRA period than in the pre-JGTRRA period. 
 
If growth firms pay dividends in response to tax incentives provided by JGTRRA 
without the expectation of maturation following JGTRRA, dividend increases of growth 
firms before and after JGTRRA may be interpreted more positively by the market. After 
determining whether there are changes in dividend-increasing growth firms’ R&D and 
capital expenditures following JGTRRA, I examine the market’s reaction to 
announcements of dividend increases by growth firms before and after JGTRRA. This 
gauges whether the market reacts as if these firms have matured or simply responded to 
increased tax-driven demand for dividends following JGTRRA. A more positive market 
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response to post-JGTRRA dividend announcements relative to pre-JGTRRA 
announcements would imply that the market interprets growth firms’ post-JGTRRA 
dividend increases to be a response to tax-driven shareholder demands rather than a 
mechanism for paying out excessive free cash flow arising from firm maturation effects. 
My seventh hypothesis is as follows:  
H7: Market reaction to dividend increases for growth firms is more positive in 
the post-JGTRRA period than in the pre-JGTRRA period. 
  
Data and Research Design 
I gather data from a number of sources for the 2000 through 2004 sample period. 
Dividend and stock return data are taken from the CRSP database. Other firm-specific 
data come from the Compustat database. When the CRSP and Compustat databases are 
combined, there are 33,006 observations with sufficient data for the initial models 
including dividend and earnings levels. I then delete 4,012 observations that have 
missing values for either lagged dividends or earnings, along with observations which 
have values below the 1st percentile or greater than the 99th percentile for any of the 
continuous variables used in the models. This leaves a final sample of 28,994 
observations for the main tests.  Data limitations for R&D and capital expenditures 
decrease the number of observations from 28,994 to 14,904 for these tests.  
Tests of H4a and H4b determine whether firms without an ability to sustain 
higher dividends nevertheless increase dividends to satisfy tax induced shareholder 
demands. To test H4a, I measure the explanatory value of dividend-based forecasts, 
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loosely based on the Penman (1983) dividend expectation model for earnings.23 To 
estimate the model, I combine pre-JGTRRA and post-JGTRRA observations. I first 
compare the quarterly pre-JGTRRA and post-JGTRRA earnings forecast errors 
calculated by the Penman (1983) model, using quarter-over quarter lagged terms for 
dividends and earnings, as presented in Model (10): 
Earnt = α + β1 Divt + β2 Divt-4 + β3 Earnt-4 + ε    (10) 
where: 
 
Earn  = Quarterly net income (Compustat data item #11 * data item #15) 
Div  = Quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP 
 
More negative post-JGTRRA forecast errors, relative to pre-JGTRRA forecast 
errors, would indicate that firms increased dividends without an expectation of higher 
future profitability. Additionally, greater absolute forecast errors would indicate that 
dividend-based earnings forecasts are noisier in the post-JGTRRA period. This 
combination could be interpreted as being consistent with firms increasing dividends in 
response to shareholder demands for higher dividends rather than favorable changes in 
the economic circumstances of the firm, hence less informative as to future earnings, 
consistent with H4a. In addition to simple tests of differences in forecast errors, I add a 
post-JGTRRA dummy (Post) to Model (10), along with the interaction between Post and 
dividend levels (changes), as presented in Model (11): 
Earnt = α + β1 Divt (Chg. Divt) + β2 Earnt-4 + β3 Post +    
  β4 Post* Divt (Chg. Divt) + ε     (11) 
                                                 
23 Penman (1983) uses annual data and creates prediction models.  To avoid contamination between 
predictions of pre- and post-Act observations, I compare the error terms of Model (1) to determine the 
difference between actual and predicted earnings.  In additional analyses, I delete 2003 observations to 
ensure that there is not bias related to the year of the tax law change.  Results are consistent based on both 
methods. 
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where: 
 
Post    = 1 for quarters following the passage of JGTRRA, and zero 
   otherwise 
Chg. Div    = Change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP 
 
As in Penman (1983), I expect positive coefficients on concurrent dividends, 
along with lagged earnings. The coefficients of interest are the interactions between Post 
and concurrent dividends. Negative coefficients for each of these interaction variables 
would indicate that post-JGTRRA dividends are less positively correlated with earnings, 
consistent with the H4a argument that tax-driven shareholder demand for dividends 
influenced firms’ post-JGTRRA dividend increases. To determine that firm size is not 
driving the results of Model (10), I scale both the earnings variables and the dividend 
variables by assets, tabulating both the scaled and unscaled results.24 
In addition to earnings levels, I examine the ability of dividends to forecast 
earnings changes in both the pre-JGTRRA and post-JGTRRA periods. I modify Model 
(2) from Nissim and Ziv (2001), who examine changes in earnings as a function of both 
changes in dividends and return on equity. In addition to dividend changes, I also 
include dividend levels on the right-hand side in a separate model. I run both scaled and 
unscaled versions of the models to ensure that size does not drive the results. As in 
Model (2) above, I add the dichotomous variable (Post) for post-JGTRRA observations, 
along with the interaction between Post and dividend levels (changes). A negative 
coefficient for the interaction between Post and the dividend variable would suggest that 
                                                 
24 As a sensitivity test, I also include categorical industry (one-digit SIC codes) variables to control for 
industry effects. 
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post-JGTRRA dividend increases are less positively correlated with concurrent earnings 
changes, consistent with the influence of tax incentives. Model (12) is as follows: 
Chg. Earnt = α + β1 Divt (Chg. Divt) + β2 ROEt + β3 Post +   
 β4 Post*Divt (Chg. Divt) + ε     (12) 
 where: 
 
ROE   = return on equity (Compustat data item #11t * data item #15t)/ 
   Compustat data item #60t-1 
 
To test H4b, I examine whether dividend increases precipitate higher quality 
future earnings using traditional earnings persistence tests. In a pre-JGTRRA test of the 
information content of dividends, Skinner (2004) finds that reported earnings of 
dividend-paying firms are more persistent than firms not paying dividends. I compare 
earnings persistence before and after JGTRRA for dividend-increasing firms. Model (13) 
builds from Skinner’s (2004) Model (7), using dummy variables for dividend changes 
and adding a dummy variable for post-JGTRRA dividend changes, and is as follows: 
Earnt+1/TAt25 = α+ β1 DivChanger + β2 Earnt/TAt-4 +β3DivChanger* Earnt/TAt-4  
   + β4 Post + β5 Post* DivChanger +  
β6 Post* DivChanger* Earnt/TAt-4  + ε   (13) 
 
where: 
 
TA  = total assets (Compustat quarterly data item #44) 
DivChanger  = 1 if firms increased dividends in the period, and zero otherwise 
 
Consistent with the findings of Skinner (2004), I expect to find positive 
coefficients for DivChanger, lagged earnings, and the interaction between Divchanger 
and Earn. I make no prediction for Post; however, a negative coefficient on the 
interaction between Post and DivChanger would indicate that dividend-increasing firms 
                                                 
25 To ensure consistency with Models (2) and (3), I also show Model (4) with unscaled earnings. 
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have lower return on assets following JGTRRA. A negative coefficient on the three-way 
interaction between Post, DivChanger and lagged earnings would indicate that there was 
a decrease in earnings persistence following JGTRRA among dividend-increasing firms, 
consistent with the H4b expectation that firms’ dividend policies respond to shareholder 
demand for higher dividends associated with tax incentives or favorable changes in the 
economic circumstances of the firm. 
To test H5, I regress size-adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal returns on 
changes in dividends and an indicator variable for post-JGTRRA dividend changes to 
determine if there was a change in the market’s reaction to dividend increases after the 
passage of JGTRRA. Again, the focus is on the interaction between Post and the change 
in dividend variable, as a negative coefficient would indicate that the market concluded 
that dividend changes were influenced more by tax incentives and less by fundamental 
changes in the underlying earnings generation of the firm. Model (14) is as follows:  
CARt = α + β1 Div26 (Chg. Divt) + β2 Post + β3 Post * Div (Chg. Divt) + ε   (14) 
where: 
 
CAR = size-adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding 
  firms’ announcements of dividend increases 
 
To test H6a and H6b, I examine the future growth implications of dividend 
increases by comparing R&D and capital expenditures27 for growth firms increasing 
dividends before and after JGTRRA. As in previous models, I examine the R&D and 
                                                 
26 I compare the market reaction to announcements of ordinary dividend and special dividend 
announcements, along with announcements of changes in dividends. 
27 Because R&D and capital expenditures are unpopulated for many firms in Compustat, I also test total 
cash flows from investing.  Results for cash flows from investing are similar but somewhat weaker than 
for R&D and capital expenditures. 
 59
capital expenditure variables both scaled by assets and unscaled to ensure that results are 
not solely attributed to firm size effects. In both models, I add a proxy for relative 
growth rate, measured by changes in firm sales and scaled by the largest sample firm 
value to create a continuous variable bounded by zero and one (Clement and Tse 2003). 
I also interact the growth variable with dividend changes and the post-JGTRRA dummy 
variable. A negative coefficient for the interaction between changes in dividends and 
growth indicate support for the firm maturation hypothesis in the pre-JGTRRA period, 
as growth firms increasing dividends would suggest signs of maturity, choosing to pay 
dividends as a way to reduce free cash flow. A positive coefficient on the three-way 
interaction between Post, Growth, and Chg. Div lends support to the notion that growth 
firms responded to tax incentives associated with JGTRRA, rather than paying dividends 
as a mechanism to reduce excessive free cash flow, consistent with H6a and H6b. 
Models (15) and (16) are as follows: 
Chg. R&Dt = α + β1 Chg. Divt + β2 Post + β3 Post* Chg. Divt + β4 Growth +
            β5 Growth* Chg. Divt + β6 Post*Growth* Chg. Divt + ε (15) 
 
Chg. CAPXt = α + β1 Chg. Divt + β2 Post + β3 Post* Chg. Divt + β4 Growth +
   β5 Growth* Chg. Divt + β6 Post*Growth* Chg. Divt + ε (16) 
 
where: 
 
Chg. R&D = changes in quarterly research and development expenditures 
   (Compustat data item #4) 
Chg. CAPX = changes in quarterly capital expenditures (Compustat data item 
   #90) 
Growth  = changes in quarterly firm sales (Compustat data item #2), scaled 
   by the largest sample firm value to create a continuous variable
   bounded by zero and one, consistent with Clement and Tse  
   (2003). 
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As a sensitivity test to Models (11) and (12), I determine whether the earnings 
implications of dividends in the pre- and post-JGTRRA periods are different for growth 
and non-growth firms. I first look at earnings levels by adapting Model (11), and then I 
modify Model (12) to test changes in earnings. As in Models (11) and (12), I examine 
the earnings and dividend variables both scaled by assets and unscaled to ensure that 
results are not solely attributed to firm size effects. In both models, I add the proxy for 
relative growth rate, and I interact the growth variable with dividend levels and changes 
and the post-JGTRRA dummy variable. A negative coefficient for the interaction 
between dividends and Post indicates that dividends are less indicative of earnings in the 
post-JGTRRA period for non-growth firms, consistent with the tax argument made in 
H4a. A positive coefficient on the three-way interaction between Post, Growth, and 
dividends indicates that growth firms paying dividends after the passage of JGTRRA 
have stronger earnings. Models (17) and (18) are as follows: 
Earnt = α + β1 Divt (Chg. Divt) + β2 Earnt-1 + β3 Post +    
  β4 Post* Divt (Chg. Divt) + β5 Growth + β6 Growth* Divt (Chg. Divt) +
  β7 Post*Growth* Divt (Chg. Divt) + ε    (17) 
 
Chg. Earnt = α + β1 Divt (Chg. Divt) + β2 ROEt + β3 Post +   
        β4 Post* Divt (Chg. Divt) + β5 Growth + β6 Growth* Divt (Chg. Divt)
       + β7 Post*Growth* Divt (Chg. Divt) + ε    (18) 
 
where: 
 
Growth  = changes in quarterly firm sales (Compustat data item #2), scaled 
   by the largest sample firm value to create a continuous variable
   bounded by zero and one, consistent with Clement and Tse  
   (2003). 
 
To test H7, I calculate size-adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal returns 
around the dividend announcements of growth firms to determine the market reaction to 
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dividend increases. I build from Model (14), adding relative growth (Growth), and the 
interaction between Growth, Chg. Div28 and Post. As illustrated in Models (15) and (16), 
a negative coefficient on the interaction between changes in dividends and growth is 
indicative of the market expecting that growth firms paying dividends have matured. 
However, a positive coefficient on the three-way interaction between Post, Growth and 
dividends provides evidence that the market concluded that growth firms increased 
dividends in response to tax incentives, as opposed to concluding that these firms 
matured, consistent with H7. Model (19) is as follows:  
CARt = α + β1 Chg. Divt + β2 Post + β3 Growth + β4 Growth*Chg. Divt +  
  β5 Post * Chg. Divt + β6 Post *Growth*Chg. Divt + ε  (19) 
 
Univariate Analysis 
Table 9, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample period, while 
Table 9, Panels B and C provide descriptive statistics for the pre- and post-JGTRRA 
periods.29  Both mean and median tests were conducted to determine whether variables 
differed between the pre- and post-JGTRRA periods. The results of those tests are 
presented in Panel C. There was considerable growth for sample firms from the pre-
JGTRRA to the post-JGTRRA period, as total assets (TA), sales (Growth), and net 
income (Earn) are all significantly greater in the post-JGTRRA period based on both 
                                                 
28 In sensitivity analyses, I break out the change in dividend variable into small (less than five percent), 
medium, and large (greater than ten percent) changes to determine if there is a difference in the market 
reaction to dividends of varying sizes, as it is possible that investors could be disappointed with smaller 
than expected dividend changes in the post-Act period. 
 
29 All sample periods ending following the passage of JGTRRA are considered part of the post-Act period. 
Under this classification scheme, the second quarter of 2003 for calendar-year firms is considered part of 
the post-Act period.  As previously discussed, in sensitivity analyses I have deleted 2003 observations to 
ensure that there are not issues in calculating pre- and post-Act observations. 
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mean and median tests. Additionally, mean change in dividends (Chg. Div) nearly 
doubled in the post-JGTRRA period. These univariate tests suggest that there are likely 
joint influences of tax incentives and improved earnings fundamentals for the increase in 
dividends. Additionally, I compare forecast errors in the pre- and post-JGTRRA periods 
to determine the explanatory value of dividend-based earnings forecasts by comparing 
the error terms from Model (10) in the pre- and post-JGTRRA period. I find that forecast 
errors (Err) are higher (t-value for difference = 5.42) in the post-JGTRRA period than in 
the pre-JGTRRA period and absolute forecast errors (AbsErr) are not significantly 
different between period.  These results suggest that dividends are at least as informative 
as to future earnings in the post-JGTRRA period as in the pre-JGTRRA period, lending 
no univariate support to H4a.  However, it is possible that earnings are simply stronger 
in the post-JGTRRA period due to macroeconomic circumstances, warranting 
multivariate analysis to test H4a. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Table 10 presents the results for earnings levels regressed on dividends before 
and after JGTRRA. As expected, earnings levels are positively associated with current 
dividends, dividend changes, and lagged earnings. Post-JGTRRA earnings are higher 
than pre-JGTRRA earnings, as evidenced by the positive coefficient for Post. This result 
likely reflects the economic upturn in the post-JGTRRA period. The variable of interest 
in Model (11) is the interaction between Post and Div (Chg. Div).  A negative coefficient 
would suggest that post-JGTRRA dividends were less informative as to future earnings, 
consistent with tax-driven shareholder demands leading to increased dividends. The 
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coefficient is marginally negative, suggesting limited support for the H4a. Results are 
generally similar between the scaled and unscaled models; however, the interaction 
between Post and Div is not significant in either of the scaled models, indicating a lack 
of support for H4a. 
Table 11 presents the results for Model (12), which examines the predictive value 
of dividends for earnings changes. As expected, I find that both current dividend levels 
and changes are positively associated with changes in earnings. However, while the 
variable of interest, the interaction between Post and Div (Chg. Div), is in the predicted 
(negative) direction, it is not significant, suggesting that the fundamental earnings 
circumstance of firms continued to be the primary driver of dividend increases in the 
post-JGTRRA period as opposed to tax-driven shareholder demands. Unlike Model (11), 
however, results are stronger for the scaled models, as there is a marginally negative 
association between scaled earnings changes and the interaction between Post and Div, 
providing marginal support for H4a.  Considering the results of all the univariate and 
multivariate tests of H4a, there is only limited support for the notion that dividends were 
less informative as to future earnings. 
Table 12 presents the results for the H4b expectation that dividend-increasing 
firms have lower earnings persistence in the post-JGTRRA period relative to the pre-
JGTRRA period. The variables of interest in Model (13) are the interaction between Post 
and DivChanger and the three-way interaction between Post, DivChanger and lagged 
earnings; negative coefficients for these variables would indicate that there was a 
decrease in earnings and earnings persistence, respectively, following JGTRRA among 
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dividend-increasing firms, consistent with the explanation that firms increased dividends 
in response to the tax incentive independent of fundamental earnings effects on 
dividends. The coefficient for the interaction between Post and DivChanger is negative 
and significant, suggesting that dividend-increasing firms had lower earnings in the post-
JGTRRA period than the pre-JGTRRA period; however, the coefficient for the three-
way interaction between Post, DivChanger and earnings (Earn/TA) is positive, 
suggesting that dividend-increasing firms’ had higher earnings persistence in the post-
JGTRRA period. Thus, results generally do not support H4b. Additionally, it appears 
that size does not influence this relation, as results are quantitatively similar using the 
scaled and unscaled variables. 
Table 13 examines the market reaction to dividend announcements using a three-
day cumulative abnormal return calculation, both before and after JGTRRA. In this 
table, I separately consider the market reaction to announcements of ordinary dividends, 
special dividends, and changes in ordinary dividends. Results for each type of dividend 
are reported in separate columns. The coefficient of interest in each model is the 
interaction between Post and the dividend variable. A negative coefficient would imply 
that the market interpreted dividend increases were driven by increased shareholder 
demand for dividends because of tax incentives. For all three models, the interaction 
between Post and Div is positive, inconsistent with H5.  This is potentially due to 
increased investor appreciation of dividends due to decreased shareholder-level taxes as 
opposed to the expectation that dividends were only temporary. The coefficient is higher 
for special dividends than for changes in ordinary dividends, suggesting that the positive 
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reaction to dividend announcements reflects the lower tax costs for individual investors 
in the post-JGTRRA period. It is also of interest to note the consistently positive 
coefficient associated with Post in all three models. This coefficient is likely a refection 
of a generally stronger economy in the post-JGTRRA period relative to the pre-JGTRRA 
period. 
Table 14 displays results of testing the H6a and H6b assertions related to growth 
firms’ changes in R&D and capital expenditures following changes in dividends. A 
negative coefficient for the interaction between dividend changes and growth indicates 
support for firm maturation in the pre-JGTRRA period, as growth firms increasing 
dividends would have matured and chosen to pay dividends as a way to reduce free cash 
flow because of fewer growth opportunities.  A positive coefficient on the three-way 
interaction between Post, Growth, and Chg. Div lends suggests that growth firms 
responded to tax incentives associated with JGTRRA, rather than paying dividends as a 
mechanism to reduce excessive free cash flow, consistent with H6a and H6b. Results in 
Table 14 are generally consistent with H6a and H6b, as the coefficient for pre-JGTRRA 
dividends paid by growth firms, Post*Div (Chg. Div), is negative and significant.  
Additionally, the coefficient for post-JGTRRA dividends and the three-way interaction 
between Post, Growth, and Div (Chg. Div) are positive and significant for both R&D and 
capital expenditures, suggesting that post-JGTRRA dividend payments by growth firms 
were not in lieu of investing activities to reflect slowed growth.30  These results support 
                                                 
30 While the results are somewhat weaker in the scaled models, there is continued support for H3a and 
H3b.  Additionally, results are similar for increases in cash flows from investing (Compustat data item 
#91), as overall cash flows from investing are higher in the post-Act period for growth firms paying 
dividends. 
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a firm maturation argument in the pre-JGTRRA period and a tax argument in the post-
JGTRRA period.  
Tables 15 and 16 examine whether the earnings implications of dividends in the 
pre- and post-JGTRRA periods are different for growth and non-growth firms. Results in 
Table 15 suggest that the weaker results found in Table 10 for H4a are a result of 
differences in reactions by growth and non-growth firms, as the coefficient for Post*Div 
(Chg. Div) is negative and significant. This implies that non-growth firms increased 
dividends in the post-JGTRRA period despite lower earnings levels. The positive 
coefficient on the three-way interaction between Post, Growth, and Div (Chg. Div) 
suggests that growth firms increased dividends in the post-JGTRRA period but the 
increase was related to the level of earnings. Results in Table 16 are similar to Table 15, 
albeit somewhat weaker. The interaction between Post and Div (Chg. Div) is generally 
negative, and the three-way interaction between Post, Growth and Div (Chg. Div) is 
generally positive.  Overall, these results suggest that growth firms paying dividends had 
stronger earnings, which adds strength to the tax argument for dividends paid by growth 
firms over the maturation argument, supporting H4a. 
To test H7, I calculate three-day cumulative abnormal returns around dividend 
announcements, specifically focusing on growth firms, to determine the market reaction 
to these firms’ dividend increases. I build from Model (14), adding the Growth variable 
and the interaction between Growth, Chg. Div. and Post. Similar to Models (17) and 
(18), a negative coefficient on the interaction between changes in dividends and growth 
is indicative of the market expecting that growth firms paying dividends have matured. 
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However, a positive coefficient on the three-way interaction between Post, Growth and 
Div provides evidence that the market interpreted that growth firms increased dividends 
in response to tax incentives, as opposed to the firm maturation effect, consistent with 
H7. The results in Table 17 generally support H7, as ordinary dividends paid by growth 
firms are interpreted negatively by the market before JGTRRA, but are interpreted more 
positively in the post-JGTRRA period. It is also interesting to note that sensitivity 
analyses suggest that small dividend (less than five percent) increases by growth firms 
lead to significantly more positive market reaction; this also supports the tax argument, 
as it appears that small dividend increases by growth firms were rewarded by the market 
for utilizing the tax benefits of JGTRRA without damaging future growth opportunities. 
Finally, market reaction to special dividends paid by growth firms is viewed positively 
in both the pre-JGTRRA and the post-JGTRRA periods with an insignificant difference 
between the two periods.   
Conclusion 
To determine the impact of taxes on firms’ dividend policies, this paper examines 
the relation between contemporary dividend increases and future earnings around the 
passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. Specifically, I 
investigate whether firms increase dividends in response to shareholder demands for 
dividends caused by short-term tax incentives or in response to favorable changes in the 
economic circumstances of the firm, consistent with the ability to sustain dividend levels 
in the future. While some firms may have increased dividends to maximize the value of 
temporary tax advantages, other firms may have chosen to increase dividends only to a 
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level that could be maintained after the expiration of JGTRRA, guarding against future 
dividend decreases or omissions (Christie 1994).  
I determine whether dividend increases have the same explanatory value as to 
future earnings following JGTRRA as before JGTRRA. In addition to dividend-based 
forecasts, I also examine the relative earnings persistence of dividend-increasing firms 
both before and after JGTRRA. I observe whether firms increasing dividends have 
increased earnings persistence before and after the passage of JGTRRA. Results provide 
limited support for the notion that dividend increases were less explanatory as to 
earnings in the post-JGTRRA period, consistent with a tax-oriented explanation for 
dividend increases. Multivariate analysis also suggests that firms increased dividends in 
response to tax incentives; however, the earnings response varied for growth and non-
growth firms. Non-growth firms that increase dividends have lower earnings to support 
them in the post-JGTRRA period consistent with a tax-oriented explanation for dividend 
increases; however, growth firms that increase dividends have higher earnings in the 
post-JGTRRA period. Additionally, I find that dividend-increasing growth firms have 
higher R&D and capital expenditures in the post-JGTRRA period relative to the pre-
JGTRRA period, supporting the notion that post-JGTRRA dividends were in response to 
tax incentives rather than due to firm maturation effects. 
Next, I focus on the earnings responses and market reactions to dividend 
increases of growth firms before and after JGTRRA. Market reaction to dividend 
increases for both growth firms and non-growth firms in the post-JGTRRA period is 
consistently positive. For non-growth firms, this potentially suggests that the market 
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valued dividends taxed at a lower rate; for growth firms, this reaction suggests that the 
market did not interpret dividend payments as firm maturation in the post-JGTRRA 
period, but as satisfying increased shareholder demand for dividends. Ordinary 
dividends paid by growth firms are viewed negatively by the market in the pre-JGTRRA 
period, but they are seen more positively in the post-JGTRRA period.  Additionally, 
small (less than five percent) dividend increases by growth firms are met with more 
positive market reaction in the post-JGTRRA period, consistent with the ability to both 
increase dividends and have future growth opportunities. 
There is a great opportunity for future research examining the impact of 
JGTRRA on growth firms.  While our results suggest that these firms’ are not paying 
dividends as a result of poor growth opportunities and a reduction of free cash flow, 
there is not sufficient data to determine the future earnings impact of these dividend 
payments.  It is possible that there will be an earnings decline, similar to the findings of 
DeAngelo et al. (1996) and Bernartzi et al. (1997); however, it is possible that these 
firms paid dividends under different circumstances due to tax incentives. This must be 
left to future research. Additionally, it will be interesting to determine whether firms will 
sustain these dividend increases after the expiration of sunset provisions and how the 
market will react to such reductions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
TAXES AND INVESTMENTS 
 
 This study examines the effects of two tax laws enacted to increase business 
capital expenditures. First, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act (JCWAA) of 
2002 created two significant business tax provisions in response to the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001: (1) a 30 percent first-year bonus depreciation allowance for new 
asset purchases with recovery lives not more than 20 years, and (2) for firms with 
operating losses in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the act extended the net operating loss 
(NOL) carryback period from two to five years, allowing firms to obtain refunds for 
taxes paid on income from as far back as 1996. Second, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003 increased the 30 percent bonus depreciation 
allowance to 50 percent for qualified asset purchases from May 2003 until December 
2004. 
 Congress passed these acts to create incentives for firms to increase capital asset 
spending to spur the lagging economy. Upon signing JCWAA, President Bush said that 
the law would “provide tax incentives for companies to expand and create jobs by 
investing in plant and equipment and stimulate economic growth by extending net 
operating loss rules” (Bush 2002). R. Glenn Hubbard, Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, advised the Senate Joint Economic Committee that “The key to 
transforming recovery into robust growth is the pace of business fixed investment. Only 
with robust business investment will labor markets firm and the economy return to 
robust job creation. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (the stimulus 
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package) reduced disincentives to investment- technically 30 percent expensing” 
(Hubbard 2002). However, former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill dissented, stating 
that he “never made an investment decision based on the tax code, and good business 
people do not do things on the basis of tax code inducements” (Suskind 2004, 49). This 
paper investigates whether these two acts accomplished their intent as an economic 
stimulus and determines if there were unintended effects of the law. 
Much of the empirical work related to the bonus depreciation provisions created 
by the acts has focused on the macroeconomic effects (Gale and Orszag 2004, Desai and 
Goolsbee 2004, and House and Shapiro 2005).  These studies generally find that the 
bonus depreciation provisions led to only a marginal effect on capital expenditures, 
concluding that the acts failed to create the intended economic stimulus.  I provide an 
incremental contribution to this stream of literature in three ways. First, I create an 
expectations model to predict the amount that capital expenditures would have been in 
the absence of the acts; second, I examine a subset of firms that provide additional detail 
in footnotes related to qualified and nonqualified asset purchases.  For this subsample, I 
determine if firms increased total capital asset purchases or simply shifted the mix of 
qualified and non-qualified assets purchased to utilize the tax benefits of these acts. 
Finally, I examine the impact of bonus depreciation provisions on firms’ capital and 
operating lease transactions for firms in varying marginal tax rate classes. 
Additionally, I observe whether firms accelerated their intended first quarter 
2003 investments into the fourth quarter of 2002 to take full advantage of the NOL 
carryback provisions that ended in 2002 and whether firms accelerated qualified asset 
 72
purchases into the fourth quarter of 2004 before the bonus depreciation provisions 
ended. Kinney and Trezevant (1993) find that firms maximize the present value of 
investment-related tax shields by placing investments in service during the fourth quarter 
of the current year rather than the first quarter of the following year, and Maydew (1997) 
finds evidence of intertemporal income shifting by firms with NOL carrybacks in 
response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. I predict and find a similar effect for 
depreciable asset additions. Finally, I look at cross-sectional differences among various 
firm-specific characteristics, including loss positions and international investment, to 
determine the impact of these characteristics on capital expenditures. 
Capital structure theory provides a framework for examining capital investment 
incentives. Mackie-Mason’s (1990) tax exhaustion hypothesis states that non-debt tax 
shields are less valuable as firms’ taxable income levels decrease, implying that there is 
a limit to the benefit that firms may realize from depreciation expenses. The JCWAA 
extension of NOL carrybacks potentially mitigates the effects of tax exhaustion, as firms 
in current-year loss positions can recoup prior taxes paid.  As a result, I posit and 
subsequently find that firms in current-year loss positions increase spending on capital 
expenditures in 2002 to use the NOL carrybacks which expired at the end of 2002. 
 I find that firms significantly changed their investment patterns as a result of 
these acts, increasing qualified asset purchases and decreasing nonqualified asset 
purchases, leading to a marginal increase in overall capital expenditures, consistent with 
the findings of prior research related to the act. In addition, I find that firms with current-
year losses and positive income in the extended carryback periods increased depreciable 
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asset spending in 2002 in order to utilize the NOL carryback provisions. Results also 
suggest that firms increase depreciable asset purchases less as a function of business 
need in the post-JCWAA period. I also find support for the notion that firms accelerated 
future capital asset spending to take advantage of expiring tax benefits, including firms 
that had less business need for the assets in the short term. 
 Finally, I examine the impact of these acts on firms’ leasing transactions, finding 
that firms in low marginal tax rate (MTR) classes significantly increase operating lease 
transactions following the passage of JCWAA, whereas firms with higher MTRs 
decrease lease transactions.  Results are consistent with the Graham et al. (1997) notion 
that leasing by low tax-rate firms is favored when the depreciation tax shield is received 
early in the lease term.  Additionally, I find that there was little impact on low MTR 
firms’ operating lease transactions in the 50 percent JGTRRA period relative to the 30 
percent JCWAA period, but for higher MTR firms, this period led to further decreases in 
operating leases. 
These findings are relevant to many different parties. First, legislators have an 
interest in determining whether the acts created the intended stimulus to investment 
spending and the extent to which there were unintended consequences of this legislation. 
Additionally, this research is of interest to researchers in taxation, as I provide further 
evidence of the influence of taxation on firms’ business decisions. Finally, this paper 
extends the capital structure literature by examining the effects of non-debt tax shields 
and tax exhaustion. 
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 The balance of this paper is organized into five sections. The next section 
provides background and details of the two acts, followed by the hypotheses, sample 
selection and methodology, test results, and conclusion. 
Background 
Figure A presents the timeline of events surrounding the passage of the two acts 
and the specific dates firms may receive benefits under the acts. Congress passed 
JCWAA in March 2002, and its provisions were implemented retroactively to 2001 tax 
returns. Although JCWAA applied retroactively to 2001, firms had no knowledge of the 
Act in 2001. Thus, the first possible response to the provisions of JCWAA occurred in 
2002. For this reason, I test for changes in 2002 and beyond, using 2000 and 2001 as 
control years. To test the impact of JGTRRA’s 50 percent allowance, I compare the 
increases from the JCWAA period to the JGTRRA period, which began in May 2003. 
Before the passage of JCWAA, firms could carry tax losses back two years or 
forward fifteen years. Because of the JCWAA provisions, firms could carry FY 2001 
and FY 2002 tax losses back as far as five years. Firms maintained the option to carry 
losses back two years or forward fifteen years based on their determination of the 
present value of the tax benefits of these losses.31 
 Appendix A outlines the criteria for firm expenditures to qualify for the 30 
percent bonus depreciation allowance. Generally, any newly purchased property with a 
                                                 
31 A firm’s decision as to whether it will carry losses forward or backward is a function of three variables: 
First, firms must determine their marginal rate of taxation in the year(s) to which they could carry back 
current losses. Second, they must estimate future marginal tax rates prevailing for the period to which they 
could carry forward current losses. Finally, they must compare the present value of tax benefits for the 
losses carried forward to the tax benefits of carrying the losses back. 
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recovery life of less than 20 years (all property except land and buildings) placed in 
service between September 11, 2001 and September 10, 2004 that has at least 50 percent 
business usage qualifies for the allowance. Qualified assets consist of machinery and 
equipment, furniture and fixtures, and leasehold improvements, while nonqualified 
assets are comprised of buildings, land, and construction in progress. 
Hypotheses Development 
 
A number of studies examine firms’ responses to changes in tax laws to 
determine if the law had its intended effect. Trezevant (1992) examines changes in 
firms’ levels of investment tax shields and debt tax shields in response to the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, specifically testing for the substitution effect outlined by 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). Scholes et al. (1992) and Givoly et al. (1992) consider 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to determine firms’ responses to reduced maximum 
corporate tax rates. Plummer (2000) examines the effects of the Investment Tax Credit. 
The Congressional intent behind JCWAA and JGTRRA was to create incentives for 
firms to increase capital asset additions to spur the lagging economy. I test whether the 
acts’ incentives led firms to increase purchases of qualified depreciable assets.  It is 
important to note that the Congressional intent of the acts could be supported even in the 
event of a decrease in capital expenditures; for this reason, I determine whether firms 
made greater qualified expenditures because of the acts than they otherwise would have.  
H8a and H8b are as follow: 
H8a: Ceteris paribus, firms placed more qualified assets in service after the 
passage of JCWAA than they would have in the absence of the act. 
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H8b: Ceteris paribus, firms placed more qualified assets in service after the 
passage of JGTRRA than they would have in the absence of the act. 
 
 The intent of JCWAA and JGTRRA was to stimulate investment spending, but 
economic forces and firm-specific constraints32 limit a firm’s ability to purchase new 
depreciable assets. Relative to straight-line depreciation, the Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (MACRS) depreciation used for tax purposes allows firms to take 
more rapid depreciation deductions for assets with shorter useful lives. These are the 
same assets targeted by the acts, creating a larger gap in depreciation deductions 
between qualified and nonqualified asset classes. If firms have a fixed annual budget for 
capital expenditures, the expected increases in qualified asset purchases may force 
decreases in nonqualified asset purchases. My ninth hypothesis tests whether firms 
shifted the mix of qualified and nonqualified asset purchases33 following the passage of 
JCWAA (including the JGTRRA period). 
 H9: Firms offset increases in qualified asset purchases with decreases in  
 nonqualified asset purchases following the passage of JCWAA.  
 
Mackie-Mason’s (1990) tax exhaustion hypothesis states that non-debt tax 
shields, such as depreciation, are less valuable as firms’ taxable income levels (hence 
marginal tax rates) decrease, leading to the expectation that there is an upper bound on 
the benefit firms realize from depreciation expenses. However, the extension of NOL 
carrybacks potentially attenuates the effects of tax exhaustion, because firms with 
                                                 
32 Firms obviously have scare resources and budgetary or cash-flow limitations that may limit purchases of 
depreciable assets.  In addition to firm-specific limitations, macroeconomic forces associated with a 
lagging economy could also lead to diminished purchases. 
33 This is not to say that qualified assets are substitutes for nonqualified assets.  I am merely testing 
whether firms shifted the timing of asset purchases, accelerating purchases of qualified assets or delaying 
nonqualified asset purchases. 
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current-year losses can obtain refunds of previously paid taxes. I expect that firms in 
current-year loss positions and past profits will combine the extended NOL carryback 
and bonus depreciation provisions to obtain refunds on previously paid taxes. This leads 
to my tenth hypothesis: 
H10: Firms with current-year tax losses and positive income in the previous 
three to five years placed more qualified assets in service after the passage of the 
JCWAA than before the act, utilizing the extended NOL carryback provisions. 
 
Curatola (2002) suggests, “A likely effect of the additional first-year depreciation 
provision is that many taxpayers will accelerate their capital acquisitions in 2004 before 
this deduction expires. A consequence of such an acceleration strategy could be that 
acquisitions in 2005 (and possibly later) will decrease, not necessarily a result intended 
by Congress” (p. 18).  The sunset provisions related to NOL carrybacks and bonus 
depreciation could lead firms to accelerate future purchases into the period leading up to 
the sunset provision to maximize the tax benefits, similar to the findings of intertemporal 
shifting of investment-related tax shields by Kinney and Trezevant (1993). This leads to 
my final hypotheses: 
H11a: Firms accelerated first quarter 2003 asset acquisitions for qualified 
property into the fourth quarter of 2002 to take advantage of the NOL carryback 
provisions that expired in 2002. 
 
H11b: Fourth quarter 2004 qualified acquisitions exceeded other quarters in the 
JCWAA and JGTRRA periods due to the expiration of bonus depreciation 
provisions. 
 
Data and Research Design 
 
My sample consists of 104 firms that disaggregate depreciable asset purchases 
into various qualified and nonqualified categories from the first quarter of 2000 through 
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the fourth quarter of 2004. I hand-collect quarterly footnote data for these firms from the 
EdgarScan database to identify qualified and nonqualified asset purchases.  I begin with 
the universe of Compustat firms, and I delete 1,438 firms without tax EINs to remove 
foreign firms, 3,892 firms with SIC Codes greater than 6,000, and 1,752 firms without 
calendar year ends to avoid confounds with timing of asset purchases.  Among the 3,334 
remaining firms, I find required data for 104 firms that disaggregate property, plant and 
equipment data into qualified and nonqualified categories throughout the sample 
period.34 In addition to the footnote data, I use the Compustat database for relevant 
control variables. 
To determine firms’ responses to the changes in tax law, I develop a model to 
predict the amount that capital expenditures would have been had the acts not been 
passed. Specifically, I create prediction models for post-JCWAA qualified additions, 
nonqualified additions, and total capital expenditures based on firms’ levels of relevant 
control variables for the eight quarters preceding the passage of JCWAA. The three 
prediction models are as follow: 
Qualt = α0 + α1 Qualt-1 + α2 Casht-1 + α3ChSalest + α4 ADCOSTt-1+   
 α5 LTDt-1 + α6PTIt-1 + α7-10 ΣEcont-1 + α11-13 ΣQtrdum + ε  (20) 
 
NONt = α0 + α1 NONt-1 + α2 Casht-1 + α3ChSalest + α4 ADCOSTt-1+  
 α5 LTDt-1 + α6PTIt-1 + α7-10 ΣEcont-1 + α11-13 ΣQtrdum + ε  (21) 
 
CAPXt = α0 + α1 CAPXt-1 + α2 Casht-1 + α3ChSalest-1 + α4 ADCOSTt-1+  
 α5 LTDt-1 + α6PTIt-1 + α7-10 ΣEcont-1 + α11-13 ΣQtrdum + ε  (22) 
 
where: 
                                                 
34 There are potential data confounds related to both asset dispositions and merger activity.  Dispositions 
decrease the levels of reported asset increases, and merger activity leads to an overstatement of firms’ 
qualified asset purchases.  While I made every effort to control for these issues in collecting the data, any 
uncontrolled dispositions or merger effects create noise and bias against finding results. 
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Qualt   = log of qualified asset purchases in quarter t reported in quarterly  
  footnotes 
NONt   = log of nonqualified asset purchases in quarter t reported in quarterly 
  footnotes 
CAPXt  = log of capital expenditures in quarter t reported in quarterly  
  footnotes 
Qualt-1   = log of qualified asset purchases in quarter t-1 reported in quarterly 
  footnotes 
NONt-1  = log of nonqualified asset purchases in quarter t-1 reported in quarterly 
  footnotes 
CAPX t-1  = log of capital expenditures in quarter t-1 reported in quarterly footnotes 
LTDt-1  = log of long-term debt (Compustat data item #9) in year t-1  
ChSalest-1 = annual net sales (Compustat data item #12) in year t less net sales in 
 year t-1   
Casht-1  = Cash (Compustat data item #1) held end of year t-1 scaled by total 
 assets at t-1 (Compustat data item #6) 
ADCOSTt-1 = 1 – (Accumulated Depreciation / Gross Property Plant and Equipment) 
reported by Compustat 
PTIt-1   = pretax income (Compustat data item #170) in year t-135 
ΣEcon  = a vector of macroeconomic variables, including inflation,  
  unemployment, change in gross domestic product, and housing starts, 
  reported by Research Insight 
ΣQtrdum  = a vector of quarter dummies 
 
I include a quarter-over-quarter lag of each capital expenditure variable (Qual, 
CAPX, and NON) to capture firms’ tendencies to keep expenditures at similar levels 
through time. Long-term debt (LTD) is used as a control variable, as most firms incur 
debt to make capital expenditures; firms in high debt positions may be unable to increase 
capital expenditures following the passage of the acts. Change in sales (ChSales) is 
included as a proxy for a firm’s rate of growth, and ADCOST is used to control for the 
relative age of firms’ depreciable assets and proxies for a firm’s business need for asset 
replacements. Cash controls for firms’ relative ability to pay for expenditures, and pre-
                                                 
35 I do not transform changes in sales or pretax income using natural logarithms because of the impact of 
observations less than zero.  As a sensitivity test, I re-run these models using percentage change in sales 
and pretax income scaled by assets.  Results are qualitatively similar throughout the paper using either 
method. 
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tax income (PTI) controls for the tax exhaustion effect. Macroeconomic control 
variables, obtained from Research Insight, include inflation, unemployment, change in 
gross domestic product, and housing starts.  Because these economic measures are 
leading indicators, I incorporate values at time t-1 to determine the effects on capital 
expenditures in year t.  Finally, quarterly dummies are used to control for seasonal 
differences in firms’ expenditures.  
After creating the regression models for the pre-act period, I use the coefficients 
from these regression models and actual values of each explanatory variable in the post-
JCWAA period to create a prediction for each capital expenditure variable in the post-
JCWAA period. This predicted value yields an estimate of the amount of qualified or 
nonqualified asset additions expected had the act not been passed. To test H8a and H9, I 
run simple t-tests to determine firms’ responses to JCWAA, comparing firms’ levels of 
capital expenditures, qualified and nonqualified assets, along with the differences 
between actual and predicted values for each variable.  To test H8b, I use t-tests to 
determine the differences between capital expenditures, qualified and nonqualified asset 
acquisitions between the 30% JCWAA period and the 50% JGTRRA period.  I again use 
t-tests to test H11a and determine if firms accelerated 2003 additions into the fourth 
quarter of 2002 to take advantage of the NOL carryback provisions that expired at the 
end of 2002. To test H11b, I compare the fourth quarter of 2004 to all other quarters 
advantaged by the acts to determine if firms increase expenditures at the end of the 
sunset period. 
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To test H10, I create two separate multivariate models (Models (23) and (24)), 
focusing on observations from the post-JCWAA period, with the predicted errors from 
Models (20) and (21) as the dependent variables. I do not include a model for NON 
because nonqualified assets have small depreciation allowances and realize no incentives 
from either act, likely yielding little impact on firms’ post-act tax strategies. The variable 
of interest in these models is the interaction between CYLoss and PTIt3-t5. A positive 
coefficient on this interaction term would support H10, suggesting that loss firms with 
greater income in the extended carryback period had greater capital expenditures. 
Models (23) and (24) are as follows: 
DiffQualt = α0 + α1CYLoss + α2Dum50 + α3 Foreign+ α4 PTIt1-t2 + α5 PTIt3-t5 + 
       α6CYLoss * PTIt3-t5 + ε      (23) 
 
DiffCAPXt = α0 + α1CYLoss + α2Dum50 + α3 Foreign+ α4 PTIt1-t2 + α5 PTIt3-t5 + 
         α6CYLoss * PTIt3-t5 + ε      (24) 
 
where: 
 
DiffQualt    = the difference between actual qualified asset acquisitions and their 
  predicted values based on Model (20) 
DiffCAPXt  = the difference between actual capital expenditures and their predicted 
  values based on Model (22) 
CYLoss  = 1 if current year pretax income (Compustat data item #170) is less than 
  zero 
Dum50  = 1 if the observation occurs during the 50 percent bonus depreciation 
  period, and zero otherwise 
Foreign  = percentage of foreign assets, reported by Compustat 
PTIt1-t2   = sum of pretax income (Compustat data item #170) for years t-1 and t-2 
PTIt3-t5   = sum of pretax income (Compustat data item #170) for years t-3, t-4, 
  and t-5 
 
The difference variables include controls for the macroeconomic factors and 
other business factors in Models (20) and (22), so these controls are omitted from 
Models (23) and (24). In addition, I create a dummy variable for the post-JGTRRA 
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period (Dum50) to examine differences in firms’ reactions when the bonus depreciation 
provisions increase to 50 percent. Finally, I determine the impact of foreign assets on 
firms’ reactions to the acts. I expect that foreign holdings would dampen the response to 
a change in domestic tax law36, leading to a negative coefficient on Foreign.   
After looking at the acts’ impacts on depreciable asset spending, I examine the 
acts’ impacts on firms’ leasing transactions for firms in varying marginal tax rate 
classes.  Conventional lease models predict that firms with low marginal tax rates use 
more leases relative to firms with high marginal tax rates (Graham, Lemmon and 
Schallheim, 1997).  The provisions of JCWAA and JGTRRA could have two separate 
effects on leasing transactions.  The provisions increase the tax benefits for the lessor on 
qualified purchases, potentially leading higher marginal tax rate firms to increase 
qualified purchases during the bonus depreciation period.  According to Graham et al. 
(1997), “Leasing by the low tax-rate firm is favored when (i) the depreciation tax shield 
is received early in the lease term, (ii) the taxable gain on the sale of the asset is 
relatively small, (iii) larger lease payments occur later in the lease term, or (iv) the 
before-tax discount is high.”  While (ii) through (iv) are difficult to test, the increased 
depreciation provisions obviously move the depreciation tax shield forward in the lease 
term.  However, the extended NOL carryback provisions in 2002 could lead firms with 
current-year losses (likely lower MTR firms) to decrease rental transactions in favor of 
purchasing assets outright. 
                                                 
36 Qualified property does not include tangible property used predominantly outside the U.S. [I.R.C. 
§168(g)(1)(A)]. 
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As in estimating the amount of firms’ capital expenditures and qualified asset 
purchases in the absence of the act, I attempt to determine the impact of the acts on 
firms’ capital and operating lease transactions.  I first replicate the analyses of Graham et 
al. (1997) to determine firms’ spending on capital and operating leases in the pre-act 
period, controlling for before-financing marginal tax rates (as calculated on John 
Graham’s website), earnings, book value, financial distress, market-to-book ratio, 
property, plant and equipment levels, and size in the following models37:   
CapLeaset = α0 + α1 MTRClassB + α2MTRClassC + α3ECOSTt + α4ZSCOREt + 
      α5OENEGt + α6MTBt + α7 Collateralt + α8Sizet + α9-13 SIC + ε   (25) 
 
OpLeaset = α0 + α1 MTRClassB + α2MTRClassC + α3ECOSTt + α4ZSCOREt + 
      α5OENEGt + α6MTBt + α7 Collateralt + α8Sizet + α9-13 SIC + ε   (26) 
 
where: 
 
CapLeaset = Capital leases divided by the market value of equity 
OpLeaset = Operating leases divided by the market value of equity 
MTRClassB = a categorical variable where before-financing marginal tax rate 
  is between 10 percent and 30 percent, calculated on John  
  Graham’s website38 
MTRClassC = a categorical variable where before-financing marginal tax rate 
  is greater than  30 percent, calculated on John Graham’s website 
ECOSTt = the standard deviation of the first difference in the firm’s  
  earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes divided by the 
  mean level of the book value of total assets multiplied by the sum 
  of research and development and advertising expenses divided by 
  total assets 
ZSCOREt = a modified version of Altman’s (1968) Z-Score, consistent with 
Graham et al. (1997) 
                                                 
37 While Graham et al. (1997) restrict their sample to firms with SIC codes between 2000 and 5999, I 
extend this sample to all firms with SIC codes less than 5999 to be consistent with other tests used in the 
paper.  In addition, I do not remove firms in the telephone and utilities industries like Graham et al. 
(2002). 
38 While Graham et al. (1997) use the level of marginal tax rate, I calculate three dummy variables for low, 
medium, and high marginal tax rates to better determine the impact of the act for firms in various MTR 
classes.  Low MTR is less than 10 percent and is denoted by the intercept, medium is between 10 and 30 
percent, and high is greater than 30 percent. 
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OENEGt = 1 if the book value of common equity is negative, and zero 
  otherwise 
MTBt  = market value of the firm divided by the book value of the firm 
Collateralt = net property, plant and equipment divided by the book value of 
  total assets 
Sizet  = the natural log of the market value of the firm 
SIC  = one-digit SIC code dummy variables 
 
Next, I model the effects of the acts on firms’ capital and operating lease 
transactions, examining observations in the pre-Act and post-Act periods to determine 
the impact of the acts on leasing decisions for firms in varying MTR classes.  I create a 
variable (Post) for observations following the passage of JCWAA, and in sensitivity 
analyses, I break out observations into the separate JCWAA and JGTRRA periods.  
Models (27) and (28) are as follow:  
CapLeaset = α0 + α1 MTRClassB + α2MTRClassC + α3ECOSTt + α4ZSCOREt + 
      α5OENEGt + α6MTBt + α7 Collateralt + α8Sizet + α9Post + 
      α10Post*MTRClassB + α11Post*MTRClassC + α12-16 SIC + ε   (27) 
 
OpLeaset = α0 + α1 MTRClassB + α2MTRClassC + α3ECOSTt + α4ZSCOREt + 
      α5OENEGt + α6MTBt + α7 Collateralt + α8Sizet + α9Post +  
      α10Post*MTRClassB + α11Post*MTRClassC + α12-16 SIC + ε   (28) 
 
where: 
 
Post = 1 for observations following the passage of JCWAA, and zero otherwise39 
Results 
Table 18a displays descriptive statistics of quarterly capital expenditures for the 
period of 2000 through 2004. Table 18b presents annual capital expenditures and the 
related control variables for the same period, while Table 18c displays the annual capital 
expenditures by year. The descriptive statistics show an increase between pre-JCWAA 
                                                 
39 In addition to using a single dummy variable for Post, I also include two separate dummy variables for 
the 30 percent JCWAA period and the 50 percent JGTRRA period, and the interactions between each 
variable and MTRClassB and MTRClassC. 
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and post-JCWAA qualified asset acquisitions and capital expenditures, with a decrease 
in nonqualified assets in the post-act period. In addition, there is an approximately five 
percent increase in the ratio of qualified assets to total expenditures. This difference is 
economically significant because a five percent increase in qualified asset acquisitions 
for a firm with $100 Million of new investment (approximate mean annual capital 
expenditure level) would create an additional $1.5 million ($2.5 million) in bonus 
depreciation expense in the 30 percent (50 percent) period, lowering tax expense by 
approximately $525,000 ($875,000) at the 35 percent corporate tax rate. In addition, the 
2004 annual qualified asset mean purchases of $150 million, coupled with the decrease 
in median asset acquisitions, suggests that a number of firms significantly increased 
qualified asset purchases at the end of the bonus depreciation period. 
Tables 19a through 19c present the levels of quarterly capital expenditures in 
each of the three periods (pre-JCWAA, JCWAA 30 percent bonus, and JGTRRA 50 
percent bonus).40 Again, the results are consistent with H8a and H9, as mean and median 
tests indicate that qualified asset purchases increased while non-qualified asset purchases 
decreased. However, there is no univariate support for H8b, as median tests indicate that 
qualified asset purchases decreased significantly in the 50 percent period. Tables 20a and 
20b present the Pearson correlation matrices for qualified asset purchases and capital 
expenditures and the explanatory variables used in the multivariate models. All data to 
the right of the diagonal are for the pre-JCWAA period, and the data to the left of the 
                                                 
40 It is important to note that Qual and NON are reported on the balance sheet, whereas CAPX is reported 
on the statement of cash flows.  For this reason, the sum of Qual and NON does not always equal overall 
CAPX. 
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diagonal are for the post-JCWAA (including the JGTRRA) period.  Consistent with 
expectations, qualified expenditures are positively correlated with lagged expenditure 
values, growth (ChSales), and income (PTIt1-t2 and PTIt3-t5).  It is also interesting to note 
that the correlation for the proxy for the relative age of assets (ADCOST) is considerably 
stronger in the pre-JCWAA period than in the post-JCWAA period, lending support to 
the notion that firms increased capital asset spending more as a function of increased 
depreciation allowances than as a function of relative business need. 
Although the univariate evidence supports H8a and H9, I create multivariate 
prediction models for qualified assets, nonqualified assets, and total capital expenditures 
(Models (20) through (22)). The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 21. As one 
would expect, previous quarter-over-quarter expenditures, lagged cash, and growth are 
all positively correlated with capital expenditures. Consistent with the tax exhaustion 
effect, PTI is positively associated with capital expenditures; however, debt is found to 
be positively associated with capital expenditures, possibly because of the debt 
securability effect.41 Additionally, the relative age of firms’ depreciable assets also 
impacts capital expenditures, as firms with newer assets make fewer asset acquisitions. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that fourth quarter expenditures are significantly positive 
for qualified assets and capital expenditures in total but not for nonqualified assets. 
The coefficients from the regression models in Table 21 are used to create 
predicted values for qualified assets, nonqualified assets, and total capital expenditures. 
It is important to note the explanatory power of the prediction models is very strong.  
                                                 
41 Debt securability relates to the fact that banks often loan companies money with fixed assets as 
collateral.  Therefore, firms with greater fixed assets have the ability to take on greater long-term debt. 
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The prediction errors are presented in Tables 22a through 22c. Table 22a suggests that in 
the period following the passage of JCWAA, firms significantly increased qualified 
assets while significantly decreasing nonqualified assets. This resulted in an 
economically small but statistically significant increase in total capital expenditures. 
Tables 22b and 22c outline an increase in qualified asset purchases from the 30 percent 
JCWAA period to the 50 percent JGTRRA period, but overall capital expenditures were 
higher in the JCWAA period than the JGTRRA period. Taken together, Tables 22a 
through 22c provide support for H8a, H8b, and H9.  
Additionally, untabulated t-tests on prediction errors yield support for H11a and 
H11b. These tests indicate that firms increased qualified asset purchases in the fourth 
quarter of 2002 relative to the first quarter of 2003, and qualified additions in the fourth 
quarter of 2004 are significantly greater than the average across the entire post-act 
period. This supports the notion that firms accelerated expected future purchases to 
utilize the expiring sunset provisions relating to the NOL carryback period and the bonus 
depreciation period. 
Table 23 presents results from regressions on prediction errors calculated in 
Models (20) and (21) in both the JCWAA period and the entire bonus depreciation 
period, including the 50 percent JGTRRA period. I do not run these models on 
nonqualified assets because of the minimal tax depreciation impact of nonqualified 
assets. Because all of the macroeconomic and other explanatory variables have been 
included in the prediction models, I specifically focus on the impact of the extended 
NOL carryback period. As predicted in H10, the coefficient for the interaction of CYLoss 
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and PTIt3-t5 is significant and positive, offering support for the notion that loss firms with 
positive income in the extended carryback periods increased capital expenditures to 
obtain tax refunds. Additionally, there is moderate support for H8b because post-
JGTRRA qualified asset purchases increased, as evidenced by the positive coefficient on 
Dum50. Finally, there is little support for the expectation that firms’ foreign positions 
diminish the likelihood of a response to a change in domestic tax law, as the coefficient 
on Foreign is insignificant. 
Table 24 displays results for Models (25) through (28).  The pre-act period 
models (25 and 28) yield similar, albeit weaker, results than Graham et al. (1997).  The 
main difference is in the two MTR class dummy variables, which are significantly 
positive in the operating lease model, implying that firms in higher MTR classes have 
greater operating leases.  However, the post-JCWAA models suggest that firms in low 
MTR classes significantly increase operating lease transactions following the passage of 
JCWAA, whereas firms with higher MTRs decrease operating lease transactions, 
consistent with the Graham et al. (1997) notion that leasing by low tax-rate firms is 
favored when the depreciation tax shield is received early in the lease term.  In a separate 
untabulated analysis, there was little impact on low MTR firms’ operating lease 
transactions in the 50 percent JGTRRA period relative to the 30 percent JCWAA period, 
but for higher MTR firms, this period led to another decrease in operating leases. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
As a sensitivity test to the prediction error models, I create models for the entire 
sample period, using actual capital expenditures instead of prediction errors.  As in 
 89
Models (20) through (22), I include firm specific variables such as long-term debt, 
growth, cash, the relative age of depreciable assets, pre-tax income, macroeconomic 
variables and quarterly dummies.  I also include the explanatory variables from Models 
(23) and (24) such as Foreign and CYLoss.  Also, as in Models (23) and (24), I do not 
use NON on the left-hand side for the full sample models.  The variable of interest in 
Models (28) and (29) is the three-way interaction between CYLoss, Dum30, and PTIt3-t5, 
which tests the H10 assertion that loss firms with greater income in the carryback period 
are more likely to increase capital expenditures.  Models (29) and (30) are as follows: 
Qualt = α0 + α1 Qualt-1 + α2LTDt-1 + α3ChSalest-1 + α4Casht-1 + α5ADCOSTt-1
 + α6PTIt + α7 Dum30+ α8 Dum50 + α9 Foreign + α10 PTIt1t2 + α11PTIt3-t5
 + α12CYLoss + α13CYLoss*PTIt1-t2 + α14CYLoss*PTIt3-t5 +   
α15CYLoss*Dum30*PTIt3-t5 + α16-20ΣEcont-1 + α21-23 ΣQtrdum + ε     (29)
  
CAPXt = α0 + α1 CAPXt-1 + α2LTDt-1 + α3ChSalest-1 + α4Casht-1 + α5ADCOSTt-1
 + α6PTIt + α7 Dum30+ α8 Dum50 + α9 Foreign + α10 PTIt1t2 + α11PTIt3-t5
 + α12CYLoss + α13CYLoss*PTIt1-t2 + α14CYLoss*PTIt3-t5 +   
α15CYLoss*Dum30*PTIt3-t5 + α16-20ΣEcont-1 + α21-23 ΣQtrdum + ε     (30)
   
where: 
 
Qual  = log of quarterly qualified assets, reported in quarterly footnotes 
CAPX   = log of quarterly capital expenditures, reported in quarterly footnotes 
PTIt   = pretax income (Compustat data item #170) for the current year 
Dum30   = 1 if the observation occurs during the 30 percent bonus depreciation period, and zero
    otherwise 
 
Table 25 presents regression models estimated for both the entire sample period 
and for the post-JCWAA period. For simplicity, I omit the coefficients on the 
macroeconomic variables and the quarterly dummy variables, but their coefficients are 
similar to those found in the prediction models in Table 4. As expected, lagged values of 
capital expenditures are significantly positive. Long-term debt remains positive and 
significant, contrary to the substitution effect. As in Table 23, there is support for H10, 
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as the coefficient for loss firms with income in the carryback period 
(CYLoss*Dum30*PTIt3-t5) is significantly positive. In addition, it is interesting to note 
the coefficients for the ADCOST variable, which measures the relative age of firms’ 
assets. In the entire period, as in the pre-act period, the coefficient is negative and 
significant; however, in the post-act period, the coefficient is insignificant, leading to the 
supposition that firms increased capital expenditures more as a function of tax benefits 
than the necessity to replace existing assets. 
In addition to running the natural logarithmic models, I also used variables scaled 
by total assets and the market value of equity. Results are similar using each scaling 
method. To determine that the results found in the paper are not confounded by merger 
and acquisition activity, I examined firms’ statements of cash flows to determine if they 
had merger activity for the quarter, and deleted such firm-quarter observations from the 
sample.  Separate regression analyses confirm that results are not sensitive to the 
deletion of these observations.  I also estimate the models using annual capital 
expenditures as opposed to quarterly capital expenditures.  Results for the annual models 
are qualitatively similar to the quarterly models; however, using quarterly data provides 
a cleaner test of the impact of the acts because of the mid-year passage of both JCWAA 
and JGTRRA.  
Finally, to supplement analyses on the capital expenditure models for the smaller 
hand-collected sample, I also run similar models for a sample of firms with necessary 
data available on Compustat.  While I cannot determine the effects of the acts on firms 
qualified and nonqualified purchases, I can make an assessment on the total capital 
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expenditures for a larger sample of firms which increases generalizability of the study.  
My untabulated results for the larger sample of firms are comparable to the Gale and 
Orszag (2004), Desai and Goolsbee (2004), and House and Shapiro (2005) findings that 
the bonus depreciation provisions led to only a marginal effect on overall investment 
spending, as mean sample capital expenditures increased by approximately 3.5 percent 
in the JCWAA period and returned to pre-Act levels in the JGTRRA period.   
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I determine firms’ responses to two tax law changes that gave firms 
an incentive to increase spending on depreciable assets, specifically focusing on firms’ 
additions of qualified and nonqualified asset classes. Firms significantly changed their 
investment patterns as a result of these acts, increasing qualified asset purchases and 
decreasing nonqualified asset purchases, yielding only a marginal increase in capital 
expenditures. In addition, I find that firms with current year losses and past positive 
income increased depreciable asset spending in the fourth quarter of 2002 in order to 
utilize the extended NOL carryback provisions of JCWAA.  Finally, I find that firms 
with lower MTRs increased their use of operating leases to better use the increased 
depreciation allowances, whereas firms in higher MTR brackets decreased their use of 
operating leases.  These results are consistent with tax clientele theory. 
These findings are relevant to many different parties. First, legislators have an 
interest in determining whether the acts created the intended stimulus to investment 
spending and the extent to which there were unintended consequences of this legislation. 
Additionally, this research is of interest to researchers in taxation, as I provide further 
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evidence of the influence of taxation on firms’ business decisions. Finally, this paper 
extends the capital structure literature by examining the effects of substitution of debt 
and non-debt tax shields and tax exhaustion. 
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CHAPTER VII  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the past four years, the Bush Administration has signed into law two tax 
provisions that changed the landscape of corporate and individual taxation.  First, the Job 
Creation and Worker Assistance Act (JCWAA) of 2002 created a 30 percent first-year 
bonus depreciation allowance for new property with a recovery life of at most 20 years 
acquired between September 10, 2001 and September 11, 2004.  Second, the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) extended the JCWAA depreciation 
provisions, and more importantly, substantially reduced the individual tax rate for 
qualifying dividends.  In this dissertation, I examine the impact of these changes in tax 
legislation on firms’ dividend policy and investment decisions. 
In Chapter IV, I examine the impact of reduced shareholder-level dividend taxes 
from JGTRRA on firms’ dividend decisions.  The act creates a natural setting for 
studying the effects of classic agency conflicts between shareholders and management 
resulting from the change in individual investors’ demand for dividends and the impact 
of dividends on management stock options.  The conflict arises specifically from the 
increase in option compensation over the past twenty years- stock options now account 
for more than half of total CEO compensation in the largest U.S. companies (Rappaport 
1999), and increases in dividends diminish the value of these options.  I attempt to 
determine whether and how firms attempt to assuage the agency conflicts between 
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management and shareholders created by JGTRRA, specifically focusing on the impact 
of board independence.   
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) find that stock and option compensation for 
directors has increased over time; for this reason, I determine if increased equity and 
option compensation for directors aligns the financial interests of managers and 
directors, giving management a better chance to act opportunistically to the detriment of 
other shareholders.  Opportunistic behavior in the case of JGTRRA could result in some 
firms increasing dividends too much (resulting in the expropriation of wealth from the 
firm) or not increasing dividends enough (resulting in the underutilization of shareholder 
tax benefits) depending on firms’ and managers’ particular characteristics.  While many 
of the initial studies of JGTRRA look at firms increasing dividends following the act, I 
add to the stream of literature by also focusing on firms not increasing dividends after 
the passage of the act. 
Data analyses suggest that board independence appears to mitigate the effects of 
both CEO stock and option holdings on dividend increases, as the coefficients for CEO 
stock and option holdings become insignificant when board independence is included in 
the model.  Firms with greater board independence pay lower dividends and increase 
dividends less than firms with less board independence.  Additionally, firms with greater 
board independence pay their CEOs less both in bonuses and total cash compensation, 
consistent with the findings of Core et al. (1999).   
In addition to examining the impact of JGTRRA on dividend policy, I examine 
changes in management compensation schemes following the passage of the act.  I 
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specifically determine whether firms implicitly dividend-protect management option 
wealth through increased stock or cash (through bonuses) compensation.  Next, I 
examine whether firms that did not initially increase dividends decreased option grants 
following JGTRRA to induce management to increase dividends and whether changes in 
compensation induce managers to increase dividends.  After looking at the main effects 
of each type of compensation change, I look at the impact of board independence to 
determine if more independent boards are more likely to change compensation contracts 
to assuage the agency conflicts created by JGTRRA. 
Compensation analyses suggest that the cross-section of firms examined appear 
to implicitly dividend-protect CEO option wealth, as dividend-increasing firms with 
greater CEO option sensitivity (how sensitive CEO option portfolios are to changes in 
stock price) increase bonuses and total cash compensation to effectively reimburse CEOs 
for the decrease in option value, holding constant other variables commonly associated 
with compensation.  Additionally, firms with greater board independence appear to 
protect options from increases in dividends through increases in bonuses and other cash 
compensation better than firms with lower board independence.  Finally, I find that firms 
not increasing dividends in the first year following the passage of JGTRRA decrease 
option grants, specifically for firms with greater CEO option sensitivity.  Although this 
is true of the cross-section of firms, firms with greater board independence decrease 
option grants more than firms with less board independence. 
Chapter V examines the relation between contemporary dividend increases and 
future profitability.  Signaling theory (Ross 1977; Bhattacharya 1979, 1980) argues that 
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because dividends are costly, only strong firms with good future expectations can afford 
to pay them.  Empirical evidence generally suggests that dividend increases coincide 
with strong past and current profits, but yields only mixed evidence as to whether firms 
also sustain future profitability levels (Healy and Palepu 1988; Bernatzi et al. 1997; 
Nissim and Ziv 2001).  I provide a cleaner test between traditional signaling arguments 
and tax arguments for dividend payments by comparing earnings for firms increasing 
dividend payments both before and after the passage of JGTRRA.  The tax argument is 
supported if the correlation between dividends and earnings drops in the period after the 
passage of JGTRRA, as firms would be increasing dividends with fewer earnings to 
support these increases, taking advantage of the temporary tax benefits. 
In this same context, past research has ignored contextual variables that are 
potentially important in interpreting the economic significance of dividend increases.  
For example, the literature does not differentiate between dividend increases for growth-
oriented and mature firms.  I extend this literature by testing the future earnings 
implications of dividend increases for firms of varying growth rates to determine if there 
is a firm maturation explanation inherent in dividend increases (Grullon et al. 2002).   
Results generally support the notion that dividend increases were less predictive 
of future earnings in the post-JGTRRA period relative to the pre-JGTRRA period, 
consistent with a tax-oriented explanation for dividend increases. Overall, I find that 
earnings forecast errors are higher in the post-JGTRRA period and provide a more noisy 
prediction than in the pre-JGTRRA period, as forecast errors are more optimistically 
biased.   Multivariate analyses suggest that firms increased dividends in response to tax 
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incentives; however, the earnings response varies for growth and non-growth firms. 
Non-growth firms that increase dividends have lower earnings to support them in the 
post-JGTRRA period, consistent with a tax-oriented explanation for dividend increases; 
however, growth firms that increase dividends have higher earnings in the post-JGTRRA 
period. Additionally, R&D and capital expenditures for dividend-increasing growth 
firms are significantly higher in the post-JGTRRA period, suggesting that post-JGTRRA 
dividend increases are in response to tax incentives as opposed to firm maturation. 
Finally, I examine the market reaction to announcements of dividend increases to 
determine if JGTRRA changed the market interpretation of dividend payouts.  If the 
market reaction to dividend increases diminishes after JGTRRA, this evidence might be 
consistent with a tax argument that dividend increases are based on tax benefits as 
opposed to expected future earnings.  However, this evidence might also be consistent 
with a market expectation that dividend increases are transitory, as the tax-advantaged 
dividend provisions of JGTRRA end in 2008. 
Market reaction to dividend increases for both growth firms and non-growth 
firms in the post-JGTRRA period is consistently positive. The market views initiation 
and increases in ordinary dividends by growth firms negatively in the pre-JGTRRA 
period but more positively in the post-JGTRRA period. Sensitivity analyses provide 
evidence that small dividend increases by growth firms lead to the most positive market 
responses, lending support to the notion that these firms are responding to the tax 
benefits of JGTRRA but not losing growth opportunities.  The market reacts to special 
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dividends paid by growth firms positively in both the pre-JGTRRA and the post-
JGTRRA periods. 
In Chapter VI, I study firms’ responses to increased depreciation allowances 
created by JCWAA and JGTRRA, specifically looking at firms’ expenditures on both 
advantaged and non-advantaged assets. In addition, I look at cross-sectional differences 
among firms’ expenditures, examining the impacts of loss positions and international 
holdings. After determining whether the acts had their intended effects on advantaged 
asset purchases, I examine two potentially unintended side effects of the acts. First, I 
investigate whether firms increased capital asset purchases or simply shifted the 
categories of assets purchased to utilize the benefits of the acts. Second, I observe 
whether firms accelerated their intended first quarter 2003 investments into the fourth 
quarter of 2002 to take full advantage of the NOL carryback provisions that ended in 
2002 and whether they increased fourth quarter 2004 spending before the bonus 
depreciation provisions ended. Kinney and Trezevant (1993) find that firms maximize 
the present value of investment-related tax shields by placing these investments in 
service during the fourth quarter of the current year rather than the first quarter of the 
following year, and I expect to find a similar effect for depreciable asset additions.  
I find that firms significantly changed their investment patterns because of these 
acts, increasing qualified asset purchases and decreasing nonqualified asset purchases, 
leading to a marginal increase in overall capital expenditures, consistent with the 
findings of prior research related to the act. In addition, I find that firms with current-
year losses and positive income in the extended carryback periods increased depreciable 
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asset spending in 2002 in order to utilize the NOL carryback provisions. Results also 
suggest that firms increase depreciable asset purchases less as a function of business 
need in the post-JCWAA period. I also find support for the notion that firms accelerated 
future capital asset spending to take advantage of expiring tax benefits, including firms 
that had less business need for the assets in the short term. 
Finally, I examine the impact of these acts on firms’ leasing transactions, finding 
that firms in low marginal tax rate (MTR) classes significantly increased use of 
operating leases following the passage of JCWAA. However, firms with higher MTRs 
decreased use of leases, consistent with the Graham et al. (1997) notion that leasing by 
low tax-rate firms is favored when firms receive the depreciation tax shield early in the 
lease term.  Additionally, I find that there was little impact on low MTR firms’ operating 
lease transactions in the 50 percent JGTRRA period relative to the 30 percent JCWAA 
period, but for higher MTR firms, this period led to further decreases in operating leases. 
I believe that this dissertation is of interest to many parties.  First, this 
dissertation extends tax literature using the Scholes et al., (2002) framework.  The 
Scholes et al. (2002) framework acknowledges that tax strategies do not always explain 
firms’ decisions, as other costs may outweigh the tax benefits of a transaction.  In the 
case that firms respond to the tax acts inconsistently with tax incentives, it is imperative 
to determine which other costs drive firm behavior.  This dissertation is also of interest 
to researchers in finance, as a number of finance theories are inherent in the empirical 
tests (e.g. agency theory and signaling).  In addition, these papers are of value to 
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regulators, who are interested in understanding the implications of changes in tax law, 
and whether firms’ responses are consistent with the intent of these laws. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure A: Timeline of events relating to JCWAA of 2002 and JGTRRA of 2003 
 
   2002 NOL Carryback Period      Former 2-year Carryback 
            |-------------------------------------------------|●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●| 
 
  2001 NOL Carryback Period       Former 2-year Carryback 
  |-------------------------------------------------|●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●|      |---------------------------------------------------| 
 
  |----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------ٱ-----|-----♦----------|-----◙----------|--------------| 
1/1/96          1/1/97        1/1/98      1/1/99    1/1/2000      1/1/01          1/1/02        1/1/03        1/1/04        1/1/05 
 
 
ٱ September 11, 2001-December 31, 2004: Firms may take a bonus depreciation allowance for assets with 20-year (or 
shorter) recovery lives purchased during this period. 
 
♦ March 9, 2002: JCWAA was passed.  It is important to note that because the act was passed in 2002, calendar-year 
firms could not plan 2001 depreciable asset additions. However, firms with fiscal years ending in March or after had 
the ability to plan their fourth-quarter additions based on the new provisions. 
 
◙ May 23, 2003: The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 was passed, increasing the bonus 
depreciation amount from 30 percent to 50 percent. 
 
●●● This denotes the two-year carryback period that firms could use prior to JCWAA. It is important to note that firms may 
still use the previous provisions, carrying losses back only two years or carrying them forward twenty years, if they 
determine that this is in their best interest. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Requirements to Qualify for Additional 30 percent Depreciation Allowance 
 
In order to qualify for the additional 30 percent depreciation allowance, firms 
must adhere to the following requirements: 
• The property must be computer software, water utility property, a qualified 
leasehold improvement property, or have a Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (MACRS) Recovery Period of 20 years or less. Original 
use of the property must have begun after September 10, 2001. 
• The taxpayer must acquire the property between September 11, 2001 and 
September 10, 2004, and there must be no written binding contract for the 
property in effect before September 11, 2001. 
• The taxpayer must place the property in service before January 1, 2005. 
• Taxpayers required to use the alternative depreciation system may not take 
the 30 percent depreciation allowance. 
• Acquired property may not be classified as listed property. 
• The business use of the property must be greater than 50 percent. 
• The 30 percent allowance is available to both regular tax and alternative 
minimum tax firms.  
 
Note: 
 
The 30 percent depreciation allowance is available to all organizational forms (self-
employed, partnerships, S Corporations, etc.), but the focus of this paper is on C 
Corporations because C Corporations are the only organizational form with an entity-
level tax. 
 
The 30 percent depreciation allowance increased to 50 percent in 2003 for 2003 and 
2004 advantaged asset additions. However, the increase was announced in the second 
quarter of 2003, outside the data range used in this paper. 
 
Qualified leasehold property is defined as improvements to the interior portion of a 
nonresidential building made by the lessor or lessee, and the improvement may not be 
placed in service less than three years after the building was first placed in service. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 Recreation of Appendix A from Core and Guay (2002): Calculating Black-
Scholes Value and Sensitivities of Individual Stock Options 
 
Estimates of a stock option’s value or sensitivity to stock price or stock return 
volatility are calculated based on the Black-Scholes (1973) formula for valuing 
European call options, as modified to account for dividend payouts by Merton (1973). 
 
Option value = [Se-dt N(Z) – Xe-rt N(Z – σT(1/2))] 
 
where: 
Z = [ln(S/X) + T (r-d + σ2/ 2)] / σT(1/2) 
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = Price of the underlying option 
X = exercise price of the option 
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
r = natural logarithm of risk-free interest rate 
T = time to maturity of the option in years 
d = natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
The sensitivity with respect to a 1% change in stock price is defined as: 
[d(option value) / d(price)] * (price / 100) = e-dt N(Z) * (price / 100) 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Tables for Chapters IV through VI 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Panel A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Sales Log of net sales (Compustat Data Item #12) 
Invopp 
 
investment opportunities, calculated by Core et al. (1999) as the average of market to 
book ratio for the previous five years 
ROA 
 
 
return on assets (earnings before interest and taxes [Compustat Data Item #18 + 
Compustat Data Item #15 + Compustat Data Item #16] divided by average total 
assets [Compustat Data Item #6]) 
Chg. ROA Change in return on assets 
Ret Stock return from CRSP 
ROAStd Standard deviation of ROA, as calculated by Core et al. (1999) 
RetStd Standard deviation of stock returns, as calculated by Core et al. (1999) 
Ops 
Operating income before depreciation (Compustat Data Item #13), scaled by the 
maximum sample value 
Div 
Common dividends in millions from CRSP, scaled by total assets (Compustat Data 
Item #6) 
Chg. Div 
Change in common dividends in millions from CRSP, scaled by total assets 
(Compustat Data Item #6 
Sense CEO option sensitivity, as calculated by Core et al. (2002) 
Cash 
 
Cash and cash equivalents (Compustat Data Item #1), scaled by the maximum 
sample value 
Intexp Interest expense (Compustat Data Item #15), scaled by the maximum sample value 
Options CEO options held from Execucomp, as a percentage of shares outstanding 
Stock CEO shares held from Execucomp, as a percentage of shares outstanding 
Size Total assets (Compustat Data Item #6) 
MB Market to book ratio (Market value of equity divided by book value) 
Indep Board independence, as calculated in equation (1) 
Bonus  Level of CEO bonus from Execucomp 
Chg. Bonus Change in CEO bonus from Execucomp 
TCC Level of CEO total cash compensation from Execucomp 
Chg. TCC Change in CEO total cash compensation from Execucomp 
Chg. Ops Change in operating income before depreciation (Compustat Data item #13) 
Chg. OptGrants  changes in option grants 
LagDivDum 1 if firms did not increase dividends in the year following the passage of JGTRRA 
 
Panel B: Data Sources 
Source Variables 
CRSP Div, Chg. Div, Ret, RetStd 
Board Analyst Indep component: Sharesheld, %insiders, %gray, CEO 
Execucomp Bonus, Chg. Bonus TCC, Chg. TCC, Indep component: Sharesreceived, Stock, 
Options,  Sense, InMoney (sensitivity) 
Compustat Sales, Invopp, ROA, Chg. ROA, ROAStd, Ops, Chg. Ops, Cash, Intexp, Size, MB 
Fama French Idiosyncratic risk (as a sensitivity test) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Entire Period 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Sales 2111 3,720.500 865.705 1,2042.94 
Invopp 2111 2.205 2.715 116.131 
ROA 2111 2.938 5.310 22.183 
Chg. ROA 2111 0.006 0.000 0.405 
Ret 2111 0.022 -0.002 0.184 
ROAStd 1351 0.064 0.019 0.347 
RetStd 2087 0.130 0.101 0.137 
Ops 2111 411.800 103.400 1,192.69 
Div 2111 0.176 0.000 0.33 
Chg. Div 2111 -0.006 0.000 0.091 
Sense 1503 234.310 57.278 1,257.53 
Cash 2111 388.107 61.528 2,261.12 
Intexp 1895 52.047 9.400 180.355 
Options 2029 0.151 0.117 0.148 
Stock 2008 0.279 0.037 0.643 
Size 2111 2,800.250 758.659 8,497.3 
MB 2090 6.996 2.635 99.363 
Indep 2111 3.906 4.000 0.605 
Bonus  2092 566.047 280.905 1,001 
Chg. Bonus 2089 295.442 133.000 2,816.79 
TCC 2092 1,135.510 800.000 1,142.18 
Chg. TCC 2089 562.791 405.266 2,856.39 
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Table 2: (Continued) 
Panel B: Pre- vs. Post-JGTRRA Descriptive Statistics 
  
Means   Medians  
Variable Pre Post Difference Pre Post Difference 
Sales 3,652.19 4,369.430 717.240 856.171 870.565 14.394 
Invopp 1.96 3.229 1.273 2.899 2.167 -0.732*** 
ROA 3.09 2.306 -0.786 5.452 4.793 -0.659* 
Chg. ROA 0.01 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.002 0.002** 
Ret 0.03 -0.008 -0.037*** 0.001 -0.022 -0.023*** 
ROAStd 0.07 0.045 -0.027* 0.019 0.019 0.000 
RetStd 0.13 0.118 -0.015** 0.104 0.090 -0.014*** 
Ops 392.39 491.345 98.951 102.616 106.781 4.165 
Div 0.18 0.166 -0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chg. Div -0.01 0.014 0.025*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
Sense 247.94 194.746 -53.189 51.292 72.660 21.368*** 
Cash 343.26 571.958 228.703 53.791 102.752 48.961*** 
Intexp 53.74 45.088 -8.648 9.579 8.071 -1.508 
Options 0.15 0.158 0.008 0.114 0.129 0.015** 
Stock 0.30 0.198 -0.101*** 0.038 0.029 -0.009* 
Size 2,697.66 3,220.760 523.100 730.738 865.184 134.446*** 
MB 7.86 3.299 -4.559 2.627 2.671 0.044 
Indep 4.04 3.36 -0.679*** 4.000 3.185 -0.815*** 
Bonus  533.65 705.233 171.583*** 265.881 375.000 109.119*** 
Chg. Bonus 245.73 508.646 262.918*** 105.432 234.378 128.946*** 
TCC 1,078.17 1,381.830 303.660*** 765.000 990.877 225.877*** 
Chg. TCC 494.30 856.536 362.239*** 370.569 532.982 162.413*** 
Note: variables are defined in Table 1, Panel A 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 3: Bivariate Correlations 
 
Panel A: Compensation Variables 
Variable Chg. TCC Chg. 
Bonus 
Sales Invopp ROA Chg 
ROA 
Ret ROA 
Std 
RetStd Chg. 
Ops 
Chg. 
Div 
Sense Indep 
Chg. 
TCC 
1.000 0.995 
<0.001 
0.081 
<0.001 
-0.008 
0.718 
0.444 
<0.001 
-0.003 
0.900 
-0.033 
0.127 
-0.008 
0.776 
-0.048 
0.029 
0.015 
0.489 
0.006 
0.771 
0.046 
0.078 
-0.089 
<0.001 
Chg. 
Bonus 
0.846 
<0.001 
1.000 0.066 
0.003 
-0.007 
0.762 
0.446 
<0.001 
-0.004 
0.854 
-0.033 
0.130 
-0.009 
0.748 
-0.043 
0.053 
0.011 
0.613 
0.004 
0.858 
0.051 
0.050 
-0.057 
0.009 
Sales 
0.240 
<0.001 
0.152 
<0.001 
1.000 0.009 
0.686 
0.041 
0.059 
-0.004 
0.838 
-0.026 
0.241 
-0.031 
0.257 
-0.067 
0.002 
0.464 
<0.001 
0.111 
<0.001 
0.077 
0.003 
-0.063 
0.004 
Invopp 
0.028 
0.195 
0.063 
0.004 
0.009 
0.674 
1.000 -0.005 
0.821 
-0.908 
<0.001 
-0.011 
0.624 
-0.545 
<0.001 
-0.052 
0.018 
-0.006 
0.786 
0.007 
0.742 
-0.02 
0.433 
0.003 
0.894 
ROA 
0.102 
<0.001 
0.156 
<0.001 
0.042 
0.053 
0.543 
<0.001 
1.000 0.043 
0.049 
-0.031 
0.152 
-0.017 
0.523 
-0.120 
<0.001 
0.067 
0.002 
0.009 
0.700 
0.105 
<0.001 
0.023 
0.301 
Chg. 
ROA 
0.015 
0.499 
0.050 
0.022 
0.027 
0.213 
0.190 
<0.001 
0.254 
<0.001 
1.000 0.023 
0.287 
0.511 
<0.001 
0.048 
0.274 
0.060 
0.006 
-0.009 
0.677 
0.050 
0.053 
0.018 
0.400 
Ret 
0.006 
0.789 
0.028 
0.198 
-0.041 
0.058 
0.086 
<0.001 
0.027 
0.208 
0.042 
0.052 
1.000 -0.009 
0.743 
0.100 
<0.001 
-0.047 
0.032 
-0.012 
0.582 
0.052 
0.045 
0.052 
0.017 
ROAStd 
-0.162 
<0.001 
-0.122 
<0.001 
-0.304 
<0.001 
0.187 
<0.001 
-0.001 
0.984 
-0.056 
0.041 
0.036 
0.186 
1.000 0.121 
<0.001 
0.052 
0.054 
-0.008 
0.777 
0.075 
0.008 
0.025 
0.361 
RetStd 
-0.059 
0.008 
-0.035 
0.116 
-0.206 
<0.001 
0.048 
0.028 
-0.120 
<0.001 
-0.094 
<0.001 
0.110 
<0.001 
0.348 
<0.001 
1.000 -0.038 
0.081 
-0.007 
0.761 
0.040 
0.122 
0.034 
0.116 
 
Chg. Ops 
0.100 
<0.001 
0.103 
<0.001 
0.352 
<0.001 
0.403 
<0.001 
0.310 
<0.001 
0.393 
<0.001 
-0.021 
0.330 
-0.047 
0.080 
-0.082 
<0.001 
1.000 -0.002 
0.944 
0.140 
<0.001 
0.030 
0.163 
Chg. Div 
0.072 
0.001 
0.049 
0.025 
0.092 
<0.001 
0.008 
0.724 
0.089 
<0.001 
0.031 
0.158 
-0.040 
0.066 
-0.170 
<0.001 
-0.177 
<0.001 
0.018 
0.409 
1.000 -0.006 
0.809 
-0.031 
0.158 
Sense 
0.406 
<0.001 
0.366 
<0.001 
0.355 
<0.001 
0.454 
<0.001 
0.338 
<0.001 
0.132 
<0.001 
0.060 
0.020 
-0.031 
0.281 
-0.014 
0.585 
0.329 
<0.001 
0.052 
0.043 
1.000 0.004 
0.882 
 
Indep 
-0.359 
<0.001 
-0.240 
<0.001 
-0.202 
<0.001 
0.110 
<0.001 
0.044 
0.042 
0.093 
<0.001 
0.037 
0.092 
0.138 
<0.001 
0.084 
<0.001 
0.058 
<0.001 
-0.083 
<0.001 
-0.115 
<0.001 
1.000 
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Table 3: (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Dividend Variables 
 
Variable Chg. Div Cash Ops Intexp Options Stock Size MB Indep 
 
Chg. Div 
1.000 0.059 
0.006 
0.007 
0.734 
-0.040 
0.080 
-0.015 
0.506 
0.027 
0.218 
0.011 
0.599 
0.001 
0.974 
-0.069 
0.002 
Cash 
0.001 
0.966 
1.000 0.006 
0.800 
-0.472 
<0.001 
0.071 
0.001 
-0.013 
0.553 
-0.049 
0.026 
0.015 
0.497 
0.050 
0.021 
Ops 
0.070 
0.001 
0.050 
0.022 
1.000 -0.176 
<0.001 
-0.093 
<0.001 
0.097 
<0.001 
-0.020 
0.356 
0.046 
0.034 
0.050 
0.022 
Intexp 
-0.024 
0.304 
-0.577 
<0.001 
-0.189 
<0.001 
1.000 0.059 
0.012 
-0.053 
0.025 
0.063 
0.007 
0.058 
0.013 
-0.015 
0.516 
Options 
-0.101 
<0.001 
0.048 
0.030 
-0.162 
<0.001 
0.002 
0.944 
1.000 0.063 
0.005 
-0.174 
<0.001 
-0.010 
0.669 
-0.098 
<0.001 
Stock 
0.043 
0.053 
-0.063 
0.005 
0.025 
0.265 
0.047 
0.046 
0.214 
<0.001 
1.000 -0.043 
0.057 
-0.008 
0.736 
-0.049 
0.027 
Size 
0.091 
<0.001 
-0.269 
<0.001 
-0.010 
0.635 
0.228 
<0.001 
-0.342 
<0.001 
-0.174 
<0.001 
1.000 -0.005 
0.804 
-0.032 
0.138 
MB 
0.022 
0.322 
0.245 
<0.001 
0.412 
<0.001 
-0.229 
<0.001 
-0.117 
<0.001 
-0.0117 
0.436 
-0.011 
0.630 
1.000 0.013 
0.553 
Indep 
-0.080 
<0.001 
0.093 
<0.001 
0.062 
0.004 
-0.045 
0.051 
-0.104 
<0.001 
-0.586 
0.009 
-0.202 
<0.001 
0.082 
<0.001 
1.000 
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Table 4: Implicit Dividend Protection Measured by Changes in Compensation, 
Along with the Impact of Board Independence  
Chg. Bonus =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA + β5 Ret + 
   β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops + β9 Chg. Div +  
   β10 Senset-1 + β11 Senset-1 * Chg. Div + ε   (2) 
Chg. Total Cash =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA +  
 β5 Ret +  β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg Ops + β9 Chg. Div + 
  β10 Senset-1 + β11 Senset-1 * Chg. Div + ε    (3) 
Chg. Bonus =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA + β5 Ret + 
   β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg Ops + β9 Chg. Div +  
   β10 Senset-1 + β11 Indep + β12 Senset-1 * Chg. Div +   
   β13 Indep*Chg. Div + β14 Senset-1*Indep +   
   β15 Senset-1 *Chg. Div*Indep + ε    (4) 
Chg. Total Cash =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA +  
 β5 Ret +  β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops + β9 Chg. Div + 
  β10 Senset-1 + β11 Indep + β12 Senset-1 * Chg. Div +  
 β13 Indep*Chg. Div + β14 Senset-1 * Indep +   
  β15 Senset-1 *Chg. Div*Indep + ε    (5) 
  Chg Bonus Chg. Bonus Chg. TCC Chg. TCC 
Variable Prediction Model (2) Model (4) Model (3) Model (5) 
Intercept ? 354.699 165.547 662.462*** 487.356*** 
Sales + 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
Invopp - -0.206 0.218 -0.13 0.177 
ROA + 1.773* 2.657*** 2.38 2.984** 
Chg. ROA + -25.078 86.683* -2.823 80.874 
Ret + 54.212 47.845 63.72 80.565 
ROAStd ? -2.960 47.231 33.999 41.205 
RetStd ? -523.292* -82.277 -748.263** -573.152* 
Chg. Ops + -0.045 -0.149 -0.135 -0.047 
Chg. Div ? 410.124 -296.522 1576.335 405.259 
Sense ? 0.235*** -0.141* 0.25*** -0.081 
Sense * Chg. Div + 1.071*** 1.684*** 1.305*** 2.437** 
Indep ?  -93.801***  -213.9** 
Indep * Chg. Div  ?  -24.668  -71.455 
Indep * Sense ?  -0.226***  -0.311** 
Sense *Chg. Div * 
Indep +  0.510***  0.77** 
      
Adjusted  
R-square  0.096 0.301 0.119 
 
0.226 
No. Observations  1,229 1,195 1,229 1,195 
Note: variables are defined in Table 1, Panel A 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 5: Implicit Dividend Protection Measured by Compensation Levels, Along 
with the Impact of Board Independence 
Bonus =  α + β1 LagBonus + β2 Sales + β3 InvOpp + β4 ROA + β5 Chg. ROA + 
  β6 Ret + β7 StdROA + β8 StdRet + β9 Chg. Ops + β10 Chg. Div +  
  β11 Senset-1 + β12 Senset-1 * Chg. Div + ε    (2a) 
Total Cash =  α + β1 Lag Total Cash + β2 Sales + β3 InvOpp + β4 ROA +  
  β5 Chg. ROA + β6 Ret + β7 StdROA + β8 StdRet + β9 Chg. Ops + 
  β10 Chg. Div + β11 Senset-1 + β12 Senset-1 * Chg. Div + ε (3a) 
Bonus =  α + β1 LagBonus + β2 Sales + β3 InvOpp + β4 ROA + β5 Chg. ROA + 
  β6 Ret + β7 StdROA + β8 StdRet + β9 Chg Ops + β10 Chg. Div +  
  β11 Senset-1 + β12 Indep + β13 Senset-1 * Chg. Div +    
  β14 Indep*Chg. Div + β15 Senset-1*Indep +    
  β16 Senset-1 *Chg. Div*Indep + ε     (4a) 
Total Cash =  α + β1 Lag Total Cash + β2 Sales + β3 InvOpp + β4 ROA + 
   β5 Chg. ROA + β6 Ret + β7 StdROA + β8 StdRet + β9 Chg. Ops + 
  β10 Chg. Div + β11 Senset-1 + β12 Indep + β13 Senset-1 * Chg. Div + 
  β14 Indep*Chg. Div + β15 Senset-1*Indep +   
  β16 Senset-1 *Chg. Div*Indep + ε    (5a) 
  Bonus Bonus Total Cash Total Cash 
Variable Prediction 
Model 
(2a)   Model (4a) Model (3a)   Model (5a) 
Intercept ? 
307.689**
* 165.550*** 726.788*** 473.728*** 
LagBonus + 0.612*** 0.611***   
LagTCC +   0.589*** 0.599*** 
Sales + 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
Invopp - 0.215 0.218 0.345 0.354* 
ROA + 2.652*** 2.656*** 3.524*** 3.436*** 
Chg. ROA + 88.098* 86.683* 122.947* 127.834* 
Ret + 21.186 47.845 73.826 82.804 
ROAStd ? 41.824 47.231 80.58 84.27 
RetStd ? -189.872 -82.277 -473.058*** -322.615* 
Chg. Ops + -0.155 -0.149 -0.323 -0.242 
Chg. Div ? 374.887 -296.522 1410.243 -272.055 
Sense ? 0.096*** -0.141* 0.153*** -0.173* 
Sense * Chg. Div + 0.887*** 1.684*** 1.275*** 2.459*** 
Indep ?  -93.801***  -178.599*** 
Indep * Chg. Div  ?  24.668  72.177 
Indep * Sense ?  -0.226***  -0.279*** 
Sense *Chg. Div * 
Indep +  0.510***  0.889*** 
      
Adjusted R-sq  0.437 0.454 0.469 0.495 
No. Observations  1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 
Note: variables are defined in Table 1, Panel A 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 6: Changes in Dividends Related to CEO Stock and Option Holdings and the 
Impact of Board Independence 
Chg. Div = α + β1 Cash + β2 Ops + β3 Intexp + β4 Options +   
     β5 Stock + β6 Size + β7 MB + ε      (6) 
 
Chg. Div = α + β1 Cash + β2 Ops + β3 Intexp + β4 Options +   
     β5 Stock + β6 Size + β7 MB + β8 Indep + β9 Indep*Options +  
     β10 Indep*Stock +ε        (7) 
 
Variable Prediction Model (6) Model (7) 
Intercept ? -0.0004 -0.0009* 
Cash + 0.0008** 0.0008** 
Ops + 0.0001 0.0002 
Intexp - -0.0003 -0.0003 
Options - 0.000 -0.000 
Stock + 0.00002** 0.000 
Size ? 0.000 0.000 
MB - 0.000 0.000 
Indep ?  -0.0004* 
Indep*Options +  -0.000003 
Indep*Stock -  -0.000005 
    
Adjusted R-sq  0.001 0.004 
No. Observations  1,801 1,801 
Note: variables are defined in Table 1, Panel A 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 7: Dividend Levels Related to CEO Stock and Option Holdings and the 
Impact of Board Independence 
Div = α + β1 LagDiv + β2 Cash + β3 Ops + β4 Intexp + β5 Options +  
  β6 Stock + β7 Size + β8 MB + ε      (6a) 
 
Div = α + β1 LagDiv + β2 Cash + β3 Ops + β4 Intexp + β5 Options +  
  β6 Stock + β7 Size + β8 MB + β9 Indep + β10 Indep*Options +  
  β11 Indep*Stock +ε        (7a) 
 
Variable Prediction Model (6a)   Model (7a) 
Intercept ? -0.0003 -0.0004 
LagDiv + 0.909*** 0.908*** 
Cash + 0.0001 0.0001 
Ops + 0.001*** 0.002*** 
Intexp - -0.0007* 0.0007* 
Options - -0.00001** -0.00001 
Stock + 0.00003** 0.000001 
Size ? 0.000 0.000 
MB - -0.000 -0.000 
Indep ?  -0.00006** 
Indep*Options +  -0.000003 
Indep*Stock -  0.000001 
    
Adjusted R-sq  0.914 0.914 
No. Observations  1,801 1,801 
Note: variables are defined in Table 1, Panel A 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
 
  
122
 
Table 8: Changes in Stock Option Grants Related to Whether Firms Increased 
Dividends in the First Year Following the Passage of JGTRRA 
 
Chg. OptGrants =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA +  
β5 Ret +  β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops +β9 LagDivDum+ 
 β10 Senset-1 + β11 Senset-1 * LagDivDum + β12ChgTCC +  
 β13 ChgStock + ε            (8) 
 
 Chg. OptGrants =  α + β1 Sales + β2 InvOpp + β3 ROA + β4 Chg. ROA +  
   β5 Ret + β6 StdROA + β7 StdRet + β8 Chg. Ops + β9 LagDivDum+  
   β10 Senset-1 + β11 Senset-1 * LagDivDum + β12ChgTCC +  
   β13 ChgStock + β14 Indep + β15 Senset-1 * LagDivDum +  
   β16 Indep*Chg. Div + β17 Senset-1 *LagDivDum*Indep + ε     (9) 
 
Variable Prediction Model (8)   Model (9) 
Intercept ? 0.03327 0.31051** 
Sales + -0.00001 -0.00001 
Invopp - -0.009 -0.0006 
ROA + 0.006*** 0.006*** 
Chg. ROA + -0.289 -0.236 
Ret + 0.043 0.034 
StdROA ? 0.193 0.206 
StdRet ? 1.700*** 1.706*** 
Chg. Ops + 0.0001 -0.0001 
LagDivDum ? -0.092 -0.437 
Sense ? -0.0003*** -0.002*** 
Sense * LagDivDum  - -0.0004** -0.002*** 
ChgTCC - -0.051** -0.036* 
ChgStock - 0.027 0.013 
Indep ?  0.179*** 
LagDivDum * Indep ?  0.196 
Indep * Sense ?  -0.001*** 
LagDivDum * Sense 
*Indep - 
 -0.001*** 
    
Adjusted R-sq  0.070 0.138 
No. Observations  383 383 
Note: variables are defined in Table 1, Panel A 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Entire Sample Period 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Earn 28,994 15.248 1.441 61.471 
Div 28,994 22.636 0 82.802 
Chg. Earn 28,994 6.160 0.514 40.872 
Chg. Div 28,994 1.977 0 11.039 
ROE 28,994 -0.002 0.019 0.124 
TA 28,994 2,594.970 404.820 8,204.23 
Growth 28,994 24.129 1.248 101.954 
Err 28,994 0 -0.085 277.99 
AbsErr 28,994 32.870 2.380 276.043 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Act Period 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Earn 14,744 12.780 1.126 58.206 
Div 14,744 21.472 0 81.097 
Chg. Earn 14,744 6.063 0.508 42.331 
Chg. Div 14,744 1.338 0 9.561 
ROE 14,744 -0.007 0.164 0.124 
TA 14,744 2,434.780 379.050 7,941.910 
Growth 14,744 17.749 0.585 98.032 
Err 14,744 -8.189 0.152 474.916 
AbsErr 14,744 44.682 3.534 472.880 
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Table 9: (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Post-Act Period 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Earn 14,150 17.821*** 1.836*** 64.602 
Div 14,150 23.849** 0*** 84.530 
Chg. Earn 14,150 6.260*** 0.520 39.296 
Chg. Div 14,150 2.642*** 0*** 12.358 
ROE 14,150 0.003*** 0.022*** 0.124 
TA 14,150 2,761.880*** 436.480*** 8,465.980 
Growth 14,150 30.777*** 2.214*** 105.479 
Err 14,150 13.090 0.409 186.559 
AbsErr 14,150 35.984 3.727 183.523 
 
where: 
 
Earn   = quarterly net income (Compustat data item #11 * data item #15)   
  in millions of dollars 
Div   = quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP, in millions   
  of dollars 
Chg. Div = change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP, in millions   
  of dollars 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero    
  otherwise 
ROE   = return on equity (Compustat data item #11t * data item #15t)/   
  Compustat data item #60t-1 
TA  = total assets (Compustat data item #44), in millions of dollars 
Growth   = changes in quarterly firm sales, in millions of dollars  
Err  = residual term from Model (1) 
AbsErr  = absolute value of the residual term from Model (1) 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 10: Current Earnings Explained by Current and Lagged Dividends in the 
Pre-Act and Post-Act Periods 
 
Earnt = α + β1 Divt (Chg. Divt) + β2 Earnt-4 + β3 Post +    
  β4 Post* Divt (Chg. Divt) + ε      (11) 
 
Variable Prediction Dividend 
Levels 
Dividend 
Changes 
Scaled 
Levels 
Scaled 
Changes 
Intercept ? 3.188*** 6.613*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
Divt + 0.267*** 0.818*** 0.234*** 0.103*** 
Earnt-1 + 0.573 0.755*** 0.169*** 0.175*** 
Post ? 1.635*** 0.460 0.006*** 0.006*** 
Post*Divt - -0.0003 -0.055* -0.002 0.290 
      
Adjusted R2  0.671 0.609 0.164 0.145 
No. of 
Observations 
  
28,894 
 
28,894 
 
28,894 
 
28,894 
where: 
 
Earn   = Quarterly net income (Compustat data item #11 * data item #15) 
Div   = Quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP 
Chg. Div = Change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero otherwise 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 11: Changes in Earnings Explained by Changes in Dividends in the Pre-Act 
and Post-Act Periods 
 
Chg. Earnt = α + β1 Divt (Chg. Divt) + β2 ROE + β3 Post +    
      β4 Post*Divt (Chg. Divt)  + ε     (12) 
Variable Prediction Dividend 
Levels 
Dividend 
Changes 
Scaled 
Levels 
Scaled 
Changes 
Intercept ? 4.558*** 5.848*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
Divt + 0.079*** 0.311*** -0.044 0.211*** 
ROE + 27.231*** 30.338*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 
Post ? -0.173 -0.459 -0.009*** -0009*** 
Post*Divt - -0.004 -0.018 0.067 -0.106* 
      
Adjusted R2  0.034 0.016 0.004 0.006 
No. of 
Observations 
  
28,894 
 
28,894 
 
28,894 
 
28,894 
where: 
 
Earn   = Quarterly net income (Compustat data item #11 * data item #15) 
Div   = Quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP 
Chg. Div = Change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero    
  otherwise 
ROE   = return on equity (Compustat data item #11t * data item #15t)/   
  Compustat data item #60t-1 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 12: Earnings Persistence for Dividend-Increasing Firms in the Pre-Act and 
Post-Act Periods 
 
Earnt+1/TAt-1 = α+ β1 DivChanger + β2 Earnt/TAt-4 +β3DivChanger* Earnt/TAt-4  
   + β4 Post + β5 Post* DivChanger +  
β6 Post* DivChanger* Earnt/TAt-4  + ε   (13) 
 
Variable Prediction Model (13) Model (13) 
unscaled 
Intercept ? -0.018*** 4.435*** 
DivChanger + 0.021*** 6.474*** 
Earnt/TAt-1 + 0.164*** 0.580*** 
DivChanger* 
Earnt/TAt-1 
+ 0.743*** 0.318*** 
Post ? 0.008*** 1.018** 
Post* DivChanger - -0.009*** -3.421*** 
Post* DivChanger* 
Earnt/TAt-1 
- 0.034 0.112 
    
Adjusted R2  0.166 0.628 
No. of Observations  28,894 28,894 
 
where: 
 
Earn   = Quarterly net income (Compustat data item #11 * data item #15) 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero    
  otherwise 
TA  = total assets (Compustat data item #44) 
DivChanger  = 1 if firms increased dividends in the period, and zero otherwise 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 13: Three-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Dividend 
Announcements in the Pre-Act and Post-Act Periods 
 
CARt = α + β1 Chg. Divt + β2 Post + β3 Post * Chg. Divt + ε  (14) 
Variable Prediction Ord Spec Chg. Div 
Intercept ? 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
Div + 0.002* 0.002*** -0.001** 
Post ? -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
Post*Div ? 0.003* 0.008*** 0.007*** 
     
Adjusted R2  0.002 0.004 0.006 
No. of 
Observations 
 78,156 78,156 22,591 
 
where: 
 
CAR   = size-adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding   
  firms’ announcements of dividend increases 
Div   = Quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP  
Chg. Div  = Change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero    
  otherwise 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
  
129
 
Table 14: Research and Development and Capital Expenditures Impact of 
Dividend Changes for Growth Firms in the Pre-Act and Post-Act Periods 
 
Chg. R&Dt = α + β1 Chg. Divt + β2 Post + β3 Post* Chg. Divt + β4 Growth +
         β5 Growth* Chg. Divt + β6 Post*Growth* Chg. Divt + ε (15) 
 
Chg. CAPXt = α + β1 Chg. Divt + β2 Post + β3 Post* Chg. Divt + β4 Growth +
   β5 Growth* Chg. Divt + β6 Post*Growth* Chg. Divt + ε (16) 
 
Variable Prediction Chg. 
R&D 
Chg. CAPX Scaled 
Chg. 
R&D 
Scaled 
Chg. 
CAPX 
Intercept ? -0.172 -6.152*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
Chg. Divt ? 0.144*** 0.174 0.0001*** 0.0002***
Post ? 0.772*** 6.571*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
Post*Chg. Divt - -0.112*** -0.183* -0.0001* -0.0001** 
Growth + 3.310*** 15.974*** 0.017*** 0.037*** 
Growth*Chg. 
Divt 
- -8.624*** -2.404* -0.002** -0.001 
Post*Growth* 
Chg. Divt 
+ 9.039*** 9.702*** 0.002** 0.001 
      
Adjusted R2  0.028 0.010 0.009 0.029 
No. of 
Observations 
 14,904 14,904 14,904 14,904 
where: 
 
Chg. R&D = changes in quarterly research and development expenditures   
  (Compustat data item #4) 
Chg. CAPX = changes in quarterly capital expenditures (Compustat data item   
  #90) 
Div   = Quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP 
Chg. Div = Change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero    
  otherwise 
Growth   = changes in quarterly firm sales (Compustat data item #2), scaled   
  by the largest sample firm value to create a continuous variable  
  bounded by zero and one, consistent with Clement and Tse (2003). 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 15: Earnings Impact of Dividend Changes for Growth Firms in the Pre-Act 
and Post-Act Periods 
 
Earnt = α + β1 Divt (Chg. Divt) + β2 Earnt-1 + β3 Post +    
  β4 Post* Divt (Chg. Divt)  + β5 Growth + β6 Growth* Divt (Chg. Divt)  +
   β7 Post*Growth* Divt (Chg. Divt) + ε    (17) 
 
Variable Prediction Dividend 
Levels 
Dividend 
Changes 
Scaled 
Levels 
Scaled 
Changes 
Intercept ? 2.563*** 6.252*** -0.016*** -0.014*** 
Divt + 0.261*** 0.873*** 0.252*** -0.028 
Earnt-1 + 0.573*** 0.755*** 0.169*** 0.174*** 
Post ? 1.472*** 0.385 0.006*** 0.006*** 
Post*Divt - -0.024*** -1.054*** -0.024* 0.206 
Growth + 11.014*** 6.870*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 
Growth*Divt - 0.323 -0.132*** -0.064*** 0.350 
Post*Growth*Divt + 0.673*** 1.591*** 0.051* 0.101 
      
Adjusted R2  0.674 0.609 0.174 0.158 
No. of 
Observations 
 28,894 28,894 28,894 28,894 
where: 
 
Earn   = Quarterly net income (Compustat data item #11 * data item #15) 
Div   = Quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP 
Chg. Div = Change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero    
  otherwise 
Growth   = changes in quarterly firm sales (Compustat data item #2), scaled   
  by the largest sample firm value to create a continuous variable  
  bounded by zero and one, consistent with Clement and Tse (2003). 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 16: Impact of Dividends on Changes in Earnings for Growth Firms in the 
Pre-Act and Post-Act Periods 
 
Chg. Earnt = α + β1 Divt (Chg. Divt) + β2 ROE + β3 Post +   
      β4 Post* Divt (Chg. Divt) + β5 Growth + β6 Growth* Divt (Chg. Divt) + 
     β7 Post*Growth* Divt (Chg. Divt) + ε    (18) 
 
Variable Prediction Dividend 
Levels 
Dividend 
Changes 
Scaled 
Levels 
Scaled 
Changes 
Intercept ? 4.276*** 5.597*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
Divt + 0.065*** 0.312*** -0.158 0.217*** 
ROE + 25.941*** 29.673*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 
Post ? -0.220 -0.522 -0.010*** -0.009*** 
Post*Divt - -0.021*** -0.063* 0.102 -0.301*** 
Growth + 3.809** 4.722** 0.067*** 0.068*** 
Growth*Divt - 0.585 -0.0004 0.288 -0.061 
Post*Growth*Divt + 0.400*** 1.037*** -0.077 0.452*** 
      
Adjusted R2  0.039 0.017 0.008 0.008 
No. of 
Observations 
 28,894 28,894 28,894 28,894 
where: 
 
Earn   = Quarterly net income (Compustat data item #11 * data item #15) 
Div   = Quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP 
Chg. Div = Change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero    
  otherwise 
ROE   = return on equity (Compustat data item #11t * data item #15t)/   
  Compustat data item #60t-1 
Growth   = changes in quarterly firm sales (Compustat data item #2), scaled   
  by the largest sample firm value to create a continuous variable  
  bounded by zero and one, consistent with Clement and Tse (2003). 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 17: Three-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Dividend 
Announcements of Growth Firms in the Pre-Act and Post-Act Periods 
 
CARt = α + β1 Chg. Divt + β2 Post + β3 Growth + β4 Growth*Chg. Divt +  
  β5 Post * Chg. Divt + β6 Post *Growth*Chg. Divt + ε  (19) 
 
Variable Prediction Ord Spec Chg. Div 
Intercept ? 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
Div + 0.003** 0.002*** -0.001*** 
Post ? -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
Growth + 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 
Growth*Div - -0.114*** 0.065* 0.059*** 
Post*Div ? 0.002* 0.008*** 0.006*** 
Post*Growth*Div + 0.082* -0.094 0.014 
     
Adjusted R2  0.002 0.004 0.01 
No. of 
Observations 
 78,185 78,185 22,591 
where: 
 
Div   = Quarterly ordinary dividends aggregated from CRSP 
Chg. Div  = Change in quarterly ordinary dividends from CRSP 
Post   = 1 for quarters following the passage of the Act, and zero    
  otherwise 
Growth   = changes in quarterly firm sales (Compustat data item #2), scaled   
  by the largest sample firm value to create a continuous variable  
  bounded by zero and one, consistent with Clement and Tse (2003). 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 18: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics- Quarterly Capital Expenditure Variables  
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
Qual 16.687 0 0.196 2.240 263.189 
NON 6.586 0 0 0.471 74.551 
CAPX 15.786 0.050 0.888 5.198 98.266 
Ratio 0.753 0.559 0.977 1 0.346 
where: 
 
Qual  = qualified asset additions, reported in quarterly footnotes 
NON  = nonqualified asset additions, reported in quarterly footnotes  
CAPX  = total capital expenditures, reported in quarterly footnotes   
Ratio  = qualified asset additions divided by the sum of qualified and nonqualified additions, as   
 reported in quarterly footnotes 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics- Annual Capital Expenditure Variables  
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
Qual 66.746 0.222 2.858 12.530 551.214 
NON 26.344 0 0.276 4.719 164.887 
CAPX 93.090 0.255 4.213 20.795 701.271 
Ratio 0.783 0.659 0.872 1 0.259 
Cash 84.443 1.054 8.105 39.781 289.382 
Sales 979.086 13.378 92.655 340.745 21,044 
ChSales 0.181 -0.074 0.052 0.191 1.107 
ADCost 0.509 0.394 0.507 0.610 0.182 
CYLoss 0.527 0 1 1 0.499 
LTD 373.822 0.009 4.33 100.0 11,236 
PTI 127.056 -2.383 1.325 32.863 603.193 
Foreign 11.383 0 0 18.007 19.778 
where: 
 
Qual   = qualified asset additions, in millions, aggregated from quarterly footnotes 
NON   = nonqualified asset additions, in millions, aggregated from quarterly footnotes  
CAPX   = total capital expenditures, in millions, aggregated from quarterly footnotes 
Cash   = cash and cash equivalents (Compustat data item #1), in millions 
Sales   = annual net sales (Compustat data item #12), in millions 
ChSales   = sales in year t less Sales in year t, in millions  
ADCOST  = 1 – (Accumulated Depreciation / Gross Property Plant and Equipment), reported by 
 Compustat 
CYLOSS  = 1 if current year pretax income is less than zero, and zero otherwise 
LTD  = Long-Term Debt (Compustat data item #9) in year t-1, in millions 
PTI   = pretax income (Compustat data item #170), in millions 
Foreign   = percentage of foreign assets, reported by Compustat 
Ratio   = qualified asset additions divided by the sum of qualified and nonqualified 
  additions, as reported in quarterly footnotes 
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Table 18: (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Annual Capital Expenditure Variables by Year 
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
Qual 2000 65.704 0.264 3.096 13.818 242.650 
Qual 2001 31.991 0.129 2.298 12.095 139.264 
Qual 2002 47.685 0.255 2.367 13.328 207.879 
Qual 2003 38.940 0.146 3.035 12.232 146.556 
Qual 2004 150.244 0.267 2.672 16.971 1,178.07 
      
NON 2000 33.865 0 0.214 4.301 175.951 
NON 2001 12.203 0 0.324 4.575 37.794 
NON 2002 21.206 0 0.300 5.623 90.343 
NON 2003 18.793 0 0.208 4.973 67.952 
NON 2004 45.925 0 0.248 8.046 303.073 
      
CAPX 2000 99.569 0.444 4.962 23.869 379.392 
CAPX 2001 44.195 0.222 3.987 17.950 171.140 
CAPX 2002 68.891 0.269 4.636 20.795 277.225 
CAPX 2003 57.733 0.192 4.021 18.136 199.714 
CAPX 2004 196.168 0.300 4.317 24.832 1,479.13 
      
Ratio 2000 0.800 0.721 0.893 1.0 0.255 
Ratio 2001 0.744 0.597 0.840 1.0 0.300 
Ratio 2002 0.783 0.620 0.878 1.0 0.251 
Ratio 2003 0.796 0.669 0.872 1.0 0.243 
Ratio 2004 0.791 0.627 0.886 1.0 0.244 
where: 
 
Qual  = qualified asset additions, in millions, aggregated from quarterly footnotes 
NON  = nonqualified asset additions, in millions, aggregated from quarterly footnotes  
CAPX  = total capital expenditures, in millions, aggregated from quarterly footnotes   
Ratio  = qualified asset additions divided by the sum of qualified and nonqualified additions, as   
reported in quarterly footnotes 
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Quarterly Capital Expenditure Variables in the Pre-JCWAA Period 
 
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
Qual 11.791 0 0.207 2.019 70.923 
NON 5.820 0 0 0.322 46.136 
CAPX 14.398 0.057 0.903 5.196 60.329 
 
 
 
Panel B: Quarterly Capital Expenditure Variables in the JCWAA (30 Percent) 
Period 
 
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
Qual 12.305 0.001 0.233 2.727 62.489 
NON 4.677 0 0 0.802 19.738 
CAPX 20.125 0.053 0.988 5.092 170.451 
 
 
 
Panel C: Quarterly Capital Expenditure Variables in the JGTRRA (50 Percent) 
Period 
 
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
Qual 27.721 0 0.129 2.254 469.873 
NON 9.339 0 0 0.497 122.712 
CAPX 14.231 0.039 0.756 5.251 49.492 
 
where: 
 
Qual  = qualified asset additions, in millions, reported in quarterly footnotes 
NON  = nonqualified asset additions, in millions, reported in quarterly footnotes  
CAPX = total capital expenditures, in millions, reported in quarterly footnotes   
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Table 20: Bivariate Correlations 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrices for Qualified Asset Additions 
 Qualt Qualt-1 LTDt-1 ChSalest-1 ADCostt-1 PTIt1-t2 PTIt3-t5 ForPct 
Qualt 1.000 
 
0.029 
(0.497) 
0.355 
(<.001) 
0.259 
(<.001) 
-0.055 
(0.102) 
0.330 
(<.001) 
0.228 
(<.001) 
0.463 
(0.168) 
Qualt-1 
 
0.312 
(<.001) 
1.000 0.547 
(0.104) 
0.034 
(0.312) 
0.001 
(0.979) 
0.033 
(0.335) 
0.013 
(0.737) 
0.084 
(0.012) 
LTDt-1 
 
0.295 
(<.001) 
0.625 
(<.001) 
1.000 0.657 
(<.001) 
-0.140 
(<.001) 
0.242 
(<.001) 
0.132 
(<.001) 
0.043 
(0.201) 
ChSalest-1 
 
0.335 
(<.001) 
0.409 
(<.001) 
0.487 
(<.001) 
1.000 -0.180 
(<.001) 
0.130 
(<.001) 
0.028 
(0.455) 
0.027 
(0.426) 
ADCostt-1 
 
-0.015 
(0.611) 
-0.080 
(0.008) 
-0.139 
(<.001) 
-0.053 
(0.159) 
1.000 -0.065 
(0.058) 
-0.701 
(0.007) 
0.018 
(0.586) 
PTIt1-t2 
 
0.103 
(<.001) 
0.514 
(<.001) 
0.344 
(<.001) 
0.475 
(<.001) 
-0.092 
(0.002) 
1.000 0.936 
(<.001) 
0.230 
(<.001) 
PTIt3-t5 
 
0.065 
(0.041) 
0.484 
(<.001) 
0.308 
(<.001) 
0.400 
(<.001) 
-0.110 
(<.001) 
0.948 
(<.001) 
1.000 0.261 
(<.001) 
Foreign -0.003 
(0.933) 
0.075 
(0.014) 
0.046 
(0.128) 
0.118 
(0.002) 
-0.082 
(0.007) 
0.152 
(<.001) 
0.199 
(<.001) 
1.000 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrices for Total Capital Expenditures 
 CAPXt CAPXt-1 LTDt-1 ChSalest-1 ADCostt-1 PTIt1-t2 PTIt3-t5 ForPct 
CAPXt 1.000 
 
0.548 
(<.001) 
0.603 
(<.001) 
0.388 
(<.001) 
-0.085 
(0.011) 
0.559 
(<.001) 
0.408 
(<.001) 
0.082 
0.014 
CAPXt-1 
 
0.260 
(<.001) 
1.000 0.567 
(<.001) 
0.250 
(<.001) 
-0.056 
(0.097) 
0.406 
(<.001) 
0.254 
(<.001) 
0.091 
(0.007) 
LTDt-1 
 
0.393 
(<.001) 
0.425 
(<.001) 
1.000 0.657 
(<.001) 
-0.140 
(<.001) 
0.242 
(<.001) 
0.132 
(<.001) 
0.430 
(0.201) 
ChSalest-1 
 
0.226 
(<.001) 
0.149 
(<.001) 
0.487 
(<.001) 
1.000 -0.180 
(<.001) 
0.130 
(<.001) 
0.028 
(0.455) 
0.027 
(0.426) 
ADCostt-1 
 
-0.054 
(0.073) 
-0.057 
(0.061) 
-0.139 
(<.001) 
-0.053 
(0.159) 
1.000 -0.065 
(0.058) 
-0.101 
(0.007) 
0.018 
(0.586) 
PTIt1-t2 
 
0.369 
(<.001) 
0.337 
(<.001) 
0.344 
(<.001) 
0.475 
(<.001) 
-0.092 
(0.002) 
1.000 0.936 
(<.001) 
0.230 
(<.001) 
PTIt3-t5 
 
0.312 
(<.001) 
0.359 
(<.001) 
0.308 
(<.001) 
0.400 
(<.001) 
-0.110 
(<.001) 
0.948 
(<.001) 
1.000 0.261 
(<.001) 
Foreign 0.023 
(0.456) 
0.021 
(0.486) 
0.046 
(0.128) 
0.118 
(0.002) 
-0.082 
(0.007) 
0.152 
(<.001) 
0.199 
(<.001) 
1.000 
where: 
CAPX   = Capital expenditures, reported in quarterly footnotes 
LTDt-1  = Long-Term Debt (Compustat data item #9) in year t-1 
ChSalest-1  = Sales (Compustat data item #12) in year t-1 less Sales in year t-2 
Casht-1   = Cash (Compustat data item #1) held end of year t-1  
ADCOSTt-1  = 1– (accumulated depreciation (Compustat data item #7 – Compustat data item #8) /gross 
 property plant and equipment (Compustat data item #7) 
PTIt1-t2   = Sum of Pretax Income (Compustat data item #170) for Years t-1 and t-2 
PTIt3-t5   = Sum of Pretax Income (Compustat data item #170) for Years t-3, t-4, and t-5 
Foreign  = Percent of foreign assets, reported in Research Insight 
* Note: data to the right of the diagonal are for the pre-JCWAA period; data to the left are for the post-
JCWAA period 
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Table 21: Regression Results for Three Prediction Models  
 
Qualt = α0 + α1 Qualt-1 + α2 Casht-1 + α3 ChSalest + α4 ADCOSTt-1+   
 α5 LTDt-1 + α6 PTIt-1 + α7-10 ΣEcont-1 + α11-13 ΣQtrdum + ε  (20) 
NONt = α0 + α1 NONt-1 + α2 Casht-1 + α3 ChSalest + α4 ADCOSTt-1+   
 α5 LTDt-1 + α6 PTIt-1 + α7-10 ΣEcont-1 + α11-13 ΣQtrdum + ε  (21) 
CAPXt = α0 + α1 CAPXt-1 + α2 Casht-1 + α3 ChSalest-1 + α4 ADCOSTt-1+  
 α5 LTDt-1 + α6 PTIt-1 + α7-10 ΣEcont-1 + α11-13 ΣQtrdum + ε  (22) 
 
Variables 
 
Prediction Qualt NONt CAPXt 
Intercept 
 
? -2.319 
(-0.33) 
11.137 
(0.81) 
-0.247 
(-0.05) 
Qual (NON, CAPX)t-1 + 0.163*** 
(4.52) 
0.265*** 
(4.31) 
0.211*** 
(8.02) 
Casht-1 + 0.325*** 
(8.19) 
0.202*** 
(3.04) 
0.297*** 
(10.04) 
ChSalest-1 + 0.0005 
(1.52) 
0.001*** 
(3.83) 
0.00008 
(0.51) 
ADCOSTt-1 - -1.660*** 
(-3.18) 
-2.215** 
(1.99) 
-1.807*** 
(-4.53) 
LTDt-1 ? 0.365*** 
(11.78) 
0.328*** 
(4.20) 
0.399*** 
(17.06) 
PTIt-1 + 0.0005*** 
(3.69) 
0.0006*** 
(3.00) 
0.0004*** 
(3.72) 
Qtr2dum ? 0.503 
(1.61) 
0.349 
(0.62) 
0.232 
(0.98) 
Qtr3dum ? 0.361 
(0.99) 
0.204 
(0.31) 
0.382 
(0.158) 
Qtr4dum ? 0.512* 
(1.80) 
0.234 
(0.51) 
0.582*** 
(2.82) 
 
(Adjusted R2) 
  
0.648 
 
0.565 
 
0.708 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
where: 
Qualt   = log of qualified asset purchases in quarter t, reported in quarterly footnotes 
NONt   = log of nonqualified asset purchases in quarter t, reported in quarterly footnotes 
CAPXt   = log of capital expenditures in quarter t, reported in quarterly footnotes 
Qualt-1   = log of qualified asset purchases in quarter t-1, reported in quarterly footnotes 
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NONt-1   = log of nonqualified asset purchases in quarter t-1, reported in quarterly footnotes 
CAPX t-1  = log of capital expenditures in quarter t-1, reported in quarterly footnotes 
LTDt-1   = log of long-term debt (Compustat data item #9) in year t-1  
ChSalest-1 = Sales (Compustat data item #12) in year t-1 less Sales in year t-2 
Casht-1   = log of cash (Compustat data item #1) held end of year t-1  
ADCOSTt-1 = 1– (accumulated depreciation (Compustat data item #7 – Compustat data item #8) /gross 
 property plant and equipment (Compustat data item #7) 
PTIt-1   = pretax income in year t-1(Compustat data item #170)   
ΣEcon  = a vector of macroeconomic variables, including inflation, unemployment, change in 
  gross domestic product, and housing starts, reported by Research Insight 
ΣQtrdum  = a vector of quarter dummies 
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Table 22: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Prediction Errors from Models (1) through (3) 
Following the Passage of JCWAA (Entire Post-Act Period, Including JGTRRA) 
 
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
DiffQual 0.576*** -0.099 0.696 1.487 1.349 
DiffNON -0.545*** -1.204 -0.376 0.698 1.930 
DiffCAPX 0.147** -0.530 0.143 0.783 1.112 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Prediction Errors from Models (1) through (3) in 
the JCWAA (30 Percent) Period 
 
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
DiffQual 0.492*** -0.247 0.472 1.312 1.343 
DiffNON -0.646*** -1.358 -0.454 0.608 1.924 
DiffCAPX 0.200*** -0.477 0.146 0.887 1.119 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Prediction Errors from Models (1) through (3) in 
the JGTRRA (50 Percent) Period 
 
Variable Mean 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile Std. Dev. 
DiffQual 0.803*** 0.062 0.898 1.522 1.350 
DiffNON -1.244 -1.054 -0.036 0.809 1.944 
DiffCAPX 0.024 -0.756 0.126 0.627 1.091 
 
where: 
 
DiffQual = difference between the natural log of post-act qualified asset additions and predicted
  values calculated from Model (20) 
DiffNON =  difference between the natural log of post-act nonqualified asset additions and  
  predicted values calculated from Model (21) 
DiffCAPX =  difference between the natural log of post-act capital expenditures and predicted values
  calculated from Model (22) 
 
Note: 
* Student’s t-statistic significant at the 0.1 level. 
** Student’s t-statistic significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Student’s t-statistic significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 23: Regression Models for Prediction Errors of Qualified Asset Additions 
and Capital Expenditures 
 
DiffQualt = α0 + α1 CYLoss + α2 Dum50 + α3 Foreign+ α4 PTIt1-t2 + α5 PTIt3-t5 + 
 α6 CYLoss*PTIt3-t5 + ε      (23) 
DiffCAPXt = α0 + α1 CYLoss + α2 Dum50 + α3 Foreign+ α4 PTIt1-t2 + α5 PTIt3-t5 + 
   α6 CYLoss*PTIt3-t5 + ε     (24) 
 
Variable 
 
Expected 
Sign 
DiffQual 
post 
DiffCAPX
post 
DiffQual 
30% 
DiffCAPX 
30% 
 
Intercept 
 
 
(?) 
 
0.616*** 
(5.43) 
 
0.240** 
(3.01) 
 
0.613*** 
(4.97) 
 
0.232*** 
(2.73) 
CYLoss (-) 0.153 
(0.56) 
0.410** 
(2.14) 
0.131 
(0.27) 
0.308 
(1.31) 
Dum50 (+) 0.319* 
(1.80) 
-0.215* 
(-1.84) 
-- -- 
Foreign (?) -0.002 
(-0.52) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
0.003 
(0.80) 
PTI t1-t2 (+) 0.00002 
(0.10) 
-0.00006 
(-0.57) 
0.00002 
(0.11) 
0.00005 
(0.37) 
PTI t3-t5 (?) -0.00008 
(-0.58) 
-0.00003 
(-0.35) 
-0.0001 
(-0.53) 
-0.0001 
(-1.14) 
CYLoss*PTIt3-t5 (+) 0.011** 
(2.34) 
0.010*** 
(3.15) 
0.012** 
(2.36) 
0.011*** 
(3.12) 
 
(Adjusted R2) 
  
0.029 
 
0.072 
 
0.021 
 
0.063 
Note: 
* Significant at the 0.1 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
where: 
DiffQualt    = difference between the natural log of post-act qualified asset additions and predicted
  values calculated from Model (20) 
DiffCAPXt  = difference between the natural log of post-act capital expenditures and predicted 
  values calculated from Model (22) 
CYLoss   = 1 if current year pretax income (Compustat data item #170) is less than zero, and zero 
  otherwise 
Dum50   = 1 if the observation occurs during the 50 percent bonus depreciation period, and zero 
 otherwise 
Foreign   = percentage of foreign assets, reported by Research Insight 
PTIt1-t2   = Sum of Pretax Income (Compustat data item #170) for Years t-1 and t-2 
PTIt3-t5   = Sum of Pretax Income (Compustat data item #170) for Years t-3, t-4, and t-5 
 
  
141
 
Table 24: Regression Models for Capital and Operating Leases in the Pre- and 
Post-JCWAA Periods 
 
CapLeaset = α0 + α1 MTRClassB + α2MTRClassC + α3ECOSTt + α4ZSCOREt + 
 α5OENEGt + α6MTBt + α7 Collateralt + α8Sizet + α9-13 SIC + ε   (25) 
OpLeaset = α0 + α1 MTRClassB + α2MTRClassC + α3ECOSTt + α4ZSCOREt + 
 α5OENEGt + α6MTBt + α7 Collateralt + α8Sizet + α9-13 SIC + ε   (26) 
CapLeaset = α0 + α1 MTRClassB + α2MTRClassC + α3ECOSTt + α4ZSCOREt + 
 α5OENEGt + α6MTBt + α7 Collateralt + α8Sizet + α9Post + 
 α10Post*MTRClassB + α11Post*MTRClassC + α12-16 SIC + ε   (27) 
OpLeaset = α0 + α1 MTRClassB + α2MTRClassC + α3ECOSTt + α4ZSCOREt + 
 α5OENEGt + α6MTBt + α7 Collateralt + α8Sizet + α9Post + 
 α10Post*MTRClassB + α11Post*MTRClassC + α12-16 SIC + ε   (28) 
 
Variable 
 
Expected 
Sign 
CapLease
Pre 
OpLease 
Pre 
CapLease 
Entire 
OpLease 
Entire 
 
Intercept 
 
 
(?) 
 
0.002 
(0.50) 
 
0.108*** 
(5.87) 
 
0.001 
(0.17) 
 
0.108*** 
(7.81) 
MTRClassB 
 
(-) 0.0001 
(0.06) 
0.014*** 
(3.32) 
-0.0001 
(-0.06) 
0.013***
(3.20) 
MTRClassC 
 
(-) -0.001 
(-0.78) 
0.013*** 
(3.68) 
-0.001 
(-1.20) 
0.011*** 
(3.35) 
ECOST 
 
(+) -0.0004 
(-0.83) 
-0.003 
(-1.42) 
-0.0001 
(-0.50) 
-0.001 
(-1.09) 
ZSCORE 
 
(+) 0.000001 
(0.26) 
0.000001 
(0.08) 
0.000006 
(0.12) 
0.000001 
(0.09) 
OENEG (?) -0.003** 
(-2.18) 
-0.169*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.023*** 
(-7.29) 
MTB 
 
(-) -0.00001 
(-0.31) 
-0.00003 
(-0.60) 
-0.000002 
(-0.30) 
-0.000003 
(-0.10) 
Collateral 
 
(+) 0.014*** 
(8.26) 
0.025*** 
(3.93) 
0.014*** 
(12.78) 
0.014*** 
(3.09) 
Size 
 
(-) -0.001*** 
(-7.12) 
-0.011*** 
(-20.69) 
-0.001*** 
(-9.11) 
-0.011*** 
(-28.40) 
Post 
 
(+)   0.0001 
(0.07) 
0.007** 
(1.98) 
Post*MTRClassB 
 
(-)   -0.002 
(-1.40) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.71) 
Post*MTRClassC 
 
(-)   -0.0002 
(-0.17) 
-0.005 
(-1.24) 
 
(Adjusted R2) 
  
0.041 
 
0.275 
 
0.041 
 
0.279 
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Note: SIC dummy variables are suppressed for presentation purposes. 
 
where: 
 
CapLeaset = Capital leases divided by the market value of equity 
OpLeaset = Operating leases divided by the market value of equity 
MTRClassB = a categorical variable where before-financing marginal tax rate is between 10  
  percent and 30 percent, calculated on John Graham’s website 
MTRClassC = a categorical variable where before-financing marginal tax rate is greater than  
  30 percent, calculated on John Graham’s website 
ECOSTt  = the standard deviation of the first difference in the firm’s    
  earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes (Compustat data item #18 +  
  Compustat data item #17 + Compustat data item #16 + Compustat data item  
  #14) divided by the mean level of the book value of total assets (Compustat data 
  item #6) multiplied by the sum of research and development (Compustat data  
  item #46) and advertising  (Compustat data item #45) expenses divided by total  
  assets (Compustat data item #6) 
ZSCOREt = a modified version of Altman’s Z-Score 
OENEGt  = 1 if the book value of common equity (Compustat data item #6 – Compustat  
  data item #181) is negative, and zero otherwise 
MTBt  = market value (Ending share price from CRSP * shares outstanding (Compustat 
  data item #25) of the firm divided by the book value (Compustat data item #6 – 
   Compustat data item #181) of the firm 
Collateralt = net property, plant and equipment (Compustat data item #8) divided by total  
  assets (Compustat data item #6) 
Sizet  = the natural log of the market value (Ending share price from CRSP * shares  
  outstanding (Compustat data item #25) of the firm 
SIC  = one-digit SIC code dummy variables 
Post   = 1 for observations following the passage of JCWAA, and zero otherwise 
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Table 25: Regression Models for Entire Period and Post-JCWAA Periods for 
Qualified Asset Additions and Capital Expenditures 
Qualt = α0 + α1 Qualt-1 + α2LTDt-1 + α3ChSalest-1 + α4Casht-1 + α5ADCOSTt-1
 + α6PTIt + α7 Dum30+ α8 Dum50 + α9 Foreign + α10 PTIt1t2 + α11PTIt3-t5
 + α12CYLoss + α13CYLoss*PTIt1-t2 + α14CYLoss*PTIt3-t5 +   
α15CYLoss*Dum30*PTIt3-t5 + α16-20ΣEcont-1 + α21-23 ΣQtrdum + ε     (29) 
CAPXt = α0 + α1 CAPXt-1 + α2LTDt-1 + α3ChSalest-1 + α4Casht-1 + α5ADCOSTt-1
 + α6PTIt + α7 Dum30+ α8 Dum50 + α9 Foreign + α10 PTIt1t2 + α11PTIt3-t5
 + α12CYLoss + α13CYLoss*PTIt1-t2 + α14CYLoss*PTIt3-t5 +   
α15CYLoss*Dum30*PTIt3-t5 + α16-20ΣEcont-1 + α21-23 ΣQtrdum + ε     (30) 
Variable 
 
Expected 
Sign 
DiffQual 
entire 
DiffCAPX 
entire 
DiffQual 
post 
DiffCAPX 
Post 
 
Intercept 
 
 
(?) 
 
-3.353 
(-1.11) 
 
-2.248 
(-1.04) 
 
44.363** 
(2.52) 
 
0.363 
(0.03) 
CAPX(Qual)t-1 (+) 0.2444*** 
(7.98) 
0.297*** 
(12.97) 
0.549*** 
(11.01) 
0.713*** 
(18.87) 
LTDt-1 (?) 0.285*** 
(11.52) 
0.297*** 
(15.70) 
0.148*** 
(4.22) 
0.085*** 
(3.14) 
ChSalest-1 (+) 0.0002 
(0.78) 
0.0001 
(0.64) 
-0.00009 
(-0.17) 
0.0002 
(0.46) 
Casht-1 (+) 0.277*** 
(9.03) 
0.249*** 
(10.62) 
0.203*** 
(5.07) 
0.079** 
(2.51) 
ADCOSTt-1 (-) -1.876*** 
(-4.74) 
-1.963*** 
(-6.49) 
-0.622 
(-1.21) 
-0.228 
(-0.59) 
PTIt (+) 0.0004* 
(1.91) 
0.00009 
(0.63) 
-0.00002 
(-0.04) 
0.00001 
(0.05) 
Dum30 (+) -0.031 
(-0.09) 
-0.071 
(-0.30) 
-- -- 
Dum50 (+) -0.396 
(-0.59) 
-0.374 
(-0.77) 
3.084** 
(2.04) 
-0.307 
(-0.31) 
Foreign (-) 0.008** 
(2.46) 
0.008*** 
(3.52) 
0.007* 
(1.70) 
0.004 
(1.43) 
PTI t1-t2 (+) 0.0002 
(1.43) 
0.0003*** 
(2.95) 
0.0003 
(1.19) 
0.0001 
(0.91) 
PTI t3-t5 (?) -0.0002* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.38) 
-0.0002 
(-0.90) 
-0.00007 
(-0.47) 
CYLoss (-) -0.772*** 
(5.63) 
-0.949*** 
(-9.44) 
-0.914*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.524 
(-4.05) 
CYLOSS*Dum30* 
PTIt3t5 
(+) 0.005** 
(2.05) 
0.003 
(1.60) 
0.004** 
(2.10) 
0.002 
(1.15) 
 
(Adjusted R2) 
  
0.684 
 
0.745 
 
0.763 
 
0.817 
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Note: 
 
* Significant at the 0.1 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
where: 
 
CAPX   = log of total capital expenditures, reported in quarterly footnotes 
Qual  = log of qualified assets, reported in quarterly footnotes 
LTDt-1   = log of long-term debt (Compustat data item #9) in year t-1 
ChSalest-1 = sales (Compustat data item #12) in year t-1 less Sales (Compustat data item #12) in 
 year t-2 
Casht-1   = log of cash (Compustat data item #1) held end of year t-1 
ADCOSTt-1 = 1– (accumulated depreciation (Compustat data item #7 – Compustat data item #8) /gross 
 property plant and equipment (Compustat data item #7) 
PTIt   = pretax income (Compustat data item #170) in year t 
Dum30  = 1 if the observation occurs during the 30 percent bonus depreciation period, and zero 
otherwise 
Dum50  = 1 if the observation occurs during the 50 percent bonus depreciation period, and zero 
otherwise 
Foreign   = percentage of foreign assets, reported by Research Insight 
PTIt1-t2   = Sum of Pretax Income (Compustat data item #170) for Years t-1 and t-2 
PTIt3-t5   = Sum of Pretax Income (Compustat data item #170) for Years t-3, t-4, and t-5 
CYLoss   = 1 if current year pretax income (Compustat data item #170) is less than zero, and zero 
 otherwise 
ΣEcon  = a vector of macroeconomic variables, including inflation, unemployment, change in 
  gross domestic product, and housing starts, reported by Research Insight (not shown in 
  table) 
ΣQtrdum  = a vector of quarter dummies (not shown in table) 
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